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ABSTRACT
The overarching goal of this investigation was to explore how individuals
experience and respond to autobiographical memories that contradict their self-concept.
A secondary goal was to explore two potential determinants of the experience and
response to self-discrepant autobiographical memories: self-threat and narcissism.
In Study 1, 291 participants were asked to recall a time when they challenged
another person’s memory for a past event. They were then asked to describe why they
challenged the other’s recollection, among other questions. Overall, the motives
identified for challenging aligned to a considerable extent with the previously theorized
functions of autobiographical remembering. As expected, instances in which participants
admitted to challenging in order to preserve or protect their self-concept emerged.
Significant differences were observed between these self-protective challenges and other
types of challenges on several dissonance proxies, including negative emotional states,
importance of convincing the other, motivation to present a positive self-image, and
distress at disagreeing with the other. There was a tendency for women who identified
self-protective motives to have higher narcissism scores.
In Study 2, 221 participants were instructed to recall a high self-threat event (a
time when they engaged in intimate partner violence) and a low self-threat event (a time
when they acted in a kind, supportive, and/or understanding way towards a romantic
partner or date) in a counterbalanced order, and thereafter rated measures designed to
capture dissonance-reducing appraisals. As expected, the high self-threat event produced
more dissonance, as indicated by higher ratings of shame, than the low self-threat event.
Consistent with the initial prediction, participants reported lower belief in accuracy and
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indicated being more critical of their past selves than their current selves after the high
self-threat event. Regarding narcissism, shame-prone women tended to be more critical
of their past-selves than their current-selves. More nurturing and more dominant
participants showed a similar pattern of criticizing past selves. More nurturing
participants tended to show higher belief in accuracy and higher belief in occurrence after
the high self-threat event than after the low self-threat event.
Overall, experiencing and responding to self-discrepant autobiographical
memories appeared to closely resemble cognitive dissonance processes. Dissonance
activation and use of appraisals depended on perceptions of self-threat and narcissism; as
self-threat increased, dissonance increased, and appraisal use increased. The findings
have implications for the utility of cognitive dissonance processes in understanding the
experience and responses to self-discrepant autobiographical memories. The findings also
have clinical implications for the utility of appraisals in protecting the current selfconcept.
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SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
CHAPTER 1
General Introduction
This investigation seeks to understand how individuals experience and respond to
autobiographical memories, recalled by the self and/or recounted by another, that
contradict their current self-concept. The self-concept is here defined as a theory that an
individual holds about himself or herself (Rosenberg, 1989). Autobiographical memories
that are discrepant with the current self-concept are henceforth referred to as selfdiscrepant autobiographical memories.
The value of such an investigation rests in its potential to (a) arrive at a more
nuanced understanding of how the self and autobiographical memories work together to
protect and preserve one’s self-concept and to (b) inform our understanding and clinical
interventions when autobiographical memories of self-discrepant acts exacerbate
psychopathology and/or interfere with treatment (Pillemer, 2001; Rubin, Hoyle, & Boals,
2014).
Chapter 1 sets the theoretical and empirical stage for this program of study by
focusing on cognitive dissonance theory and its integration into autobiographical memory
theorizing. Building on this foundation, Chapter 2 focuses on autobiographical memory
research as it applies to incompatible recollections of past events, some of which possibly
involve dissonance. Chapter 3 focuses on dissonance-reduction strategies in the context
of autobiographical memories of intimate partner violence.
Self-Discrepant Autobiographical Memories & Cognitive Dissonance
Not all autobiographical memories are discrepant with the self-concept; although
there may be incompatible versions of a recalled past event, this incompatibility does not
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necessarily violate or conflict with one’s self-concept. The focus of this investigation,
however, is on a subset of autobiographical memories wherein the past event, as recalled
by someone else (Study 1) or as recalled by the self (Study 2), does in fact violate or
conflict with one’s self-concept. Based on Aronson’s revision of cognitive dissonance
theory (1969, 1992) as well as autobiographical memory theorizing and research
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), it is the position of this manuscript that cognitive
dissonance processes underlie the experience of self-discrepant autobiographical
memories and the ensuing responses.
Overview of cognitive dissonance theory. Festinger (1957) conceptualized
dissonance as simultaneously holding two or more inconsistent cognitions, or cognitions
and behaviours, which produce an aversive state of psychological discomfort that in turn
motivates individuals to alter their cognitions/behaviours to reduce dissonance. Aronson
(1969, 1992) revised the theory by suggesting that mere inconsistency does not
necessarily produce dissonance. Rather, he argued that a certain kind of inconsistency,
where one’s action(s) conflict with one’s self-concept, would produce the sharpest
dissonance. He further elaborated on the role of the self-concept by arguing that
individuals strive to “(a) maintain a consistent, stable, and predictable sense of self, (b)
preserve a competent sense of self, and c) preserve a morally good sense of self”
(Aronson, 1969, Aronson, 1992, p. 305). He proposed that a state of dissonance would
arise when an individual has acted or is implied by someone else to have acted in a way
that (a) is startling or “astonishing” to them (i.e., as opposed to consistent with whom
they think they are), (b) makes them feels incompetent or foolish, and (c) makes them
feel immoral, ashamed, or guilty. Otherwise stated, an implication that one is immoral,
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incompetent, inconsistent, unstable, or unpredictable threatens one’s positive self-concept
and therefore creates dissonance (Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995).1
Inherent in Aronson’s revision of cognitive dissonance theory is that individuals
have a positive self-concept and that negative information is inconsistent with this selfconcept. Swann’s (Swann, 2012; Swann & Ely, 1984; Swann & Read, 1981) selfverification theory, on the other hand, proposes that the self-concept is not always
positive. The theory predicts that when faced with negative information, an individual
with a negative self-concept might not experience dissonance because this situation
would presumably be consistent with their sense of self. This investigation draws from
Aronson’s rather than Swann’s revision because, given that the studies involve
nonclinical samples, most of the participants are expected to have a positive self-concept.
Festinger (1957) and Aronson (1969, 1992) both proposed that dissonance
reduction could be accomplished in several ways, including changing the dissonant
element(s), increasing the number of consonant element(s) (e.g., outweighing, affirming
some other valued aspect of the self-concept), or reducing the importance of the dissonant
element(s) (e.g., trivialization, rationalizing).
Applications of cognitive dissonance theory in autobiographical memory
theorizing. Cognitive dissonance theory has been incorporated into Conway’s (Conway
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) self-memory-system, one influential framework within
autobiographical memory. The self-memory-system emphasizes the reciprocal
relationship between the self and autobiographical memories (Conway & Pleydell-

1

Because self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1989),
and similar theories can arguably be subsumed under the umbrella of dissonance theory
(Aronson, 1992), they are not discussed here.
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Pearce, 2000). Of relevance to this investigation, the self-memory-system is premised on
the assumption that coherence between autobiographical memory and the self-concept
provides stability and integration, which contributes to physical and psychological health.
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) draw from Higgins’ (Higgins, Bond, Klein, &
Strauman, 1986) self-discrepancy theory to underscore the need for coherence. According
to Higgins’ theory, discrepancies in self-views produced problematic mood states, such
as sadness and fear.
Along similar lines, Conway and Pleydell-Pearce argue that a lack of coherence
(e.g., dissonance) is thought to undermine important aspects of the self-concept, and
exacerbate the emergence of psychological disorders, confabulations, and delusions.
Given the pivotal role of coherence to one’s well-being, Conway (2005) and Conway and
Pleydell-Pearce (2000) suggested that when coherence is threatened, it can be reestablished by lowering the accessibility of memories that threaten or undermine this
coherence or by substantially modifying or distorting coherence-threatening memories
prior to accessing them.
The self-memory-system contributes to this investigation in three important ways.
First, it builds on Aronson’s revised cognitive dissonance theory by proposing that
dissonance (or a lack of coherence) can arise from conflict between autobiographical
memory retrieval and the current self-concept. Second, it highlights the importance of
dissonance-reducing mechanisms to one’s physical and psychological health. Third, it
proposes ways in which dissonance can be resolved (i.e., coherence can be reestablished) by modifying, distorting, or reinterpreting coherence-threatening
autobiographical memories.
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A more recent application of cognitive dissonance theory in an autobiographical
memory context can be found in Rodriguez and Strange’s work (2015), who showed that,
after writing a counter-attitudinal essay about tuition increase, participants reported not
only being more supportive of tuition increase following the essay, but also that their preessay attitudes had also been supportive of this idea. In other words, participants
unwittingly modified aspects of their recollection of pre-essay attitudes to match their
post-essay attitudes.
Discussion of cognitive dissonance in an autobiographical memory context was
also incorporated in Scoboria, Jackson, et al., (2014), and Scoboria, Boucher, et al.,
(2015) who proposed that cognitive dissonance could result from at least a temporary
conflict between two or more salient sources of information about the occurrence,
accuracy, and/or personal importance of a remembered event. These salient yet
conflicting sources of information may involve internal cognitive processes, such as
when one’s current self-concept is inconsistent with their memory for the event, or
external social processes, such as when one receives information from someone else that
undermines their current memory for a past event.
Conclusion. Based on Aronson’s revision of dissonance theory (1969, 1992) as
well as autobiographical memory theorizing and research (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000), one can argue that cognitive dissonance processes underlie the experience of selfdiscrepant autobiographical memories and the ensuing responses. It is possible to draw a
parallel between the arousal of cognitive dissonance and ensuing responses to this
dissonance, and the arousal of self-discrepancy within an autobiographical memory
context and ensuing responses to it. This parallel holds to the extent that if dissonance

5

SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
arises when an individual’s behaviour violates their self-concept as morally good,
competent, and/or consistent/stable/predictable self (Aronson, 1969, 1992), then
dissonance should also arise when aspects of an autobiographical memory, as recalled by
someone else or as recalled by oneself, reflect a behaviour that violates one’s selfconcept. Consistent with the self-memory-system (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000),
such dissonance would threaten the coherence between autobiographical memory and the
self-concept. In response, dissonance reduction strategies should theoretically become
activated to re-establish coherence and preserve the self-concept.
The parallel between cognitive dissonance and self-discrepant autobiographical
memories also holds to the extent that, if dissonance, an aversive state of discomfort, can
be alleviated by either changing the dissonant cognitions or behaviours, increasing the
number of consonant cognitions or behaviours, or reducing the importance of the
dissonant cognitions or behaviours (Aronson, 1969, 1992; Festinger, 1957), then
dissonance produced as a result of exposure to self-discrepant autobiographical memories
can also be alleviated through comparable processes that prioritize the cognition(s)
contained within the self-concept over the recalled behaviour(s).
Autobiographical Memory-Based Appraisals as Dissonance-Reducing Mechanisms
In line with Festinger’s (1957) position that dissonance could be alleviated by
trivializing the dissonant element, dissonance between the current self-concept and
autobiographical memories may also be alleviated by trivializing aspects of that
autobiographical memory (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).
Similarities have also been drawn between Festinger’s proposal of changing the dissonant
element and the idea of reconstructing self-discrepant aspects of a conflicting
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autobiographical memory in a more self-serving manner (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009;
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In both instances, research has found that using these
memory-based mechanisms, or appraisals as they will be referred to henceforth, has a
comparable effect to dissonance-reducing mechanisms insofar as improving
psychological and physical health (Snyder & Higgins, 1988), maintaining higher selfesteem and well-being scores (Beike & Landoll, 2000), and lowering psychological
maladjustment (e.g., depression, hostility, anxiety; Alicke & Sedikides, 2009).
Those autobiographical memory-based dissonance-reducing appraisals that have
been partially empirically substantiated thus far can be roughly grouped into appraisals of
importance and appraisals of veridicality. Appraisals of importance are hypothesized to
reduce dissonance by re-evaluating either the importance of a past event (or aspects of it)
or the importance of aspects of the self. Examples include devaluing a past-self
(McFarland & Alvaro, 2000), claiming a feeling of subjective distance between past and
present selves (Ross & Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Ross, 2003), trivializing the utility of the
dissonant memory (Greve & Wentura, 2010), minimizing or justifying the dissonant
memory or aspects of it (Beike & Landoll, 2000), devaluing the dissonant memory by
recalling other events more consistent with one’s current self-concept (Beike & Landoll,
2000), and viewing the dissonant memory as closed or belonging to the past, with no
bearing on the present (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman 1990; Beike & Crone, 2008;
Beike & Landoll, 2000).
Appraisals of veridicality are hypothesized to reduce dissonance by re-evaluating
the attributions made about how much a past event is believed to have truly occurred
(belief in occurrence) and/or how accurate its recall is (belief in accuracy; Scoboria et al.,
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2014). Examples include participant-reported higher accuracy ratings for pride-inducing
memories relative to shame-inducing memories, presumably to bolster the self-concept
(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008) and participant-reported reduced belief in the
occurrence of a past negative or traumatic event because its recall might be threatening or
uncomfortable (Scoboria, Boucher, & Mazzoni, 2015). To elaborate, Scoboria and
colleagues (2015) found instances in which participants reporting lowered belief in
occurrence when retrieving potentially intrusive trauma-related memories (e.g., “I pushed
it from my mind”; “I did not want to believe that that happened.”). Echoing Festinger’s
notion of increasing consonant elements, Scoboria, Jackson, et al. (2014) also proposed
that devaluing new information and maintaining the original belief in occurrence can
arguably diminish cognitive dissonance. Disputed memories are an example of instances
when, faced with conflicting information, individuals maintain their original
autobiographical belief and defend their version of a past event (Sheen, Kemp, & Rubin,
2001).
How does motivation influence appraisals? Festinger (1957) proposed that an
aversive state of psychological discomfort motivates individuals to turn to dissonancereducing mechanisms. Aronson (1969, 1992) instead argued that it was the motive to
preserve a moral, competent, and stable sense of self that drove the use of dissonancereducing mechanisms. Along those lines, the self-memory-system (Conway & PleydellPearce, 2000) proposes that the primary role of the working self is to maintain a coherent
sense of identity by regulating the encoding, accessibility, and retrieval of memories.
According to this framework, the motivation to achieve self-coherence facilitates the
reconstruction of autobiographical memories that are consistent with one’s current self-
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concept. The framework further predicts that, when encountering dissonant and/or selfthreatening information, individuals alter, distort, reinterpret or even fabricate their
memories so as to maintain their current self-concept. Failure to do so presumably results
in delusions, confabulations, or other forms of psychosis (Conway, 2005).
In contrast to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s emphasis on self-coherence,
Sedikides and colleagues (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Green, 2004, 2009;
Sedikides & Strube, 1995) have advanced self-protection and self-enhancement as
motives that play a crucial role in memory appraisal. Reminiscent of Aronson’s work,
both these motives are rooted in the assumption that individuals view themselves
positively (e.g., competent, warm, moral, attractive, and lovable), and strive to maintain,
protect, and/or enhance this positive self-concept (Sedikides & Green, 2004).
The exact relation between self-enhancement and self-protection is the subject of
many papers. Alicke and Sedikides (2009) propose that threat perception may help
differentiate between the two. They contend that, similar to the parasympathetic nervous
system, self-enhancement is activated by relatively minor disturbances or minor threats,
and makes only slight adjustments. In contrast, similar to the sympathetic nervous
system, self-protection is activated by larger disturbances, such as challenges or threats,
and makes more radical adjustments. Self-protection should therefore be activated when
self-discrepant autobiographical memories threaten the self-concept. This inference is
compatible with Alicke and Sedikides’s suggestion that experiencing negative affect, a
presumed sign of threat to the self, preferentially activates self-protection.
In addition to threat perception, Alicke and Sedikides (2009) differentiate
between the two motives in terms of effort; whereas self-enhancement requires only
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minor effort to maintain the positivity of the self-concept, self-protection requires more
considerable effort to counter or minimize the threat. Because of this, self-protective
processes are more elaborate, more cognitively demanding, and more likely to involve
self-deception than self-enhancement processes. In fact, self-protection is presumably
expressed through various efforts at forgetting, avoidance of remembering, making
excuses to deflect blame, misremembering unfavorable information about the self, or
retreating from threatening situations, which are reminiscent of the appraisals presented
earlier. Not surprisingly, the two motives relate in predictable ways to the self-serving
bias; internalizing positive outcomes is more likely to involve self-enhancement, whereas
externalizing negative outcomes (e.g., deflecting blame) is more likely to involve selfprotection.
The predominance of self-protection versus self-coherence has also been debated.
There are a handful of studies that illustrate the emergence of appraisals under conditions
of discrepancy and/or self-threat, but the underlying motives are not fleshed out. When
Baumeister et al. (1990) examined accounts involving interpersonal conflict, they found
that narratives in which a participant had angered another person contained denial of any
lasting negative consequences, justifications, excuses, and blaming of the victim. Such a
stance was deemed indicative of self-protection, but self-coherence could not be ruled
out.
Other authors interpret their results in the context of self-coherence. For example,
Beike and Landoll (2000) manipulated motivation levels by asking participants to recall
either self-discrepant or self-consistent memories. Participants in the self-discrepant
condition made more frequent use of justification, outweighing, and closure than

10

SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
participants in the self-consistent condition. As to motive, however, they argued that selfcoherence was involved, while dedicating little attention to self-protection.
A potential compromise between self-consistency and self-protection was
suggested by McFarland and Alvaro (2000), who speculated that the two motives might
work together. They experimentally manipulated self-threat by randomly assigning
participants to describe either a severe or a mild negative event, and then instructing them
to provide current and pre-event ratings on various personal characteristics (e.g., tolerant,
mature). Even though random assignment would have ensured that pre-event ratings were
comparable between the two randomly created groups, participants describing the more
severe negative event were more critical of their pre-event selves than participants
describing the mild negative event. This derision of past selves was interpreted as
bolstering the illusion that the participant had grown and improved since the negative
event, which contributed to feelings of self-worth. This illusion of improvement
presumably alleviated the threat posed by recalling negative affective states. Crucial to
the self-coherence and self-protection debate, the illusion of improvement was
engendered by derogating the past, rather than the present attributes, presumably because
past attributes are less salient and available, and therefore easier to devalue. Extending
this argument further, it would appear that coherence with one’s current self-perception
prevented the derogation of present attributes. Self-protection, however, required that the
self be protected in some way, so the past was derogated instead.
Along those same lines, Wilson and Ross (2003) asserted that individuals strive to
maintain a coherent yet favorable self-concept. They further argued that individuals do
not always value self-coherence; at times, they show a tendency to perceive improvement
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or growth in themselves by deriding past selves, which is more aligned with the selfenhancement and self-protective motives.
Another factor to consider regarding motivation is the degree of threat. According
to Baumeister, Smart, and Boden (1996), prioritizing one motivation over another may
depend on the degree of threat to the self; self-relevant information that is somewhat
discrepant should activate a self-coherence motive, whereas self-relevant information that
is strongly discrepant should activate self-protection. They further add that the greatest
threat to the self is typically experienced by individuals possessing an unstable or inflated
self-concept, a pattern most typical among narcissists.
Sedikides and Green (2004) attempted to experimentally disentangle selfprotection from self-coherence. They selected participants with a negative and a positive
self-concept and randomly instructed them to consider trait-relevant behaviours (e.g.,
trustworthy) either while thinking of themselves or someone else. Participants’ recall of
those behaviours was tested after a brief distractor task. The authors found that even
participants with a negative self-concept (i.e., individuals who self-reported behaving in
an untrustworthy or unkind manner in the past and expected to act similarly in the future)
recalled fewer negative than positive behaviours when instructed to think of themselves.
This inferior recall of self-threatening information, regardless of the valence of one’s
self-concept, established the more dominant role of self-protection vis-à-vis selfcoherence in the context of memorial self-defense. This conclusion is, however, specific
to one mechanism through which self-protection may operate: mnemic neglect (Sedikides
& Green, 2000; 2004), which refers to shallower processing of self-threatening
information, and consequently reflected in inferior recall. Other discrepancy reduction
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strategies may operate under a predominantly different motive or circumstance.
To summarize then, some individuals may prioritize self-protection, whereas
others may prioritize self-coherence. These two motives do not necessarily contradict
each other if the self-concept is inherently positive because both self-protection and selfcoherence would motivate the individual to maintain that positivity. An issue, however,
arises when there is a negative or somewhat unfavorable self-concept, in which case it is
not clear whether self-protection (and the related desire to protect oneself from negative
evaluation) or self-coherence (and the related desire to maintain that negative selfconcept) will emerge as more dominant. The valence of the self-concept becomes
relevant when considering that a current negative self-concept may be more aligned with
a dysphoric or borderline presentation (Barry, Naus, & Rehm, 2006; Jorgensen et al.,
2012), whereas a current positive self-concept may be more aligned with an adjusted
presentation. Based on the arguments presented thus far, circumstances that create
dissonance, and in particular self-threat, should predominantly activate self-protection.
When do appraisals occur? Little is known about how we choose the manner in
which we respond to self-discrepant autobiographical memories, although dissonance
theory can make several relevant contributions in this regard. According to Festinger
(1957), the magnitude of dissonance is partially contingent upon the importance of the
elements involved; the more important, valued, or consequential the conflicting elements
are, the higher that dissonance will be. Recognizing the role of individual differences,
Aronson (1969, 1992) proposed that individuals differ in their tolerance of dissonance
and in their preference for certain dissonance reduction strategies over others. Building
on Festinger’s (1957) and Aronson’s work (1969, 1992), two constructs are discussed
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below as potential determinants of responses to self-discrepant autobiographical
memories: self-threat and narcissism. No distinction is being made as to whether these
two constructs differentially impact the magnitude of dissonance or the selection of
dissonance-reducing methods. It is likely that self-threat and narcissism are involved in
both aspects to varying degrees.
Conceptualizations of self-threat. Self-threat has been operationalized in various
ways, including experiencing failure (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & LaPrelle, 1985),
experiencing self-referent negative feelings (McFarland & Alvaro, 2000), such as shame
(Aronson, 1992; Pinto-Gouveia & Matos; 2011) or fear (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), and
experiencing negative events (e.g., death, physical assault of self, proximity to a war
zone, accident, injuries, illnesses, harassment, sexual assault; Wood & Conway, 2006).
Baumeister, Smart, and Boden (1996) defined self-threat as instances when “favorable
views about oneself are questioned, contradicted, impugned, mocked, challenged, or
otherwise put in jeopardy" (p. 8). As such, self-threat should emerge when the selfconcept is mocked, challenged, or criticized in some form. Baumeister’s
conceptualization of self-threat is in line with Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) view
that certain memories, if accessed, are threatening to the current self because they
“destabilize the goals of the working self and cast the whole system into turmoil” (p.
282).
Sedikides and colleagues (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Pinter, Green, Sedikides,
& Gregg, 2011; Sedikides & Green, 2000; 2004, 2009) advanced a self-threat model,
mnemic neglect, which, reminiscent of Aronson’s revised dissonance theory (1969),
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holds that when an individual’s positive2 self-concept is exposed to a certain kind of
feedback, there is a momentary drop in self-esteem, which is uncomfortable and
motivates the individual to reduce or alleviate the discomfort. According to Sedikides, the
feedback produces dissonance if it (a) is negative or inconsistent with the self-concept,
(b) is central to aspects of the self-concept (as opposed to peripheral), and (c) is indicative
of a central trait (e.g., the trait of trustworthiness vis-à-vis the indicative behaviour of
using a roommate’s toothpaste without permission. To the extent that that individual
holds trustworthiness in high regard, the feedback involving stealing toothpaste is
perceived as threatening). More recent iterations of Sedikides’ mnemic neglect model
regard feedback as threatening if it (a) involves the self (is about oneself, not someone
else), (b) it contains negative implications (entails criticism, not flattery), and (c) it
pertains to central personality traits (traits deemed certain, descriptive, and important
aspects of the self; Pinter, Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2011; Sedikides & Green, 2009).
Relation of self-threat to dissonance and appraisals. In a large meta-analytic
review, Campbell and Sedikides (1999) found that individuals appraise (or make self-

2

Because Sedikides and colleagues (2000, 2004) assume that the self-concept is
inherently positive, only negative behavioural feedback creates dissonance. Others
concede that the self-concept may be negative (e.g., Barry, Naus, & Rehm, 2006;
Jorgensen et al., 2012), in which case, dissonance would arise when the behavioural
feedback is unexpected and inconsistent, meaning in this case, positive (Aronson, 1969).
In contrast to self-consistency proponents, self-enhancement and self-protection
proponents predict that negative behavioural feedback is undesirable under any
circumstance (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Green, 2004, 2009; Sedikides &
Strube, 1995). This investigation will not debate the merits of either side. Rather, I
assume that most individuals have a positive self-concept, particularly in a nonclinical
sample, and acknowledge that both self-consistency proponents and self-enhancement
proponents make similar predictions as to how an individual with a positive self-concept
reacts to negative behavioural feedback; he/she seeks to protect and/or preserve the
positivity of the self-concept as someone moral, competent, and predictable (Aronson,
1992; Sedikides & Green, 2004).
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serving attributions, as they refer to them) to protect their self-concept. This process, they
argued, depends on the level of threat to the self-concept; the greater the perceived selfthreat, the more self-serving and externalized, rather than internalized, the attributions
become. In other words, appraisals become more external and possibly more removed
from reality as the level of perceived self-threat grows. Applying Sedikides’
conceptualization of self-threat (Pinter, Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2011; Sedikides &
Green, 2009), appraisals should be most apparent when the feedback is directed at the
individual themselves (rather than it being about a third party), contains negative
implications for that individual, and involves central personality traits of that individual.
Given the functional similarity between dissonance-reducing appraisals and ego
defenses, ego defenses become a useful lens through which to discuss and understand
appraisals. Consistent with Campbell and Sedikides (1999), the notion that appraisal
selection is contingent upon self-threat perception also emerges in the context of ego
defenses, where it has been argued that the greater the self-threat, the more self-deceit is
required to mitigate that threat, and ego defenses arise to facilitate this self-deceit and
preserve the self-concept (Baumeister, 1986). According to Baumeister (1996) and Greve
and Wentura, (2010), defenses requiring the most self-deceit involve an absolute
rejection of threatening self-referent information, as is the case of “rejecting” or
“avoidant” defenses. On the other hand, defenses requiring comparatively less self-deceit
involve attempts at negotiating reality rather than an absolute rejection. It would therefore
appear that ego defenses become more rejecting of reality and more removed from that
reality when self-threat increases. In such cases, more self-deceit is required to preserve
the current self-concept. Along those lines, it is possible that dissonance may increase

16

SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
and/or appraisals may become increasingly more rejecting of reality as self-threat
increases.
A related yet slightly different perspective on ego defenses is offered by Vaillant
(1994, 2011), who ranked ego defenses to reflect decreasing levels of psychopathology
and increasing levels of personality maturation. According to Vaillant (1994, 2011), ego
defenses could range from psychotic defenses involving denial and/or reality distortion
(e.g., delusional projection, psychotic denial), to immature defenses (e.g., acting out,
passive aggression, dissociation, projection), to neurotic defenses (e.g., rationalization,
displacement), to mature defenses (e.g., sublimation, humour), the latter deemed
beneficial to psychological health and well-being. Based on this hierarchy, the less
mature someone’s personality is, the more likely they would be to select a psychotic or
immature defense to preserve the self-concept.
Cumulatively, the work presented in this section suggests that the magnitude of
self-threat proportionally impacts the magnitude of dissonance and likely also influences
appraisal selection––the response chosen to reduce dissonance. Echoing Vaillant’s
hierarchy (1994, 2011), the role of personality maturation in dissonance arousal and
appraisal selection has received some attention in the context of narcissism, and this will
be explored in greater detail in the next section.
Conceptualizations of narcissism. The interpersonal circumplex is widely used to
conceptualize interpersonal behaviours and traits as existing along two orthogonal
dimensions: dominance and nurturance (Wiggins, 1995). Dominance, alternatively
referred to as status, power, worth, and self-esteem, is related to a deeply held belief that
one is worthy of respect from significant others. Nurturance, alternatively referred to as
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security, love, intimacy, affiliation, and integration, is related to the deeply held belief
that one is a loved individual who can enter in intimate and lasting relationships with
significant others. Because of its interpersonal components and its useful organization of
traits along two orthogonal dimensions, the interpersonal circumplex represents a
valuable, efficient, and theory-driven way in which to assess the presence of certain
dispositional tendencies and estimate the intensity with which each disposition is
expressed (Wiggins, 1995).
Narcissism is of particular interest to this investigation because of its relationship
to self-esteem and sensitivity to perceived self-threat (APA, 2012). Most theorists suggest
that narcissistic traits range on a continuum from normal to pathological, with the
pathological expression being more prevalent in a clinical sample and the normal
expression being more prevalent in a nonclinical sample (Pincus et al., 2009). The normal
expression of narcissism is widely viewed as adaptive and corresponds to greater
assertiveness, agency, as well as having positive illusions towards the self while
minimizing any information that reflects negatively on the self (Morf & Rhodewalt,
2001). When mapped onto the circumplex, features of normal narcissism tended to
cluster around the Domineering octant (Inventory of Interpersonal Problems; Pincus et
al., 2009). The pathological expression of narcissism is widely viewed as maladaptive
and corresponds to greater aggression, hostility, manipulation, deception, and is further
characterized by a dominant and antagonistic interpersonal style, greater striving towards
self-enhancement and greater resistance and reactivity to feedback that is inconsistent
with the self-concept (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Pincus et al., 2009). When mapped onto
the circumplex, the more pathological aspects of narcissism tend to cluster around the
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Vindictive, Domineering, and Intrusive octants of the Inventory of Interpersonal
Problems (Pincus et al., 2009).
The more pathological aspects of narcissism have also been studied in terms of
two distinct dimensions: grandiose narcissism, characterized by deceitfulness, envy,
aggression, lack of empathy, and interpersonal exploitativeness, and vulnerable
narcissism, characterized by distrust, hostility, negative emotions, social avoidance to
cope with threats to the self, and interpersonal coldness (Pincus & Lukowitsky, 2010;
Pincus et al., 2009). Whereas both dimensions overlap in their antagonistic interpersonal
style, vulnerable narcissism appears to be more prevalent among individuals with
problematic attachment styles, childhood abuse/neglect, and negative emotionality (e.g.,
shame, helplessness, emptiness, low self-esteem; Pincus et al., 2009).
When mapped on the circumplex, vulnerable narcissism was most positively
related to the Cold-Hearted and Aloof-Introverted Interpersonal Adjective Scales
(Interpersonal Adjective Scales; Wiggins, 1995) octants (Miller et al., 2012), whereas
grandiose narcissism was most positively related to the Assured-Dominant, ArrogantCalculating, and Cold-Hearted (Miller et al., 2012; Pincus et al., 2009) Interpersonal
Adjective Scales octants. Using the Interpersonal Adjective Scales and the Inventory of
Interpersonal Problems together, Miller and colleagues were able to further minimize the
overlap between grandiose and vulnerable narcissism; they found that features of
grandiose narcissism fell between the Assured-Dominant and the Arrogant-Calculating
octants, whereas features of vulnerable narcissism fell along the Cold-Hearted octant.
Relation of narcissism to dissonance and appraisals. According to the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM–5; American
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Psychiatric Association, 2013), individuals with narcissistic traits possess an inflated yet
fragile sense of self-esteem and react to perceived slights or criticism with rage, hostility,
and/or aggression so as to protect the self (Baumeister et al., 1996; Campbell, Reeder,
Sedikides, & Elliot, 2000; Pincus et al., 2009). Not surprisingly, narcissists are more
motivated to protect their self-esteem than non-narcissists (Campbell et al., 2009; Morf &
Rhodewalt, 1993; Pincus et al., 2009; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998). This protection may
involve reappraising negative aspects of self, distorting disconfirming external
information (in the case of grandiose narcissism; Pincus & Lukowitsky, 2010), and
memory distortion. Rhodewalt and Eddings (2002) found that, in response to being
romantically rejected by a female confederate, highly narcissistic men recalled their
dating history in more successful terms (e.g., they claimed to usually have a girlfriend,
usually date more than one girlfriend), than they had originally reported. This biased
recall was the opposite of the pattern observed among less narcissistic individuals, who
recalled their dating history in less successful terms when rejected. Similarly, Campbell
and colleagues (2000) found that narcissists demonstrated greater self-serving bias
relative to non-narcissists.
Taken together, narcissistic individuals, who are typically sensitive to self-esteem
threats, may experience even more dissonance than less narcissistic individuals. They
may also select appraisals differently from others, such as opting for mechanisms that
absolutely reject reality rather than negotiate it, as discussed in the previous section.
Narcissism and self-threat. Earlier iterations of the mnemic neglect model
(Sedikides & Green, 2000, 2004, 2009) underscored the importance of personality in
proposing that feedback would be threatening and produce dissonance only when it
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violates central personality traits. Despite the inherent importance of personality,
however, Sedikides and Green do not propose specific personality dimensions that may
be related to self-threat.
A meta-analytic review on the self-serving bias (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999)
found that several individual differences, such as locus of control or self-esteem,
modulated experiences of self-threat, which in turn contributed to differences in selfserving appraisals. Specifically, the authors found that individuals possessing an
achievement orientation, high self-esteem, and an external locus of control, as well as
narcissistic individuals, were more likely to feel threatened and thereafter manifested
greater self-serving bias (i.e., appraisals) than their peers. In other words, those with a
stable and positive self-concept as well as those with a fragile self-concept experienced
greater self-threat and greater dissonance than their peers.
Cumulatively, these studies suggest that self-threat is a multifaceted construct that
is at least in part modulated by personality traits. In particular, individuals with
narcissistic traits may experience the most self-threat and the greatest dissonance.
Section conclusion. Dissonance arousal and appraisal-selection may in part be
guided by self-threat and personality traits, such as narcissism. In the case of narcissism
and self-threat, the two factors could combine as follows: a highly narcissistic individual
is likely to perceive threat more intensely than a less narcissistic individual (APA, 2013;
Baumeister et al., 1996; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Rhodewalt & Eddings, 2002) and
subsequently respond to this threat to a greater extent than a less narcissistic individual,
such as by devaluing the importance of a self-discrepant autobiographical memory more
than their peers.

21

SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
Chapter 1 Summary
Anchored in cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; Aronson, 1969, 1992)
and autobiographical memory research and theorizing (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000), the overarching goal of this investigation was to gain a more nuanced
understanding of how individuals experience and respond to past acts that are discrepant
with their self-concept, with a focus on arguably protective appraisals of importance and
appraisals of veridicality. Because dissonance arousal and appraisal selection are
contingent on several factors, self-threat and narcissism will also be explored as a
secondary focus. This research program was designed as two studies. Study 1 took an
interpersonal focus by exploring why individuals challenge another’s recollection of a
past event that is incompatible with theirs. Study 2 took an intrapersonal focus by
exploring how individuals appraise an autobiographical event that is presumably shame
inducing and arguably dissonant with their positive self-concept.
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CHAPTER 2
Introduction to Study 1
Study 1 sought to explore why individuals challenge another’s recollection of an
autobiographical memory that may be incompatible with their own recollection and in
some cases, arguably dissonant with their self-concept. Those particular instances, where
the recollection of past act(s) as recounted by another person violates one’s self-concept
as moral, competent, and/or stable and predictable (Aronson, 1969, 1992; see Chapter 1
for more detail), are referred to as self-discrepant autobiographical memories throughout
this manuscript. Experiences of this kind of dissonance, where self-discrepant
autobiographical memories are involved, are expected to be distinct from non-selfdiscrepant autobiographical memories.
Study 1 takes an interpersonal approach to answering how individuals experience
and respond to possibly incompatible recollections and in particular, self-discrepant
autobiographical memories. This approach was chosen because: (a) challenging another’s
recollection of a past autobiographical memory arguably produces conditions under
which cognitive dissonance and dissonance reduction mechanisms might emerge, (b)
challenging another’s recollection of a past event seems to be common and should
therefore be something that most individuals have prior experience with and can provide
examples of, and (c) the current state of autobiographical memory research appears ripe
for such a development.
In the following sections, the groundwork laid by Hirst and colleagues (Cuc,
Ozuru, Manier, & Hirst, 2006; Hirst & Echteroff, 2012; Muller & Hirst, 2014), who have
studied factors implicated in the social sharing of memories, is reviewed. This work is
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presented in order to better understand the interpersonal context and related reasons
around the choice to challenge another person’s recollection. The second part of this
review focuses on the contributions that the autobiographical memory literature makes to
this investigation regarding potential reasons for challenging. The final part of this review
focuses on self-discrepant autobiographical memories and related appraisals. The
literature review is followed by the presentation of the study hypotheses and design,
before finally turning to the results and discussion.
The Social Context of Challenges
A series of studies conducted by Hirst and colleagues have demonstrated that the
very act of conversing can reshape memories such that subsequent memories become a
blend of details encoded originally and conversations had between the initial encoding
and subsequent acts of remembering (Cuc, Ozuru, Manier, & Hirst, 2006; Hirst &
Echteroff, 2012; Muller & Hirst, 2014). In the course of an amiable conversation or a
dispute, the speaker may intentionally or unintentionally offer new and/or misleading
information, which could become incorporated into the listener’s memory (or both their
memories, depending on the context) thus altering the memory content and potentially
modifying how that memory is thereafter appraised. This is not an exhaustive explanation
of how social sharing can alter memories; examples of other processes include memory
appropriation whereby another’s memory is claimed as one’s own (Brown, Caderao,
Fields, & Marsh, 2015), and selectively retelling certain details of a memory while
omitting other details (Stone, Corman, Brown, Koppel, & Hirst, 2012). These studies
cumulatively demonstrate that memories can be revised within a social context, that
revisions can be made in the course of challenges, as well as friendlier conversations, and
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that such revisions are actually a frequent and normal part of individuals’ lives.
Challenging another’s memory may be regarded as a form of social influence, and
even, as some have discussed, an attempt at persuasion (Nash, Wheeler, & Hope, 2015).
In line with Nash and colleagues (2015), one could argue that examining instances in
which an individual challenges another’s memory bridges the gap between the social and
cognitive literatures by embedding aspects of persuasion into memory appraisals. Such
attempts add to a small but steadily accumulating line of research that seeks to examine
the effects of socially targeting (and arguably persuading against) belief in occurrence
(e.g., Scoboria et al., 2014; see next section for a more detailed treatment of this
argument).
Challenges could theoretically be subject to the same social dynamics as would be
involved in other forms of social communication. Based on Hirst and Echteroff’s review
(2012), the extent to which one individual can influence another’s memory depends on
several variables, including perceptions of expertise, perceptions of power, and
personality characteristics. For example, perceiving the speaker as an expert or as more
dominant can heighten the impact the speaker has on altering a socially remembered but
unshared (as in, not being held by all conversational participants) memory (Brown,
Coman, & Hirst, 2009; Cuc et al., 2006). As another example, Wright, London, and
Waechter (2010) demonstrated that listeners who are fearful of negative evaluation are
more susceptible to conforming to a speaker’s account. Similarly, a dominant speaker
may have a substantial impact on others’ memories. Cuc and colleagues (2006) asked
participants to study and recall stories first individually (i.e., pre-group), then in-group,
and then individually again (i.e., post-group). They found that post-group accounts
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contained a substantial number of details found in the pre-group account of the dominant
speaker (i.e., a participant that spoke the most and dominated the in-group discussion).
This scenario has a more adversarial analog in the false confessions literature, where a
police interrogator, perceived as having the greater power, can persuade an innocent
individual through implicit or explicit promises, threats, and/or implications of harsh
treatment to comply with accusations and even to believe that they have committed a
crime (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004).
Taken together, these studies suggest that challenging of memories can occur in
various contexts, including social remembering of jointly experienced memories (i.e.,
reminiscing), persuasion, and disputes. Research in this area is starting to recognize the
influence of social dynamics, such as the dominance of certain speakers (Cuc et al., 2006)
in how and why memorial challenges unfold. The present investigation builds on this
foundation by considering the various social dynamics involved in challenging, such as
aspects of personality (e.g., trait dominance, narcissism).
Challenges within the Autobiographical Memory Literature
In this next section, several areas of autobiographical memory literature are
reviewed for the purpose of informing predictions about reasons for challenging
another’s recollection. To this end, only lines of autobiographical memory inquiry that
approximate or closely parallel social challenges are presented.
Social influence and remembering. Although not explicitly formulated in terms
of a challenge, instances in which social input contradicts one’s memory have already
been investigated within the autobiographical memory literature. Sometimes, a lack of
memory is challenged (e.g., false memory studies or false confessions), and other times,
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the occurrence of and/or details within an existing memory are challenged (e.g.,
misinformation, nonbelieved memories, contested memories). Examples of challenges
are found in literatures on memory suggestions for entire events that are delivered via
hypnosis (Sheehan, Statham, & Jamieson, 1991) or dream interpretation (Mazzoni,
Lombardo, Malvagia, & Loftus, 1999). Other instances of challenges involve the use of
more cognitively based techniques, like enhancing the plausibility of suggestions
(Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001) to increase the belief that a past event in fact occurred
even if it cannot be recalled (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002). To illustrate, Scoboria, Wysman,
and Otgaar (2012) challenged participants’ recollection and attributions about whether
certain childhood events genuinely occurred by providing them with “assurances” from
their parents that such events did in fact happen. They found that the manipulation (i.e.,
confirmatory evidence from a trustworthy source, the parents) led to higher ratings of
belief in occurrence—a belief that the event truly occurred to the self (Scoboria et al.,
2012).
The finding that credible suggestions are effective at increasing the belief in the
occurrence of a false autobiographical event dovetails nicely with prior findings that the
perceived expertise and therefore trustworthiness of the speaker increases the likelihood
that the information they deliver will be accepted by the listener and integrated into the
listener’s subsequent recalls (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012). This work, alongside Cuc et al.’s
(2006) finding regarding the influence of a speaker’s dominance, implies that
dispositional qualities may be another reason for challenging others’ memories. For
instance, it is conceivable that the speaker’s own confidence in their memory ability may
be a reason to challenge someone else’s (e.g., “I challenge your recollection because I am
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confident that I am right” or “I am sure of my memory and things did not happen the way
you describe them”). Alternatively, they could be challenging because the challenger
views himself/herself as someone who is dominant in interpersonal contexts.
Nonbelieved memories. Another line of inquiry that explores the experience of
having a current, vivid memory challenged by another person is the literature on
nonbelieved memories. Nonbelieved memories involve the vivid recollection of an
autobiographical event despite reduced or relinquished belief that the event genuinely
occurred to the self (Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010; Otgaar, Scoboria & Mazzoni,
2014). More generally, nonbelieved memories tend to originate when a currently vivid
autobiographical memory is contradicted by novel evidence. Such evidence is often, but
not exclusively, provided in a social context. Most relevant to this investigation,
nonbelieved memories may originate from someone disputing or challenging the
occurrence of a past event (e.g., stating that the event did not occur, that the event was
impossible) and/or its accuracy (e.g., that the event happened differently). In turn, such
challenges contribute to reducing or even relinquishing belief that the event occurred to
the self, despite the continued presence of vivid recollection (Scoboria et al., 2015).
Several of the reasons for reducing or relinquishing autobiographical belief originally
reported in Scoboria et al. (2015) may also emerge in the present investigation. For
example, the challenger may dispute the other’s memory by suggesting that an alternative
source affected memory (e.g., “your memory came from a dream”), or the challenger
might dispute the other’s memory by appealing to assumptions about general memory
ability at a young age (e.g., “you were a child! Your imagination was running wild
then”). Furthermore, appealing to these meta-memory beliefs and/or suggesting alternate
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attributions could arguably be used with the underlying intent of trivializing the validity
of the other’s recollection.
Disputed memories. The methodology employed by Sheen and colleagues
(2001), in which disputed memories are contested in real time, arguably offers the closest
analogy to date of instances when an individual challenges another’s version of events. In
those instances, two individuals agree on most of the details regarding what happened,
but disagree on who the protagonist is. In the course of this disagreement, both sides try
to defend their belief that a past event occurred to them (e.g., two girls arguing over
which of them was sent home from school for wearing a skirt that was too short; Ikier,
Tekcan, Gulgoz, & Kuntay, 2003; Sheen et al., 2001). Sheen’s work suggests that
individuals may be motivated to challenge in order to preserve ownership of a past event
they view as belonging to them.
Another relevant finding emerging out of the disputed memories literature is
perceived importance, which is regarded as an appraisal that is made about an event in
the current investigation. Sheen and colleagues (2001) speculated that the higher
importance ratings associated with the disputed memories in their study (relative to
shared-but-not-disputed memories) could have been attributable to the participant’s
attempts at convincing themselves, the other twin/sibling, or the interviewer that the
disputed memory was indeed theirs. In contrast, the methodology employed by Ikier and
colleagues (2003), where sets of twins or siblings were interviewed separately and were
instructed to provide disputed memories, personal memories, and memories that were
clearly experienced by the other twin/sibling, did not produce higher ratings of perceived
importance. Imagery ratings were also inconsistent across the two studies; the Sheen
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study reported higher imagery ratings (hearing, seeing, etc.) but not Ikier and colleagues
(2003), who reported lower imagery ratings for disputed memories as compared with
personal memories. These inconsistent finding might be reconciled as follows. First, the
Sheen et al. (2001) methodology could arguably have mimicked the dynamics of social
challenges to a greater extent than the Ikier et al. methodology. These circumstances
might have led to heightened attempts at defending one’s memory, which could have
produced higher perceived importance ratings and higher imagery ratings. Second,
because the equivalence of the comparison memories between the two studies could not
be established (i.e., shared-but-not-disputed memories vs. personal memories and
memories of others), it is plausible that some disputed memories hold greater importance
than others. As further evidence of this argument, Sheen and colleagues (2006) found that
childhood memories of achievement and misfortune were more likely to be appropriated,
whereas childhood memories of wrongdoing were more likely to be disowned. The selfserving motives apparent in these disputed memories imply that a desire to protect
oneself from being perceived in a negative light is an important consideration in choosing
to challenge another’s memory.
Borrowed memories. Borrowed memories involve intentionally or
unintentionally appropriating past events or details of past events from others and telling
them as our own (Brown et al., 2015). Such memories are relevant to this investigation
because Brown and colleagues (2015) found that intentionally borrowing others’ personal
memories was most frequently motivated by a desire to enhance oneself (e.g., “I find the
story engaging and interesting, and would love it to be a part of my life”). This desire
appeared to reflect a self-enhancement motive consistent with the self-serving pattern
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observed in the disputed memories literature. In relation to the current investigation, selfenhancement may be another reason to challenge another’s version of events.
Memory verification. Closely related to the work on nonbelieved memories is
the small literature on memory verification, which has shown that individuals report that
they would rely on others (e.g., parents, siblings) as well as nonsocial external evidence
(e.g., photographs, videos, receipts) to validate the occurrence of a past event (Nash &
Takarangi, 2011; Wade, Nash, & Garry, 2014). In Wade et al. (2014), participants were
asked to describe how they would verify a vivid autobiographical memory if someone
else told them that the event “never happened.” Results showed that in these hypothetical
challenging scenarios, participants tended to consider both cost (i.e., money, time,
energy, effort, labor, and aggravation) and reliability (i.e., indisputable, trustworthy, and
accurate information) in choosing strategies like asking a family member or searching for
physical evidence to verify their autobiographical memories. It was further concluded
that participants sought social input (e.g., asking family members, friends) because they
regarded it as providing an optimal balance between reliability and cost to access. In a
more recent publication, Wade, Nash, Garry and Adelman (2017) showed that
participants consistently prioritized cheap-and-easy (i.e., minimal cost, effort, time, and
money) over reliable strategies for verifying autobiographical events. Of relevance to this
investigation, the work of Wade, Nash and colleagues demonstrates that challenges may
occur because individuals may wish to verify details about an autobiographical memory.
Similarly, individuals may also challenge to assist someone else with verifying or
confirming details about a shared past event (i.e., Sheen, Kemp, & Rubin, 2001, 2006).
Functions of autobiographical remembering. That individuals may challenge
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another’s recollection to verify their own recollection is also echoed in Pillemer’s work.
Pillemer (1992) argued that sharing autobiographical memories serves a social function
in facilitating the development, maintenance, and strengthening of interpersonal
interactions. This notion has also been discussed by others who found that sharing past
personal events served to connect with others (Webster, 2003), elicit or provide empathy
from others (Alea & Bluck, 2003; Bluck, 2003), teach, inform, and reminisce (Webster,
2003). This social function is also reflected in Fivush’s (2012) work on parental
reminiscing; in these instances, parents, through what could be construed as challenges,
help their children scaffold and make sense of their narratives. Similar motives involving
helping someone else make sense of their narrative, teaching, informing, providing
support, entertaining, and/or reminiscing may also emerge in the present investigation.
Pillemer (2003) also viewed autobiographical remembering as serving a directive
function whereby recalling past events assists with describing problems, solving
problems, making plans, and generally guiding future behaviours. As an example, he
proposed that memories of traumatic events could serve a directive function in reminding
the individual about which situations are safe and which ones must be avoided (Pillemer,
2003). A note of caution here that this example is not meant to imply any blame towards
the victim of a traumatic event. Rather, Pillemer appears to discuss more general operant
conditioning processes whereby situations that have caused pain in the past are avoided,
and memories of such painful events may assist with this very avoidance.
In a more recent study, Biondolillo and Pillemer (2015) demonstrated that
recalling a specific exercise episode produced higher subsequent exercise activity. It is
therefore possible that challenges examined in this investigation could also be motivated
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by similarly instrumental functions – describe problems, solve problems, motivate
change, and/or ensure that certain outcomes occur in lieu of others.
According to Pillemer (2001) and later Conway (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000), Bluck, and colleagues (Bluck, 2003; Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005;
Wilson & Ross, 2003), autobiographical remembering also serves a self function,
meaning that past autobiographical memories are retrieved to help maintain and
consolidate a sense of identity over time, a sense of “I.” In other words, memories are
recalled that are coherent with one’s self-concept and that offer a sense of continuity of
self over time. When recalled memories are not coherent with the self-concept, they risk
creating instability and psychological discomfort (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000),
which, in line with Aronson’s (1969, 1992) revision of cognitive theory, would produce
an impetus to reduce the discomfort. In the context of challenges, shared memories may
be recounted that create dissonance for the individual because aspects of the recollection
may conflict with their self-concept. It is therefore conceivable that one may challenge
another’s recollection of a shared past event to preserve the self-concept as a moral,
competent, stable, and predictable individual (Aronson, 1969, 1992).
Section conclusion. The literature reviewed in this section suggests several
reasons for an individual choosing to challenge another’s recollection of a past shared
event including self motives (e.g., dispositional qualities, belief in superiority of one’s
own memory or the inferiority of the other’s memory, preserve memory ownership, selfenhance), social motives (e.g., teach, inform, provide support, entertain, reminisce), and
directive motives (e.g., solve problems, plan). More central to this investigation, one
reason to challenge could also be to preserve the self-concept as a moral, competent,
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stable, and predictable individual (Aronson, 1969, 1992; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000).
Self-Discrepant Autobiographical Memories and Cognitive Dissonance
Beyond exploring why individuals challenge another’s recollection of a past
shared event, the current study sought to examine challenges in response to selfdiscrepant autobiographical memories. A key assumption of this study is that selfdiscrepant autobiographical memories and responses to them unfold in the same manner
as cognitive dissonance processes. This assumption is made on the basis of Aronson’s
(1969, 1992) revised cognitive dissonance theory and Conway’s self-memory-system
(2000). I draw on Swann’s (Swann, 2012; Swann & Ely, 1984; Swann & Read, 1981)
self-verification theory to argue that dissonant information provided by another
individual can also conflict with one’s self-concept and cause dissonance.
Aronson’s (1969, 1992) revision of cognitive dissonance theory predicts that
dissonance arises when an individual’s behaviour violates their own self-concept as a
moral, competent, stable, and predictable individual. Dissonance-reduction then centers
on preserving or re-establishing the self-concept as moral, competent, stable, and
predictable. Conway’s self-memory-system (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) further
emphasizes the value of having a self-concept that is supported by one’s autobiographical
memories. This notion of coherence between one’s self-concept and one’s
autobiographical memories suggests that if autobiographical memories conflict with the
current self-concept, they could create processes similar to dissonance. Beike and Landoll
(2000) advanced a similar argument when proposing that the unpleasant autobiographical
memories they asked participants to recall were comparable to the dissonant element in
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cognitive dissonance terms.
Other theories arguably contained within the larger umbrella of cognitive
dissonance theory, like self-verification theory (Swann & Read, 1981), have also
expanded on how dissonance may occur and how it can be reduced, especially when the
dissonant information comes from another individual, which is the case in Study 1.
According to Swann and his colleagues (Swann, 2012; Swann & Ely, 1984; Swann &
Read, 1981), dissonance may be resolved by (a) confronting the person providing the
dissonant feedback with a view to correcting their mistaken impression, (b) ignoring and
forgetting the dissonant information, or (c) avoiding the source of dissonant information
altogether. I build on these theories by arguing that autobiographical memories, as
recalled by another individual, could conflict with one’s self-concept as moral,
competent, and/or stable and predictable, and elicit dissonance, which is then resolved by
confronting, ignoring, or avoiding. This argument is consistent with Scoboria, Boucher,
and Mazzoni, (2015), who similarly proposed that cognitive dissonance might result from
social processes, such as when one receives information from someone else that
undermines their current memory for a past event.
Aspects of cognitive dissonance theory, as conceptualized by Aronson (1969,
1992) and contextualized within autobiographical memory theorizing by Conway
(Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), have been applied to a handful of
empirical investigations elaborated upon in the next section. For ease of presentation,
these findings are grouped into appraisals of importance, wherein the dissonancereducing strategies involve re-evaluating the importance of the memory (or aspects of it)
or the importance of past self, and appraisals of veridicality, wherein the dissonance-
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reducing strategies involve re-evaluating the belief in the occurrence and/or accuracy of
an autobiographical memory.
Appraisals of importance. Reappraisals of the importance of events may serve to
reduce dissonance by re-evaluating and devaluing the importance of a past event (or
aspects of it) or the importance of aspects of the self. In a series of experiments, Beike
and Landoll (2000) asked undergraduate male and female participants to recall
autobiographical memories that were either pleasant (indicative of strength and
independence) or unpleasant (indicative of weakness and dependence). They then asked
participants to compare the chosen autobiographical memory to the present lifetime
period in order to draw attention to any discrepancies with the participant’s current sense
of self. Finally, they directed participants to engage in various dissonance-reducing
strategies, such as making causal attributions about the autobiographical memory in
question (i.e., how much of the autobiographical memory was caused by themselves and
how much of it was caused by other external factors), and rate the degree of perceived
closure achieved on the autobiographical memory in question. Beike and Landoll found
that participants who recalled unpleasant and arguably self-discrepant autobiographical
memories were more likely to reappraise the event as closed or to justify its occurrence
than participants who recalled pleasant autobiographical memories. In other words,
compared to memories indicative of strength and independence, participants responded to
the retrieval of memories indicative of weakness and dependence by reappraising them.
Beike and Landoll did not report any gender differences, although their samples were
composed primarily of female undergraduates.
Comparable findings emerged from Sheen and colleagues (2006), who found that
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childhood memories of achievement and misfortune were more likely to be appropriated,
whereas childhood memories of wrongdoing were more likely to be disowned.
A similar intention to distance the self from unpleasant autobiographical
memories, possibly because they cast a negative perception of the self, also emerged
from the work of Baumeister, Stillwell, and Wotman (1990), who asked undergraduates
(unspecified gender composition) to provide both perpetrator and victim autobiographical
memories about angering someone else or being angered by someone else, respectively.
The authors found that perpetrator-autobiographical memories tended to contain denial of
any lasting negative consequences, justifications as to why their actions may have been
reasonable or even legitimate, mitigating circumstances, partially or entirely blaming the
victim, and claims that the incident was impulsive, could not be helped, or was
uncharacteristic of them and had little to do with the present. In contrast, victimautobiographical memories tended to contain references to lasting negative consequences,
long-term relationship damage, enduring anger, and self-blame.
As another example of reappraising event importance, McFarland and Alvaro
(2000) randomly assigned male and female undergraduates to describe either a severe or
a mild negative autobiographical memory, and then instructed them to provide current
and pre-event ratings on various dispositional attributes (e.g., tolerant, mature). Even
though random assignment would have ensured that pre-event ratings were comparable
between the two groups, participants describing the more severe autobiographical
memory were more critical of their pre-event selves (e.g., rated themselves as less
tolerant, less mature) than participants describing the mild negative autobiographical
memory. According to McFarland and Alvaro, and consistent with cognitive dissonance
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theory, recalling a severe autobiographical memory likely created distress; this distress
was reduced by belittling past selves, which in turn bolstered the illusion of personal
growth (e.g., “I was less mature back then but I am much more mature now”). The
manipulation was repeated with participants asked to visualize and describe either a
pleasant autobiographical memory or a negative and unpleasant autobiographical
memory (an event that lowered your self-esteem and made you feel bad about yourself).
The authors again found that participants who had described a negative and unpleasant
autobiographical memory demonstrated more belittling or were more critical towards
their past selves than those who had described a pleasant autobiographical memory.
McFarland and Alvaro do not investigate or report on any gender differences in their
sample.
Ross and Wilson (2002) built on the findings of McFarland and Alvaro (2000) by
investigating individuals’ subjective sense of distance—a feeling of subjective temporal
distance from an event regardless of how long ago it actually occurred. The authors
concluded that participants self-identifying as socially unsuccessful during the last year
of high school tended to feel subjectively more distant from their high school self than
participants self-identifying as socially successful. They replicated these findings in a
second study, where they found that male and female undergraduate students reported
subjectively feeling more distant from embarrassing autobiographical memories (e.g.,
events where you said or did something foolish) than proud autobiographical memories
(e.g., special achievement or kind act). In addition to subjective temporal distance, there
was also a change in the single-item rating of personal importance; participants rated
proud autobiographical memories as more important to them than embarrassing
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autobiographical memories, a finding also echoed in D’Argembeau and Van der Linden’s
(2008) study. Ross and Wilson (2002) further observed that, although past
autobiographical memories were overall rated as less important, ratings of importance
showed steeper decline for embarrassing autobiographical memories than for proud
autobiographical memories, possibly because proud autobiographical memories were
viewed as having relatively longer impact. Ross and Wilson did not find any gender
differences in their study.
This brief literature review demonstrates that reappraising the importance of an
event may involve, among other things, devaluing an autobiographical memory by
claiming that it is closed (no longer connected to the present), it is less important, or that
it feels more temporally distant. Alternatively, the reappraisal process may take the form
of belittling or devaluing aspects of a past self. Consequently, reappraisals of importance
were expected to emerge through lower self-reported ratings of event importance.
Appraisals of veridicality. Appraisals of veridicality are hypothesized to reduce
dissonance by re-evaluating the attributions made about how much a past event is
believed to have truly occurred (belief in occurrence) and/or how accurate its recall is
(belief in accuracy; Scoboria et al., 2014). Although not initially conceptualized as posthoc memory appraisals, belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy can arguably function
to reduce dissonance.
That belief in occurrence may be altered to reduce dissonance and protect the self
from discomfort was first discussed in Scoboria, Jackson, et al. (2014). It was elaborated
by Scoboria and colleagues (2015), who documented instances in which participants
reported successful altering of belief in occurrence when potentially intrusive trauma-
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related memories were involved. In other words, unwanted or dissonant autobiographical
memories may be accompanied by comparatively lower belief in occurrence ratings as a
way to resolve or reduce dissonance.
Self-reported changes in belief that the event is real may also serve to reduce
dissonance. D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008) asked male and female community
volunteers to recall both shame- and pride-inducing autobiographical memories and then
had them rate their memories on various phenomenological characteristics. The authors
found that shame-inducing autobiographical memories were rated as less coherent,
contained fewer sensory details, and produced less of a sense of re-experiencing than
pride-inducing autobiographical memories. Relevant to this investigation, shameinducing autobiographical memories received a lower rating on “I believe the event in my
memory really occurred in the way I remember it and that I have not imagined or
fabricated anything that did not occur” than pride-inducing autobiographical memories.
The item used by D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, however, has been criticized
because it arguably refers to multiple concepts and tends to cross-load with belief in
occurrence, accuracy, and recollection (Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal, 2015). The authors
did not find any effect for gender or interaction involving gender.
Taken together, it would appear that wanted or consonant memories are
accompanied by higher belief in accuracy and occurrence ratings, whereas unwanted or
dissonant memories are accompanied by lower belief in accuracy and occurrence ratings.
Extending this conclusion to the present investigation, it was expected that
autobiographical memories that were unwanted or dissonant would be accompanied by
lower ratings of belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy, whereas autobiographical

40

SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
memories that were wanted or consonant would be accompanied by higher ratings of
belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy.
Objectives and Hypothesis
The objectives of this study were to (a) explore why individuals challenge
another’s recollection of a past event that is incompatible with their recollection and, at
times discrepant with their self-concept, (b) establish that challenges involving selfdiscrepant autobiographical memories are different from other challenges, and (c) explore
the role of narcissistic features.
To meet the first objective, participants’ self-reports about why they challenged
another’s memory were collected and used in conjunction with prior work to devise a
coding frame. A number of motives for challenging were expected to emerge, including
self-motives, social motives, and directive motives. Instances of self-discrepant
autobiographical memories, where the motive to challenge revolves around protecting or
preserving a current self-concept, were also expected to emerge.
In their meta-analysis, Campbell and Sedikides (1999) showed that higher levels
of self-threat produced more extreme appraisals. It stands to reason then that higher selfthreat would result in higher dissonance. Due to the relatively novel and exploratory
nature of this study, however, it is difficult to reliably disentangle dissonance from selfthreat. As Festinger (1957) and Aronson (1969, 1992) have argued, even the presence of
dissonance itself is not easily observed but rather deduced from the presence of
dissonance-reduction strategies. I therefore will not attempt to distinguish between
dissonance and self-threat; rather, I will assume based on Aronson’s and Conway’s work
that self-threat and dissonance are inherently present whenever self-protective motives
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emerge. I expected challenges stemming from self-discrepant autobiographical memories,
in which there is arguably self-threat, dissonance and self-protection motives, to be
different from challenges stemming from simply incompatible autobiographical
memories. Relative to challenges not involving self-discrepant autobiographical
memories, challenges involving self-discrepant autobiographical memories were
expected to:
2.1. Contain proportionally more negative emotional states, a prediction in line
with the conceptualization of self-threat as self-referent negative emotions with negative
implications for the self (Aronson, 1969, 1992; McFarland & Alvaro, 2000; Sedikides &
Green, 2009), such as shame (Pinto-Gouveia & Matos, 2011; Aronson, 1992) or fear
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).
2.2. Have higher ratings on the question “during the challenge, how important
was it for you to convince the other person that you were right?” This question was asked
to gauge the extent to which the challenge involved elements central or important to the
self that would be expected to arouse dissonance. This prediction is in line with the
mnemic neglect model (see General Introduction chapter; Sedikides & Green, 2009),
Festinger’s (1957) view that the magnitude of dissonance is contingent upon the
importance, value, and consequence of the elements involved, and Aronson’s revision of
cognitive dissonance theory (1969, 1992).
2.3. Have higher ratings on the question “during the challenge, how motivated
were you to present a positive image of yourself?” This prediction is in line with
Aronson’s view that dissonance is most powerful and most upsetting when actions
contradict one’s positive self-concept as moral, competent, stable, and predictable
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(Aronson, 1969, 1992). When participants respond to this question with higher ratings, it
might suggest that the response from the other person threatened the participant’s positive
self-concept.
2.4. Have higher ratings on the question “At the time, how much did it bother you
that you disagreed with what the other person said or did?” and higher ratings on the
question “Currently, how much does it still bother you that you disagreed with what the
other person said or did?” Both questions are arguably proxies for dissonance and
should show higher ratings whenever dissonance is present.
2.5. Have greater confidence in self-reported judgments of memorial occurrence
and accuracy, arguably a way of increasing the number of consonant elements. This
prediction is aligned with Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni’s (2015) view that
autobiographical memories central to the self-concept may be more resistant to changes
in belief than autobiographical memories more peripheral to the self-concept.
2.6. Have lower ratings of event importance. As noted earlier, one way to lower
dissonance would be to reappraise the importance of an event (D’Argembeau & Van der
Lind, 2008; Ross & Wilson, 2002). If one assumes that centrality is an indicator of
importance, then mean Centrality of Event Scale ratings would be expected to be lower
whenever self-discrepant autobiographical memories are present.
Regarding the third objective, the autobiographical memory literature on this
aspect is scant as no prior work has investigated autobiographical memories in the
context of disposition and/or interpersonal dynamics. In light of research examining
narcissism, rejection, and the self-serving bias (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Rhodewalt
& Eddings, 2002; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998), it was expected that individuals scoring
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higher on narcissistic traits would be disproportionally represented among self-discrepant
autobiographical memories.
Study 1 Method
Participants
The original dataset consisted of 330 participants recruited online. Of those, 299
indicated that the challenged event was an autobiographical memory, 29 indicated not
being present when the challenged event originally occurred, and two did not answer. On
review of the responses, these two participants were deemed to have been present when
the event occurred and therefore had an autobiographical memory. Of the 301, 10 cases
were excluded because no specific memory was offered (n = 4), the participant wrote
about distinctively different events in response to the questions (n = 1), the challenge was
not initiated by the participant (n = 1), the participant wrote about a disagreement that
was not based on a memory (n = 1), and the participant admitted in their answers to
having no memory of the challenged event (n = 3). The remaining 291 participants
passed two embedded validity checks. Median time-to-completion was 23 m 9 s, with the
fastest taking a little over nine minutes. No cases were excluded based on time-tocompletion because of a slow and steady increase in times that was suggestive of normal
within-subject variance.
The final sample of 291 consisted of 155 men and 136 women, and had a mean
age of 33.24 (Mdn = 30, SD = 10.54, range 18– 66). The majority of participants selfidentified as White (n = 214, 75.1%), followed by Black (n = 22, 7.7%), East Asian (n =
15, 5.3%), Hispanic/Latino (n = 6, 2.1%), South Asian (n = 3, 1.1%), Native (n = 2,
0.7%), Middle Eastern (n = 1, 0.3%), and Multiracial (n = 22, 7.6%). Six participants did
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not report their ethnicity. Highest level of education achieved was Doctorate degree (n =
2, 0.7%), followed by Professional degree (n = 3, 1.0%), Master’s degree (n = 22, 7.6%),
Bachelor’s degree (n = 116, 40.3%), community college (n = 80, 27.8%), high
school/GED (n = 64, 22.2%), and elementary school (n = 1, 0.3%). Three participants
did not report their highest level of education.
In order to protect participant anonymity, geographic location tracking was
deactivated on Fluid surveys. Prior studies using Mechanical Turk in Dr. Scoboria’s lab,
however, have indicated that the majority of participants come from North America.
Participants whose Mechanical Turk account was affiliated with India were excluded
from this study because of the large proportion of these individuals not comprehending
similar tasks in prior projects conducted in Dr. Scoboria’s lab.
Measures (see Appendix E for a complete list)
Qualitative questions and ratings about the challenged event. Participants
answered several open-ended questions about the nature of the challenge they initiated
(see Appendix E), including how they challenged the other’s memory and why they chose
to challenge. Of relevance to this study, participants were also asked to rate the following
questions: “during the challenge, how important was it for you to convince the other
person that you were right?” (1 = not at all important; 10 = very important); “during the
challenge, how motivated were you to present a positive image of yourself” (1 = not at all
motivated to present a positive image of myself; 10 = very motivated to present a positive
image of myself); “at the time, how much did it bother you that you disagreed with what
the other person said or did?” (1 = it did not bother me at all; 10 = it bothered me very
much); and “currently, how much does it still bother you that you disagreed with what the
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other person said or did? (1 = not at all; 10 = very much).
Interpersonal Adjective Scales (Wiggins, 1995): The Interpersonal Adjective
Scales is a self-report measure that assesses interpersonal traits based on the circumplex
model of personality, which posits that interpersonal traits can be located along two
principal orthogonal dimensions: Dominance (which ranges from submissive to dominant
and controlling) and Nurturance (which ranges from cold and hostile to warm and
friendly). Participants are instructed to rate a list of 64 adjectives (e.g., “timid”) on an 8point Likert scale (1 = extremely unlikely; 8 = extremely likely) based on how accurately
each adjective describes them. There are eight adjectives that contribute to each of the
eight octants: Assured-Dominant, Arrogant-Calculating, Cold-Hearted, AloofIntroverted, Unassured-Submissive, Unassuming-Ingenuous, Warm-Agreeable, and
Gregarious-Extraverted. Octant scores for each participant are computed by averaging
across the eight adjective scores contributing to that particular octant. A Dominance score
and a Nurturance score can also be computed for each participant based on their octant z
scores and weights specified in the scoring manual (Wiggins, 1995). The Interpersonal
Adjective Scales has demonstrated adequate psychometric properties (Wiggins, 1995). In
the present study, the Interpersonal Adjective Scales and in particular the AssuredDominant, Arrogant-Calculating, and Cold-Hearted octants were used to gauge
narcissistic traits (Miller et al., 2012; Wiggins, 1995).
Measures of belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy. The three items used in
Scoboria, Jackson, et al. (2014) were also used here to assess belief in the occurrence of
events (i.e., autobiographical belief that the event truly occurred to the self). Two of the
times are scored on a 7-point scale, whereas the third item is scored on an 8-point scale.
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The three items are averaged (Scoboria, Jackson, et al., 2014), with higher scores
indicative of stronger autobiographical belief. In the current study, the Cronbach’s alpha
value for belief in occurrence was .83.
Belief in accuracy, which broadly refers to attributions made about the degree to
which the contents of a current mental representation correspond to the details that in fact
occurred in the past, were captured by using three items from Scoboria, Talarico, and
Pascal (2015). These items assess confidence in the accuracy of the memory, proportion
of memory that is accurate, and doubts as to the accuracy of the memory on 7-point
scales. The items are averaged, and higher scores are indicative of greater confidence in
the accuracy of one’s own memory. In the current study, the Cronbach’s alpha value for
belief in accuracy was .84. Measures of belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence were
used to capture participant’s appraisals of the veridicality of remembered events.
Centrality of Event Scale, 7 item version (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). The
Centrality of Event Scale is a self-report instrument that measures the extent to which a
past event is appraised as central to a person’s life story and identity. Participants are
asked to rate on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree) statements
about the subjective impact of a past event (e.g., “This event has colored the way I think
and feel about other experiences”). The 7-item version of Centrality of Event Scale has a
.96 correlation with the 20-item version of the scale, and has demonstrated good internal
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha of .92 in Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; alpha of .93 in the
current study). The Centrality of Event Scale score is obtained by averaging across the
seven items, with higher scores indicative of greater importance attributions. In the
current study, Centrality of Event Scale was used in the post-hoc analysis as a potential
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indicator of importance.
Procedure
Participants were recruited online via Mechanical Turk, a service of Amazon.com
(see Appendix A for a brief description of Mechanical Turk). The advertisement, visible
to all Turk workers whose address was not in India, asked for participants to take part in a
survey about challenging another person’s memory (see Appendix C for the recruitment
advertisement). Participant eligibility was determined through a two-step process. In step
one, Turk workers accessed a screening website where they provide their Turk ID. Only
Turk workers who had not already completed a similar study in Dr. Scoboria’s lab were
eligible to continue and referred to the study survey. Potential participants were deemed
eligible if they answered “yes” to “Have you ever challenged another person’s memory
for a past event (e.g., disagreed with their memory, told them something about their
memory was wrong)?” See Appendix D for the eligibility screen.
Those who consented were instructed to “Select a time that you challenged
another person’s memory for a past event (e.g., disagreed with their memory, told them
something about their memory was wrong). Select a time in which you initiated/started
the challenge to the other person’s memory.” Participants answered open-ended
questions about the challenge itself and then completed a series of questionnaires,
including the Interpersonal Adjective Scale, measures of Belief in Occurrence, Belief in
Accuracy, Centrality of Event Scale, and demographic information. The study took
approximately 30 minutes to complete. Participants were compensated $2.50 (USD) as a
token of appreciation. The study received clearance from the University of Windsor
Research Ethics Board.
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Analytical Approach
This investigation used a mixed methods approach that contained both qualitative
and quantitative steps. A qualitative approach was selected because it was well suited to
the overarching research goal, which was to explore and reliably describe an aspect of a
relatively new line of inquiry, in this case exploring reasons for challenging
autobiographical memories. It was also selected because it affords participants greater
freedom to reflect on their lived experiences, rather than limit them by imposing a set of
answers to choose from (Biggerstaff, 2012). A quantitative approach was chosen to
supplement the qualitative analysis by further exploring the themes that emerged from the
qualitative work.
Given the study objective of creating a coding system that can be reliably coded
by independent observers and imported into subsequent studies, qualitative content
analysis was selected over other approaches like grounded theory (Cho & Lee, 2014;
Schreier, 2012, 2014). Qualitative content analysis is a method for systematically
describing the meaning of qualitative material by assigning parts of the material to
categories and subcategories (Schreier, 2014). In addition to its better fit with the nature
of the current material and the scope of the current study, qualitative content analysis
allows greater flexibility in combining deductive and inductive approaches and allows the
processing of a larger quantity of data (Cho & Lee, 2014; Schreier, 2012, 2014).
In light of the richness of experiences under investigation, quantitative methods
were also included in order to complement and strengthen findings emerging from the
qualitative work. To this end, an explanatory mixed-design (Schwab & Syed, 2015) was
implemented by initially employing qualitative methods to identify and describe motives
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for challenging another’s recollection, and then using quantitative methods to provide
greater depth to the motives emerging from the qualitative work.
Development and Validation of the Coding Scheme
Despite lacking the more established procedures of some other qualitative
methods, several overlapping steps have been proposed for conducting qualitative content
analysis (Cho & Lee, 2014; Mayring, 2014; Schreier, 2012;). The procedures used in this
study and the steps outlined below follow the guidelines proposed by Schreier (2012,
2014) and Mayring (2014).
Step 1: Building a coding frame. The following steps for building a coding
frame, although presented in a linear fashion, are not necessarily linear in practice.
Rather, the process is iterative and dynamic, with several cycles between the substeps
described in this section. Ongoing meetings with the research supervisor were held
throughout those cycles to inform the building of the coding frame. The coding frame
took about one year and a half to develop.
1.1 Selecting the material. The primary objective of this study was to answer the
question: Why do individuals challenge another person’s memory? Participants’
responses to the question, “Why did you challenge the other person’s memory” were
prioritized in building the coding frame. Participants’ complete responses to the question
“How did you challenge the other’s memory” served as context. It was possible to code
some parts of the “how” responses as motives, provided that the coded part was
contained, discussed, or hinted at while answering “why.” This rule was implemented in
order to strike a balance between comprehensively coding motives (exhaustiveness
requirement, Schreier, 2014), staying as close as possible to what the participant
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identified as motivating their challenge, and being mindful of the difference between
“how” the challenge was carried and “why” it was carried out.
1.2 Structuring and generating. Following an initial reading of all participants’
responses to “why” they challenged, a list of potential categories was generated
deductively to help structure thinking around the coding frame. In the course of a second
reading, participants’ responses were segmented into units of analysis using the thematic
criterion. The thematic criterion consists of looking for topic changes such that one unit
of analysis corresponds roughly to one proposition (i.e., a logical statement that is
paraphrased, meaning it is independent of any embellishing or repetitive words; Mayring,
2014), or in this case, one reason for challenging. After all participant responses to “why”
were segmented and paraphrased in this manner, a strategy of successive summarizing
was adopted in order to organize and summarize similar segments, which were thereafter
turned into categories and subcategories.
Following this more deductive generation of categories and subcategories, prior
theory and related coding manuals (e.g., Pasupathi, Lucas, & Coombs, 2002; Scoboria,
Boucher, & Mazzoni, 2015) were consulted to inform the generation of any additional
(sub)categories. The “why” responses were reviewed again after this inductive step in
order to search for any relevant concepts that had not been detected before, and if needed,
new categories and subcategories were created to cover them. The categories and
subcategories developed by Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni, (2015) were also adopted
at this stage and revised to account for the change in type of event (from nonbelieved
memories to challenging another’s memory) and the perspective of the participant in
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relation to the challenged event3. This mixed approach to generating codes was
implemented in order to reach saturation and ensure that the codes generated captured all
the relevant material (Schreier, 2014).
1.3 Defining categories. At this stage, category and subcategory labels were
defined. In addition to a definition, each subcategory also consisted of indicators (i.e.,
coding aids) and typical positive examples. In practice, this step was an iterative process
whereby definitions were continually refined to optimally capture the nature of the
subcategory and aim for mutual exclusiveness of codes such that one unit of analysis
always received only one subcategory code within a certain category (Schreier, 2012). Of
note, however, mutual exclusiveness proved particularly difficult to achieve within the
Self-focused motives category where there was frequent overlap between two
subcategories, Correcting views of me and Defending the self.
1.4 Revising and expanding. At this stage, the structure of the coding frame was
examined, and definitions were expanded or amended where needed. In cases of overlap,
such as the same unit receiving more than one subcategory code within the same
category, subcategories were collapsed, or other indicators were added to help
differentiate among subcategories where possible. Decision rules were added to improve
the exclusivity of subcategory codes although, again, this was not always possible.
Step 2: Piloting phase. Piloting of the coding frame was done in stages in order
to manage the complexity and cognitive load of the codes, and to ensure that distinct
categories were coded independently. The primary investigator and one research assistant
each coded 30 consecutive cases using a portion of the coding frame. They then met to
3

Whereas Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni (2015) coded the perspective of the
challenged individual, the current study coded the perspective of the challenger.
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discuss the coding process, assess consistency of codes, and when needed, amend the
coding frame in terms of definitions, indicators, decision rules, etc. This process was
repeated several times until the entire coding frame had been pilot tested. A second pilot
phase was conducted with a second research assistant using a similar procedure but
following a different order of coding and using an entirely different set of cases for
calibration.
Step 3: The main analysis phase. Participants’ responses to “why” they had
challenged were coded by two research assistants using the finalized coding frame. As
during the piloting, the final coding was completed in stages. Please see Table 1 and
Table 2 for a summary of the codes developed and Table 3 for a description and related
examples. On average, each participant provided three reasons for challenging the other’s
memory. The coding manual is included in Appendix J.
Reliability of the Coding Scheme
In order to determine the inter-rater reliability of categories and subcategories
adapted from Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni (2015), one research assistant, who served
as the primary coder, coded the entire dataset. The principal investigator coded 20% of
the dataset (i.e., 70 randomly drawn cases from 330; Syed & Nelson, 2015) in each
category. Only the primary coder’s codes were used in the final analysis. The inter-rater
reliability statistics for those categories and subcategories are reported in Table 1.
In order to determine the inter-rater reliability of categories and subcategories
generated exclusively for this study, two research assistants coded the entire dataset. Any
discrepancies in coding were resolved by having the principal investigator consult the
assistants’ coding notes (Schreier, 2012); if one research assistant had identified a
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particular code and that code was supported by their notes, that code was kept in the final
dataset. The inter-rater reliability statistics for those categories and subcategories are
reported in Table 2.
Three indices of interrater reliability are reported in Tables 1 and 2: Percentage
agreement, Cohen’s kappa, and delta (Martin Andres & Femia Marzo, 2004). Cohen’s
kappa is reported because of its wide use. According to Syed and Nelson (2015),
however, the kappa index performs poorly in cases of highly skewed marginal
distributions, as is the case in the present study. When this occurs, it has been
recommended that the kappa statistic be presented alongside delta (Syed & Nelson,
2015). Of note, relatively equal marginal distributions tend to produce comparable kappa
and delta values (Syed & Nelson, 2015). The kappa and delta values were calculated
using the Delta 4.1.4 software (Andres & Marzo, 2004).
For interpretation purposes, kappa values between .40 and .60 indicate fair
agreement, kappa values between .60 and .75 indicate good agreement, and kappa over
.75 indicate excellent agreement (Fleiss, 1981). Although the Fleiss guidelines are widely
referenced, they are not the only kappa interpretation guidelines (Viera & Garrett, 2005).
As suggested by Syed and Nelson (2015), lower kappa values are acceptable in cases of
uneven marginal distribution. Interpretation guidelines for delta are not currently
available. The recommendation is to consider higher delta values as demonstrating
greater interrater reliability and to interpret those values alongside kappa statistics (Syed
& Nelson, 2015).
Overall, with a few exceptions, the reliability coefficients provided in Table 1 and
Table 2 were deemed acceptable. For the purposes of describing the reasons for
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challenging, each category and subcategory was consulted for consistency across
reliability indices and frequency of endorsement, and a judgment was made as to whether
to retain or drop that category (see Tables 1 and 2). Categories and subcategories were
dropped if (a) frequency of code was 0, (b) kappa and delta indices could not be
computed, or (c) kappa fell below .40.
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Table 1
Interrater Reliability Statistics for Categories and Subcategories Adopted from Scoboria, Boucher, & Mazzoni (2015)
Category

A. General metamemory beliefs

Subcategory

Rate of
endorsement %
(/291)
2.75% (8)
0.69% (2)
2.06% (6)
6.18% (18)
1.72% (5)
4.81% (14)
51.20% (149)

% Agreement a

Kappa b

Delta b

Decision

A1. General beliefs regarding memory & age
100.00%
1.00
.96
Retain
A1a. Comparative statements
100.00%
1.00
.96
Retain
A1b. Absolute statements
100.00%
1.00
.96
Retain
A2. General beliefs regarding memory ability
96.88%
0.73
.90
Retain
A2a. Comparative statement
98.44%
0.66
.93
Retain
A2b. Absolute statement
98.44%
0.79
.93
Retain
A3. General beliefs regarding memory
84.38%
0.68
.67
Retain
integrity
B. Internal features
B1. Internal features/memory characteristics
7.22% (21)
93.75%
0.47
.84
Retain
C. External evidence C1. External evidence present
2.41% (7)
100.00%
1.00
.96
Retain
C2. Lack of external evidence
0.69% (2)
100.00%
1.00
.96
Retain
D. Alternate
D1. Alternate attribution - internal
3.09% (9)
96.88%
0.23
.90
Drop
attributions
D1a. Imagination/ confabulation/
3.09% (9)
96.88%
0.23
.90
Drop
exaggeration/ simplification/ fantasy/
daydream
D1b. Dream/ nightmare
0.00% (0)
100.00%
n/a
n/a
Drop
D2. Alternate attribution – External
0.00% (0)
98.44%
0.32
.93
Drop
D3. Other alternate attribution
3.44 % (10)
92.19%
0.12
.84
Drop
E. Plausibility
E1. Subjective plausibility
2.06% (6)
98.41%
0.66
.93
Retain
F. Belief in
F1. The event did not occur
20.96% (61)
92.06%
0.58
.84
Retain
occurrence
F2. The event could not occur
0.34% (1)
100.00%
n/a
n/a
Drop
F3. The event is unlikely to have occurred
1.72% (5)
100.00%
1.00
.96
Retain
F4. Lack of corroboration from another
7.90% (23)
100.00%
1.00
.96
Retain
person/persons/third-party
F5. The Event was not witnessed
0.68% (2)
100.00%
n/a
n/a
Drop
G. Belief in accuracy G1. The event happened differently
62.89% (183)
82.54%
0.59
.65
Retain
Note. a All interrater statistics are based on the principal investigator coding 20% of the dataset for each category.
b
Kappa and Delta statistics could not be computed if neither the primary rater nor the principal investigator marked a code as present among the
cases coded by both of them.
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Table 2
Interrater Reliability Statistics for Categories and Subcategories Emerging From This Study
Category

H. Prosocial
motives

Subcategory

Rate of
endorsement %
(/291) a
2.75% (8)
3.44% (10)
9.28% (27)
3.78% (11)
1.72% (5)
1.03% (3)

% Agreement

Kappa b

Delta b

Decision

H1. Seeking confirmation
98.63%
.66
.96
Retain
H2. Providing emotional support
97.59%
.45
.94
Retain
H3. Passing on knowledge/ information
96.56%
.72
.92
Retain
H4. Reminiscing
96.56%
.57
.93
Retain
H5. Relationship maintenance
98.63%
.49
.96
Retain
H5a. Relationship maintenance through
99.66%
.80
.98
Retain
manipulation/deception
H5b. Relationship maintenance through other means
0.68% (2)
98.97%
.00
.97
Drop
I. Internal
I1. Dispositional view of other
10.65% (31)
92.44%
.52
.85
Retain
models of
I2. Situational view of other
16.84% (49)
85.57%
.29
.76
Drop
self and
I3. Discrepant view of other
4.47% (13)
96.22%
.57
.92
Retain
others
I3a. Discrepant view of 3rd party other
4.47% (13)
97.25%
.62
.94
Retain
13b. Discrepant view of challenged other
0.00% (0)
98.28%
.00
.96
Drop
I4. Dispositional view of self
9.62% (28)
91.41%
.43
.83
Retain
I5. Changing view of self
2.41% (7)
97.59%
.52
.94
Retain
I5a. Deviate from own dispositional tendencies this one
1.37% (4)
98.97%
.66
.97
Retain
time.
I5b. Deviate from own disposition tendencies from now
0.00% (0)
100.00%
N/a
N/a
Drop
on
I6. Consistent view of self over time
2.75% (8)
97.59%
.45
.95
Retain
J. SelfJ1. Correcting the event interpretation
7.90% (23)
94.50%
.47
.89
Retain
focused
J2. Correcting views of me
8.59% (25)
95.88%
.68
.92
Retain
motives
J3. Personal need to correct this event
16.49% (48)
89.35%
.53
.79
Retain
J4. Seeking validation
6.19% (18)
95.88%
.52
.92
Retain
J5. Seeking recognition
4.47% (13)
97.25%
.54
.95
Retain
J6. Managing anticipated outcomes to the self
10.31% (30)
92.10%
.40
.85
Retain
J7. Defending the self
6.87% (20)
93.81%
.41
.88
Retain
J8. Social mischief
2.75% (8)
98.97%
.80
.97
Retain
J9. Social comparison
1.37% (4)
99.31%
.75
.98
Retain
K. Emotions K1. Emotional states
26.46% (77)
76.98%
.46
.64
Drop in favour of k1a
K1a. Negative emotional states
20.27% (59)
86.60%
.61
.79
Retain
K1b. Positive emotional states
6.53% (19)
89.35%
.24
.81
Drop
K1c. Neutral emotional states
0.00% (0)
100.00%
N/a
N/a
Drop
Note. a Rate of endorsement after reconciling codes from both raters
B Kappa and Delta statistics could not be computed if neither the primary rater nor the principal investigator marked a code as present among the cases coded by both of
them.
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Study 1 Results
Qualitative Content Analysis
Research Question 1: Themes characterized by self-discrepant autobiographical
memories and themes not characterized by self-discrepant autobiographical memories
were anticipated to emerge. The presence of themes involving self-discrepant
autobiographical memories was expected to be apparent by the emergence of selfprotective motives in the coding framework.
Reasons for challenging another individual’s version of a past event. This
section includes a brief description of the categories and subcategories that emerged from
the coding. Category and subcategory definitions and prototypical examples for each
subcategory can also be found in Table 3. Categories A through G were adapted from
Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni (2015). Categories H through K emerged from this
study.
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Table 3
Retained Motives Reported For Choosing To Challenge
Motives For Challenging

Definition

Example

CATEGORY A: GENERAL META-MEMORY BELIEFS = The challenge is based on the participant’s assumption(s) regarding how memory
generally works, which is in turn used to bolster the validity of one’s own account or undermine the validity of the other’s account.
A1. General beliefs regarding memory Age influences memory such that memories cannot be
“[I challenged because] I was concerned with her
& age
formed when one is very young, memory impairment is
memory as she is getting quite old.”
common in old age, etc.
A2. General beliefs regarding memory Some people are better than others at recalling the past
“[I challenged because] I have very, very good
ability
(e.g., I rarely forget, he has a horrible memory).
memory so I clearly know she said it.”
A3. General beliefs regarding memory Memory quality, origin, and/or structure operate
“I challenged because the order in which things
integrity
differently (e.g., memories can be reconstructed, can be
took place along with the outcomes from this event
false, borrowed, exaggerated).
were being misconstrued by false recollection.”
CATEGORY B: INTERNAL FEATURES = The challenge is based on the participant’s mental representation for the shared event, which is in turn
used to bolster the validity of their own account or undermine the validity of the other’s account.
B1. Internal features/memory
The quality of the participant’s mental representation is
“[I challenged] because it was so clear in my
characteristics
vivid, strong, clear, has something compelling about it,
memory what he said”
etc.
CATEGORY C: EXTERNAL EVIDENCE = The challenge is based on the presence or absence of external evidence, which is in turn used to bolster
the validity of their own account or undermine the validity of the other’s account..
C1. External evidence present
The participant possesses external evidence.
“[I challenged because] I had evidence to the
contrary, an email”
C2. Lack of external evidence
The participant relies on the absence of external evidence.
“[I challenged because…] if he had rode the
merry-go-round, there would have been pictures
because I had my camera all ready to take them.”
CATEGORY E: PLAUSIBILITY = The challenge is based on the participant’s view that the challenged memory is implausible or impossible to have
occurred in reality.
E1. Subjective plausibility
The event could not have occurred (e.g., it is impossible,
“[I challenged] because I thought the thing she
implausible, or illogical) based on personal knowledge,
said happened was absurd. I don't even think we
preference, feelings, and/or opinions.
have the same blood type, plus she lives out of the
country!”
CATEGORY F: BELIEF IN OCCURRENCE = The challenge is based on the participant’s view that the challenged memory did not actually occur in
reality.
F1. The Event did not occur
The event did not occur.
“[I challenged because] I'm quite sure that this
never happened”
F3. The Event is unlikely to have
The event could have occurred but it is unlikely (e.g., it is
“I was fairly certain that I did not say what she
occurred
implausible).
said that I did.”
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F4. Lack of corroboration from
Others cannot confirm the occurrence of the event.
“[I challenged him] because I thought it was
another person/persons/third-party
ridiculous that he could not remember.”
CATEGORY G: BELIEF IN ACCURACY = The challenge is based on the participant’s perceived accuracy of the recalled memory, which is in turn
used to bolster the validity of their own account or undermine the validity of the other’s account.
G1. The Event happened differently
Feature(s) of the event are inaccurate, wrong, or happened “I challenged his memory because his recollection
differently (e.g., happened to another party, happened to
of the event was not exactly how it had unfolded in
the challenger)
reality,”
CATEGORY H: PROSOCIAL MOTIVES = The challenge is based on the participant’s desire to develop, maintain, and/or nurture closeness in social
relationships.
H1. Seeking confirmation
Seek out, verify, or confirm details about a past event
“I challenged her memory because I thought it was
and/or negotiate a shared interpretation of a past event.
different from mine and I figured between the two
of us we could iron out the parts that were
incorrect on both sides.”
H2. Providing emotional support
Offer empathy and emotional support.
“I challenged this person's memory because I
wanted to instill confidence in them so that they
would succeed. Whether true or not, I wanted them
to see the events that happened as positive rather
than negative”
H3. Passing on
Pass on valuable life lessons or information.
“I did so partly because I wanted to inform her of
knowledge/information
[a childhood disease] she actually had that she
believes she never had”.
H4. Reminiscing
Indulge in the enjoyable recollection of a past event.
“[I challenged] to reminisce on the good times. To
take us back to a happy time.”
H5. Relationship maintenance
Rebuild, develop, or maintain a relationship with another
“[I challenged because] I have hopes of re-creating
person.
our friendship. I want it to be like it was before.”
CATEGORY I: INTERNAL MODELS OF SELF AND OTHERS = The challenge is based on the participant’s internal models of self and/or others.
I1. Dispositional view of other
The other’s disposition undermines their credibility.
“[I challenged because] she had a way of
embellishing trifling things to make them sound
worse than they really are.”
I3. Discrepant view of other
The participant’s view of a third party person is
“[I challenged because] she created a memory in
incompatible with the other’s view of that same person.
her mind that was not fair to our mother”
I4. Dispositional view of self
The participant wishes to reaffirm their own dispositional
“[I challenged] because I don't like to be
tendencies and habits as the kind of person who speaks up, misunderstood, but most importantly I don't like
challenges, needs to be right, etc.
being lied on.”
I5. Changing view of self
The participant wishes to depart from own dispositional
“[I challenged because] on that day I got tired of
tendencies and habits.
playing along and not wanting to rock the boat
with her.”
I6. Consistent view of self over time
The participant’s internal models of “past self” and
“[I challenged because] my husband claimed I had
“present self” are incompatible.
said something that I didn't. I tried to tell him I
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would never say something of the sort and told
him why I wouldn't have”
CATEGORY J: SELF-FOCUSED MOTIVES = The challenge is based on the participant’s desire to consolidate, preserve, protect, and/or enhance a
sense of “I” and “who I am”.
J1. Correcting the event interpretation Correct, clear up, or clarify the other’s interpretation of a
“[I challenged because] I wanted to make it very
past event.
clear that I didn't mention the drinking and
cheating to call [my mother] stupid or a whore. I
wanted to make it clear that I was just worried
about her behavior.”
J2. Correcting views of me
Correct an unfavourable view and/or establish a
“[I challenged because] it bothered me that she
favourable view.
thought of me as a heavy drinker when I was
younger.”
J3. Personal need to correct this event A subjective desire for a past event to be recalled
“[I challenged because] I couldn’t justify letting
accurately.
her continue to believe that my hair was long just
for the sake of some laughs”
J4. Seeking validation
Elicit empathy from the other, ask them to take
“[I challenged because] her version was so far off
responsibility, and/or have them validate a past
that it functioned as a violent denial of the pain we
experience.
children had experienced at various points in our
childhoods”
J5. Seeking recognition
Attain recognition/acknowledgement for one’s role in
[“I challenged because] I was upset that he did not
something deemed positive, valuable, or helpful.
[give me] credit for playing a part in his eventual
marriage.”
J6. Managing anticipated outcomes to Prevent a negative, unfavourable, or unwanted situation
“I challenged it because I wanted to go on that
the self
from occurring or ensure that a positive, favourable, or
rollercoaster with my dad. This was the bargain I
wanted situation does occur.
had been promised, not the ice cream!”
J7. Defending the self
Protect oneself in response to an actual or anticipated
“[I challenged because] I was defending myself”
physical and/or emotional threat to the self.
“I challenged this particular memory because it is
one of the most painful experiences that I have
ever had to endure”
“[I challenged because] I wanted to have some fun
challenging my sister's memory because she prides
herself in her memory”
J9. Social comparison
Show superiority in an area relative to another individual.
“[I challenged because] I wanted to be able to say I
knew more than him”
CATEGORY K: EMOTIONS = The challenge is based on the participant’s experience of certain emotional state(s).
K1a. Negative emotional states
Experiencing a particular negative emotional state (e.g.,
“[I challenged because] I had all this pent up
anger, pain, shame).
frustration and anger even years later”
J8. Social mischief

Pursue thrill or amusement at the expense of the other
(e.g., through teasing, pranks)
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Category A: General meta-memory beliefs (A). This category captures challenges
driven by participants’ assumption(s) of how memory generally works, such as memory
declines with age, or memory can be false, or reconstructed. This category was divided
into three subcategories. The first subcategory (A1) involved beliefs regarding memory
and age (e.g., “Considering my cousin was two-and-a-half at the time, I doubt she could
actually remember that far back”). This A1 subcategory was further divided into two
subcategories. The first subcategory (A1a) included instances where the challenger
compared the age of the challenged party to their own as part of the challenge (e.g., “I
challenged his memory because I was older than him and I know the event didn't
happen.”). The second subcategory (A1b) included instances where the challenger made
statements about the relation between memory and age but did not evoke comparative
statements about theirs and the challenged other’s respective ages (e.g., [I challenged
because] I was concerned with her memory as she is getting quite old”).
The second subcategory (A2) involved beliefs about memory ability (e.g., “[I
challenged because] I have very, very good memory so I clearly know she said it.”). This
was further divided into two subcategories. The first subcategory (A2a) was comprised of
statements that compared the challenger’s memory to the memory ability of the
challenged party (e.g., “I challenged because I have a pretty good memory and rarely
forget things. So I was sure she had forgotten because she always does”). The second
subcategory (A2b) was comprised of statements that commented on memory ability
without a comparison (e.g., “I challenged because my memory is excellent”).
The third subcategory (A3) within the general-meta-memory beliefs category
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involved beliefs about memory integrity (i.e., memories can be borrowed, memories can
be false, memories can be exaggerated; “I challenged because the order in which things
took place along with the outcomes from this event were being misconstrued by false
recollection.”). Across the subcategories, participants appeared to use general metamemory beliefs to increase the validity of their own version and/or undermine the
validity of the other’s version.
Category B: Internal features (B). Internal features (B1) refer to the quality of the
participant’s mental representation, which could be vivid, strong, clear, or have
something compelling about it. This category was intended to capture challenges driven
by the quality of participants’ mental representation of the challenged event. For
example, participants stated, “I challenged because I remember the event so clearly” or “I
challenged because it was so clear in my memory what he said.” As was the case for
General meta-memory beliefs, Internal features also appeared to have been used to
evaluate the validity of the participants’ version.
Category C: External evidence (C). This category was used to capture challenges
driven by the presence or absence of external evidence. External evidence in this case
referred to anything that was concrete and/or tangible, such as photos, receipts, or emails.
This category was divided into two subcategories. The first subcategory (C1) involved
participants challenging because they were in possession of external evidence that
supported their version and/or undermined the validity of the others’ (e.g., “[I challenged
because] I had evidence to the contrary, an email”). The second subcategory (C2)
involved participants challenging because of the conspicuous absence of external
evidence, which supported their version and/or undermined the validity of the others’
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(e.g., “[I challenged because] if he had rode the merry-go-round, there would have been
pictures because I had my camera all ready to take them.”).
Category D: Alternate attributions (D). Alternate attributions refer to internal or
external sources that affect an event-specific memory or parts of it. This category was
used to capture challenges driven by participants’ views that an alternate source is
interfering with the other’s version to the point of being confused with reality. This
category was divided into three categories. The first subcategory (D1) involved
challenges motivated by belief or knowledge that the other’s version resulted from or was
influenced by an alternate internal source. This subcategory was further divided into two
subcategories. The first subcategory (D1a) involved challenges motivated by participants’
knowledge or belief that the others’ version resulted from or was influenced by
imagination, fantasy, etc. (e.g., “[because] what he said was a complete fabrication.” The
second subcategory (D1b) involved challenges motivated by participants’ knowledge or
belief that the others’ version resulted from or was influenced by dreams and/or
nightmares. The subcategory D1 was dropped because it was not coded reliably.
The second subcategory (D2) under the Alternate attributions category involved
challenges motivated by participants’ belief or knowledge that the others’ version
resulted from or was influenced by external sources, such as movies, TV shows, or
books. Because it was not reliably coded, this subcategory was also dropped.
The third subcategory (D3) under Alternate attributions involved challenges
motivated by participants’ belief or knowledge that the others’ version resulted from or
was influenced by other alternate sources, such as substance use, medication, and/or
mental health (e.g. “I challenged my friend’s memory because they have a mental illness
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that impairs their perception of reality and memory”). This subcategory was dropped
because it emerged as unreliable.
Category E: Plausibility (E). Plausibility refers to an assessment of whether an
event could have actually occurred based on one’s knowledge of the world. Plausibility
differs from belief in occurrence in its assessment of whether something could have
happened rather than whether something did happen. This category (E1) was used to
capture challenges driven by participants’ view that the challenged event was impossible,
implausible, or illogical to have occurred based on personal feelings, tastes, or opinions
(e.g., [I challenged] because I thought the thing she said happened was absurd.”]. Like
the categories before, Plausibility also appeared to have been used to undermine the
validity of the others’ version.
Category F: Belief in occurrence (F). Unlike plausibility, belief in occurrence
refers to an assessment of whether a past event actually occurred. This category was used
to capture challenges driven by participants’ doubts about the actual occurrence of the
challenged event. This category was originally divided into five categories, but only three
subcategories were reliably coded and retained to describe the dataset. The first
subcategory (F1) involved participants’ belief that the challenged event did not occur
(e.g., ““[I challenged because] I'm quite sure that this never happened”). The second
subcategory (F3) involved participants’ belief that the challenged event was unlikely to
have occurred (“I was fairly certain that I did not say what she said that I did.” or “My
brother said our parents were overly mean and almost abusive to us as children …[I
challenged because] I had no memory of most of the incidents, and I didn't think they had
happened…”). The third and final subcategory (F4) involved participants’ belief that the
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challenged event lacked corroboration from another person or a third party other (“[I
challenged because] he didn't remember the experience”).
Category G: Belief in accuracy. This category encompassed challenges driven by
participants’ knowledge or belief that the others’ version is inaccurate, wrong, or
happened differently. It encompassed beliefs that the challenged event occurred at a
different time, different place, involved different objects, occurred over a different length
of time, etc. Examples include, “[I challenged because] her perception of how many
cigarettes she had was wrong. My mother claimed that I stole a large portion of cigarettes
from her. I immediately let know that I only took one and she insisted that there were
many missing,” and “[I challenged because] she was clearly wrong [when stating that she
got the doll in the blue dress and I got the doll in the green dress]. I remember because we
each got the doll with the dress that matched our eye color.”
Category H: Prosocial motives (H). This category was created upon observing
that some challenges were more benign and helpful than others, and because some
individuals reported feeling helped by others who challenged their memories in another
study (Barcic, 2015; Wysman, 2016). The Prosocial motives category captures challenges
driven by participants’ desire to develop, maintain, and/or nurture closeness in social
relationships. Challenges prompted by Prosocial motives tended to (a) consist primarily
of an external, social focus, (b) be accompanied by participants’ explicit expression of
helpful and/or positive intention, and (c) be focused primarily on another person, rather
than the challenger.
Inspired by the work of Alea and Bluck (2003), Bluck et al., (2005), Webster
(2003), and Pasupathi et al., (2002), the Prosocial motives category was divided into five
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subcategories. The first subcategory (H1) involved challenges driven by a desire to seek
out, verify, or confirm details about a past event (e.g., “[I challenged because] I was
unsure about my recollection of the event and wanted to see if I was just being crazy).” In
a minority of cases there was a sense of collaboration and co-construction as the two
parties attempted to negotiate a shared interpretation of the challenged event (e.g., “I
challenged her memory because I thought it was different from mine and I figured
between the two of us we could iron out the parts that were incorrect on both sides.”).
The second subcategory (H2) involved challenges driven by a desire to provide
emotional support, care, understanding, and/or empathy. Those instances had a quasitherapeutic tone as participants used the challenge to instill confidence, show care, or
alleviate distress (e.g., “I challenged this person's memory because I wanted to instill
confidence in them so that they would succeed. Whether true or not, I wanted them to see
the events that happened as positive rather than negative”).
The third subcategory (H3) involved challenges driven by a desire to pass on
valuable knowledge and/or information (e.g., “[I challenged because] I thought it was
important for my mother to realize that the reason my dad was making more money was
because his boss wasn’t managing the company correctly”). The fourth subcategory (H4)
involved challenges driven by a desire to indulge in the enjoyable recollection of a past
event. These challenges invoked more positive emotions and used more neutral and/or
positive labels to refer to the challenge, such as “conversation” or “reminiscing” (e.g., “[I
challenged] to reminisce on the good times. To take us back to a happy time.”].
The fifth and last subcategory (H5) involved challenges driven by a desire to
rebuild, develop, or maintain relationships. Although this subcategory was originally
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divided into two additional subcategories, only relationship maintenance through
manipulation and/or deception (H5a) emerged as the more reliable subcategory. In this
subcategory, challenges involved instances of lying, deceiving or blaming in the hopes of
rebuilding or maintaining relationships. For example, one participant stated,
“I had a best friend in high school. We were so close and did everything together,
and then I started making bad choices in my life. She stopped talking to me,
saying that she didn't want to associate herself with someone that made these
choices. When she and I started talking again a few weeks ago, she said to me "I
don't even remember why we stopped talking." I told her that she must have just
been too busy, because I didn't do anything wrong and she was the one who chose
to drift away. I knew that I was the one who caused problems, but if she forgot,
there was no point in saying it. [I challenged because] I have hopes of re-creating
our friendship. I felt like it would be better to completely start over than start
again on the wrong foot. If she didn't remember, it was for the better. Maybe it
was meant to be that way.”
Category I: Internal models of self and others. Inspired by the psychodynamic
construct of internal working models, this category was created to capture challenges
driven by participants’ internal model(s) of themselves, the challenged party, and/or a
third party. These internal models involve qualities, values, characteristics, personality
traits, typical behaviours and preferences that individuals hold in relation to others and
themselves. This category was originally divided into six subcategories, but only five
subcategories emerged as reliable and were retained to describe the dataset.
The first subcategory (I1) involved challenges driven by participants’
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dispositional view of the other as someone of dubious credibility. For example, “[I
challenged because] she had a way of embellishing trifling things to make them sound
worse than they really are” or “I challenged because he is a liar and is constantly full of
shit regarding his stories and memories.”
The second subcategory (I3) was comprised of challenges driven by a
disagreement between how the participant and the challenged other view a third person
(I3a) or how they view the challenged other (I3b). Subcategory I3b was deemed
unreliable and therefore not retained to describe the dataset. Given the better reliability
found with I3a, this was the sole subcategory retained under I3. Frequently, challenges
coded under I3a involved participants standing up for or protecting a third party. For
example, “[I challenged because] I didn't think it was right for her to continue to blame
her sister for things [her sister] is not at fault” or “[I challenged because] she created a
memory in her mind that was not fair to our mother.”
The third subcategory (I4) involved challenges driven by participants’
dispositional view of themselves. Through the challenge, participants appeared to
reaffirm their own dispositional tendencies as the type of person who speaks up,
challenges, needs to be right, etc. (e.g., “[I challenged] because] I can’t stand when
something is incorrect. Besides that, I always feel the need to be right” or “[I challenged
because I generally don’t like to back down when I think I’m right.”
The fourth subcategory (I5) involved challenges driven by participants’ changing
view of themselves. In these instances, participants’ appeared motivated by a desire to
deviate or break away from their dispositional tendencies and habits. Although this
subcategory was originally divided further into two subcategories, only subcategory I5a
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was retained due to its more reliable coding. Examples of subcategory I5a include, “[I
challenged because] on that day I got tired of playing along and not wanting to rock the
boat with her” or “Usually I just go along with her. This time however, I didn't feel like
just sitting back and allow her to inaccurately recall a past event. In a way, I felt like I
was standing up for myself by holding her accountable.”
The fifth and last subcategory (I6) involved challenges driven by participants’
belief that aspects of the challenged event were inconsistent with whom they perceived
themselves to be at the time of the challenge. Inherent in those challenges was an
assumption of continuity and consistency between past-self and current-self. For
example, participants stated, “[I challenged because] I wouldn't have gotten rid of those
[belongings] myself because they had sentimental value to me” or “[I challenged
because] my husband claimed I had said something that I didn't. I tried to tell him I
would never say something of the sort and told him why I wouldn't have”].
Category J: Self-focused motives. This category was created to capture challenges
resulting from participants’ desire to consolidate, preserve, protect, and/or enhance a
sense of “I” and “who I am.” Challenges prompted by self-focused motives tended to (a)
consist primarily of an internal, self-focus, and (b) were focused primarily on the self,
rather than or in addition to the other(s). This category was divided into nine
subcategories.
The first subcategory (J1) involved challenges driven by a desire to correct, clear
up, or clarify the other’s interpretation of a past event. For example, one participant
stated,
“When I was little I used to cherish this rabbit and hugged and slept with it every
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night. My sister thought I just outgrew the rabbit when I stopped caring about it,
but I told her she was the one who made me stopped caring about the rabbit. I
told her that she told me a scary story about stuffed animals coming to life and
killing their owners, and that I got scared and locked my rabbit in the closet. My
sister said she did not remember telling that scary story at all, and the look on her
face was one of denial. [I challenged because] I wanted to correct my sister that I
didn’t outgrow the rabbit.”
The second subcategory (J2) involved challenges driven by a desire to correct an
unfavourable self-presentation and/or establish a favourable self-presentation. In all these
instances, participants believed that the others’ impression of them was inaccurate and
reflected poorly on them. In particular, concerns around being perceived as possessing
undesirable qualities, like ignorance, violence, or deceit, were observed. For example,
participants stated “[I challenged because] it bothered me that she thought of me as a
heavy drinker when I was younger” or “[I challenged because] I didn't want people
thinking me and my brother fight MMA style over stupid things.”
The third subcategory (J3) involved challenges driven by a personal need for a
past event to be recalled accurately. In all these instances, participants acknowledged
their own need for accuracy through statements like “I wanted to set the record straight.”
Such challenges also made clear that recalling accurately the challenged event accurately
primarily benefited the participant. Examples included, “[I challenged because] but I
couldn't justify letting her continue to believe that my hair was long just for the sake of
some laughs” and “[I challenged because] I wanted to make sure the story that I was
listening to was accurate.”
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The fourth subcategory (J4) involved challenges driven by a desire to elicit an
acknowledgment and/or taking of responsibility regarding the challenged event, as well
as elicit understanding regarding the emotional consequences of the challenged event. A
number of these challenges involved past traumas or distressing memories (e.g., “[I
challenged because] her version was so far off that it functioned as a violent denial of the
pain we children had experienced at various points in our childhoods” or “I challenged
his memory of it because I just wanted him to admit the truth.”
The fifth subcategory (J5) involved challenges driven by a desire to be recognized
or acknowledged for one’s role in something deemed positive, valuable, or helpful (e.g.,
[“I challenged because] I was upset that he did not [give me] credit for playing a part in
his eventual marriage.”)
The sixth subcategory (J6) involved challenges driven by a desire to prevent a
negative, unfavourable, or unwanted situation from occurring or to ensure that a positive,
favourable, or wanted situation did occur. Examples included, “I challenged because I
wanted to go on that rollercoaster with my dad. This was the bargain I had been
promised, not the ice cream!” and “[I challenged because] I wanted her to keep her
promise to me to do something for me... I wanted her to fulfill her promise.”
The seventh subcategory (J7) involved challenges driven by a desire to protect
oneself in response to actual or anticipated physical and/or emotional threat. In other
words, participants challenged in self-defense, and in fact most instances coded under this
subcategory included an explicit acknowledgement of this self-defense motive (e.g., “[I
challenged because] I was defending myself”).
The eighth subcategory (J8) involved challenges driven by the pursuit of thrill or
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amusement at the expense of the other (e.g., through teasing, pranks). For example,
participants stated, “[I challenged because] I wanted to have some fun challenging my
sister's” or “[Even though he actually returned the money owed to me 2 weeks ago, I
challenged him about not returning the money because] I wanted to see if I could do it.”
The ninth and last subcategory (J9) involved challenges driven by a desire to
show superiority or dominance in a certain area relative to another individual. For
example, participants stated, “[I challenged because] I wanted to be able to say I knew
more than him, about the house that we lived in” or “[I challenged because] I suppose
there was a part of me that felt superior in knowing something that she didn't.”
Of the nine subcategories within the Self-focused motives category, challenges
coded under Correcting views of me (J2) and Defending the self (J7) both arguably
captured self-protective motives arising as a result of dissonant information recounted by
another individual. To illustrate, one participant described the challenge as follows:
“My wife was recounting to a mutual friend about a time when we were in the city
and a kid shoved her from behind for no reason. I grabbed him and punched him
hard in the shoulder before he ran off, but in the story my wife said I cuffed him
on the cheek. I told her she had it wrong, probably because her back was turned,
or she was in shock.”
In response to why they challenged, the participant wrote,
“Because the memory didn't happen the way she said it, and it made me look a
little more violent than I had been.”
As another example, one participant described the challenge as follows:
“My mother claimed recently that I went out drinking a lot with my friends and
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that it had become a bad habit when I was younger and that she was glad I
straightened up my act. I challenged her to remember how many times she
thought I went out drinking? Because I knew for sure I would only go out on
Friday nights, and not even every Friday of the month. I discussed and said if I
went drinking a lot as she claimed, that maybe three days out of a month max
certainly does not qualify as a lot. We discussed the topic and she in the end
agreed she must have perceived it much worse than it was because I was her son
and she was worried. ”
When asked about why they challenged, the participant explained,
“Because what was said was untrue and it bothered me that [my mother] thought
of me as a heavy drinker when I was younger.”
In both instances, participant’s self-concept as “not violent” and “not a heavy
drinker” respectivey was at odds with the other’s recounting of a past event. In order to
protect or preserve the self-concept as “not violent” and “not a heavy drinker,” and
correct the others’ impression of them, the participant confronted the source of dissonant
information, as would be expected from cognitive dissonance theory.
Although the other subcategories within Self-focused motives category may have
also included challenges driven by wanting to defend or preserve the self-concept,
articulation of this motive was not as fleshed out as it was in subcategories J2 and J7. In
fact, the coding of subcategories J2 and J7 overlapped greatly and as such, I collapsed
them into one Self-protective index (used in the quantitative analyses below), rather than
treat them separately.
Category K: Emotions. This category was created to capture challenges stemming
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from participants’ experience of certain emotional state(s). Although originally divided
into three subcategories, only the Negative emotional states subcategory (K1a) emerged
as a reliable subcategory and was retained to describe the dataset. This subcategory
consisted of challenges driven by participants experiencing intense and distressing
negative emotional states, such as pain, anger, or anxiety. For example, a participant
stated, “I challenged because it is one of the most painful experiences that I have ever had
to endure” or “[I challenged because] I was trying to be honest about what happened in
the past and come clean about something that I had felt guilt over when I was younger.”
Quantitative Data Analysis
All quantitative analyses were conducted using SPSS 23. Prior to any statistical
analyses, data were checked against corresponding statistical assumptions; only
violations and corrections are reported in the appropriate sections below. Whenever
possible, bootstrapping with 5000 samples was used to calculate statistics of interest. In
light of the relatively novel and exploratory nature of this study, the alpha level was set at
.05.
Missing data. A missing values analysis revealed a relatively low amount of
missing data (i.e., 2.4% or lower per variable) but the missing items did not appear to be
distributed randomly (Little’s MCAR test χ2(6633) = 7005.06, p = .001). Further analysis
revealed that only the Interpersonal Adjective Scales data produced a significant Little
MCAR test (Little’s MCAR test χ2(4341) = 4629.51, p = .001), but not the other variables
(Little’s MCAR test χ2(299) = 246.40, p = .988).
Mean Belief in Occurrence and mean Belief in Accuracy were computed with the
data available; no replacement values were used. This was deemed appropriate given the
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low amount of data missing (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001) and the fact that these are both
average-based rather than summative indices.
Missing values on the Interpersonal Adjective Scales were handled based on the
recommendations from the manual (Wiggins, 1995), which are based on normed data.
Specifically, a participant profile was deemed valid if at least six of the eight octant
adjectives were present and fewer than five items were missing in the entire Interpersonal
Adjective Scales. Based on these criteria, four cases were excluded from the total of 291
whenever Interpersonal Adjective Scales variables were used in the analyses.
Incidentally, those four cases were also the only ones that had more than 5% (but less
than 10%) of their data missing because of their incomplete Interpersonal Adjective
Scales. A series of Mann Whitney U tests between the cases retained and the cases
excluded did not reveal any significant differences on any of the variables of interest.
Given the significant Little MCAR finding, Expectation Maximization was used
to impute the missing values on the retained Interpersonal Adjective Scales cases (n =
287). Analyses were conducted both with the imputed data and without, with very similar
results. The imputed Interpersonal Adjective Scales data, however, was retained because
of the MCAR finding.
Hypothesis 2.1. To test the hypothesis that relative to challenges not involving
self-discrepant autobiographical memories, challenges involving self-discrepant
autobiographical memories would be more likely to include negative emotional states, a
Self-protective index was computed by using subcategories “Correcting views of me”
(J2) and “Defending the self” (J7) from the qualitative coding. If either or both codes
were present in a challenge, that challenge was coded as containing a Self-protective
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motive and given a dummy code of 1 (n = 38). If neither was present in a challenge, that
challenge was coded as not containing a Self-protective motive and given a dummy code
of 0 (n = 253). I used the Self-protective index in testing hypotheses 2.2 to 2.6 as well. To
index negative emotional states, subcategory “Negative Emotional States” (K1a) was
used from the qualitative coding. Consistent with the hypothesis, a chi-square analysis
revealed that challenges containing Self-protective motives included proportionally more
negative emotional states than challenges not containing Self-protective motives, 2 (291)
= 5.25, p = .030 (two-tailed), d = .27.
Hypothesis 2.2. It was expected that relative to challenges not involving selfdiscrepant autobiographical memories, challenges involving self-discrepant
autobiographical memories would have higher ratings on the question “during the
challenge, how important was it for you to convince the other person that you were
right?”
Participants’ responses to “during the challenge, how important was it for you to
convince the other person that you were right?” had an overall mean of 7.82 (Mdn = 8;
SD = 2.40, range 1–10) and acceptable skewness and kurtosis, with no values exceeding
+/–3SD. The same Self-protective index computed to test hypothesis 2.1 was also used
here. When Self-protective motives were present, mean ratings on the question reached
8.11 (SD = 2.15; n = 38), whereas when Self-protective motives were absent, mean
ratings on this same question reached 7.78 (SD = 2.43; n = 250). Contrary to the
hypothesis, a t test comparing mean ratings between the two groups did not reach
statistical significance, mean difference = 0.33 95% CI [–0.44; 1.08], t (286) = .789, p =
.431, d = .14.
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Given the unbalanced groups in the t test above, a second comparison was set up.
The “Prosocial motives” category that emerged out of the qualitative coding and the Selfprotective index created in hypothesis 2.1 were used to create a dummy coded variable
that contrasted self-protective and prosocial motives. The Prosocial motives category was
chosen because, unlike the Self-protective index, which consisted of challenges with an
internal, self focus and centered more on the self rather than or in addition to the other,
the Prosocial motives category consisted of challenges with an external, social focus and
centered more on a specific person other than or in addition to the self. The dummy
coding was set up as follows: If the challenge contained a Self-protective index code, it
was dummy coded as 1. If the challenge contained a Prosocial motives category code, it
was dummy coded as 0. Only non-overlapping cases were used, meaning that four cases
that contained both codes were excluded. I used the Self-protective vs. Prosocial-motives
index in testing hypotheses 2.3 to 2.6 as well.
When a Self-protective-but-not-a-Prosocial code was present, mean ratings
reached 8.12 (SD = 2.25, n = 33), whereas when a Prosocial-but-not-a-Self-protective
code was present, mean ratings reached 6.81 (SD = 2.76, n = 52). Consistent with the
hypothesis, a t test comparing ratings between the two groups revealed a statistically
significant mean difference of 1.31 [0.26; 2.39], with ratings within the Self-protective
group being significantly higher than ratings in the Prosocial motives group, t (83) =
2.29, bootstrapped p = .020, d = .52.
Hypothesis 2.3. It was expected that relative to challenges not involving selfdiscrepant autobiographical memories, challenges involving self-discrepant
autobiographical memories would have higher ratings on the question “during the
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challenge, how motivated were you to present a positive image of yourself?”
Participants’ responses to “during the challenge, how motivated were you to
present a positive image of yourself?” had an overall mean of 6.30 (Mdn = 6.50; SD =
2.85, range 1–10) and acceptable skewness and kurtosis, with no values exceeding +/3SD. When Self-protective motives were present, mean ratings were 7.76 (SD = 2.39; n =
38), whereas when Self-protective motives were absent, mean ratings were 6.08 (SD =
2.86; n = 251). Consistent with the hypothesis, a t test comparing the two groups revealed
a significant difference in ratings of 1.69 [0.82; 2.52], t (287) = 3.46, bootstrapped p <
.001, d = .60. Because the Levene’s test was significant, a Mann-Whitney U test was set
up, which, consistent with the hypothesis, also demonstrated significant difference in
ratings between the two groups, U = 3123.50, Z = 3.46, p (two-tailed) < .001.
Given the disparity in n between the two groups, another comparison was set up
using the dummy coded Self-protective vs. Prosocial motives variable created in
hypothesis 2.2. When Self-protective motives were present, mean ratings reached 7.73
(SD = 2.35, n = 33), whereas when Prosocial motives were present, mean ratings reached
6.21 (SD = 2.59, n = 52). Consistent with the hypothesis, a t test comparing ratings
between the two groups yielded a statistically significant mean difference of 1.52 [0.44;
2.55], with significantly higher ratings in the self protective group than the prosocial
group, t (83) = 2.73, bootstrapped p = .007, d = .62.
Hypothesis 2.4. It was expected that relative to challenges not involving selfdiscrepant autobiographical memories, challenges involving self-discrepant
autobiographical memories would have higher ratings on the questions “at the time, how
much did it bother you that you disagreed with what the other person said or did?” and
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“currently, how much does it still bother you that you disagreed with what the other
person said or did?”
Participants’ responses to “at the time, how much did it bother you that you
disagreed with what the other person said or did?” had an overall mean of 5.04 (Mdn =
5.00; SD = 3.30, range 1–10), acceptable skewness and kurtosis, and no values exceeding
+/-3SD. The same Self-protective index computed in hypothesis 2.1 was also used here.
When Self-protective motives were present, mean ratings were 6.24 (SD = 3.19; n = 38),
whereas when Self-protective motives were absent, mean ratings were 4.85 (SD = 3.29; n
= 250). Consistent with the hypothesis, a t test comparing the two groups was statistically
significant, mean difference = 1.39 [0.29; 2.48], t (286) = 2.43, bootstrapped p = .014, d =
.43.
Given the disparity in n, another comparison was conducted using the dummy
coded Self-protective vs. Prosocial motives variable created in hypothesis 2.2. When
Self-protective motives were present, ratings reached 6.24 (SD = 3.29, n = 33), whereas
when Prosocial motives were present, ratings reached 4.23 (SD = 3.08, n = 53).
Consistent with the hypothesis, a t test comparing ratings between the two groups yielded
a statistically significant mean difference of 2.02 [0.60; 3.41], with significantly higher
ratings in the Self protective group than the Prosocial group, t (84) = 2.88, bootstrapped p
= .005, d = .64.
Participants were also asked, “currently, how much does it still bother you that
you disagreed with what the other person said or did?” Relative to the question above,
responses to this question had a lower overall mean of 3.12 (Mdn = 2.00; SD = 2.77),
acceptable skewness and kurtosis, and no values exceeding +/-3SD. When Self-protective
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motives were present, mean ratings reached 4.11 (SD = 3.20; n = 38), whereas when Selfprotective motives were absent, mean ratings reached 2.96 (SD = 2.65; n = 250). Because
the Levene’s test showed significant unequal variances, the nonparametric MannWhitney U test was used, which, consistent with the hypothesis, showed significant
differences between the two groups, U = 3847.50, Z = 2.08, p (two-tailed) = .037.
Consistent with the hypothesis, using the dummy coded Self-protective vs. Prosocial
motives variable revealed a similar pattern of findings, with higher distress ratings
observed whenever Self-protective motives were present, Mann-Whitney U = 651.50, Z =
2.11, p (two-tailed) = .035.
Hypothesis 2.5. It was expected that relative to challenges not involving selfdiscrepant autobiographical memories, challenges involving self-discrepant
autobiographical memories would have greater confidence in self-reported judgments of
memorial occurrence and accuracy.
Participants’ ratings of Belief in Occurrence had an overall mean of 6.95 (Mdn =
7.33; SD = 1.02, range 1–7.50) but skewness and kurtosis values were outside acceptable
limits, with the distribution itself appearing severely left (negatively) skewed. When Selfprotective motives were present, mean Belief in Occurrence ratings were 7.06 (SD =
1.10; n = 38), whereas when Self-protective motives were absent, mean Belief in
Occurrence ratings were 6.93 (SD = 1.01; n = 253). Contrary to the hypothesis, the
Mann-Whitney U test revealed no significant differences between the two groups, U =
4090.00, Z = 1.96, p (two-tailed) = .050.
Participants’ ratings of Belief in Accuracy had an overall mean of 6.46 (Mdn =
7.00; SD = 0.98, range 1–7) but again, the skewness and kurtosis values were outside
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acceptable limits, with the distribution appearing severely left skewed. When Selfprotective motives were present, mean Belief in Accuracy ratings were 6.64 (SD = 0.59;
n = 38), whereas when Self-protective motives were absent, mean Belief in Accuracy
ratings were 6.43 (SD = 1.02; n = 253). Contrary to the hypothesis, the Mann-Whitney U
test revealed no significant differences in Belief in Accuracy ratings between the two
groups, U = 4514.50, Z = 0.673, p (two-tailed) = .503.
The contrast variable created to test hypothesis 2.2 was then used to ascertain
whether those endorsing Self-protective motives would have higher ratings of Belief in
Occurrence and Belief in Accuracy than those endorsing Prosocial motives. When Selfprotective motives were present, ratings of Belief in Occurrence reached 7.02 (SD = 1.18,
n = 33), whereas when Prosocial motives were present, ratings of Belief in Occurrence
reached 6.78 (SD = 1.25, n = 53). Contrary to the hypothesis, using a Mann-Whitney U
test, there were no significant between-group differences in ratings, U = 704.50, Z = 1.88,
p (two-tailed) = .060.
When Self-protective motives were present, ratings of Belief in Accuracy reached
6.60 (SD = 0.62, n = 33), whereas when Prosocial motives were present, ratings of Belief
in Accuracy reached 6.11 (SD = 1.25, n = 53). Contrary to the hypothesis, the MannWhitney U test did not reach statistical significance, U = 718.50, Z = 1.48, p (two-tailed)
= .139.
Hypothesis 2.6. It was expected that relative to challenges not involving selfdiscrepant autobiographical memories, challenges involving self-discrepant
autobiographical memories would have lower Centrality of Event Scale ratings.
Participants’ mean centrality ratings reached 2.15 (Mdn = 1.71, SD = 1.15, range 1–5).
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Although skewness and kurtosis values were within acceptable limits and no values
exceeded +/-3SD, the distribution of scores was right skewed. The Self-protective index
developed above was again used here. When Self-protective motives were present,
centrality ratings reached 2.26 (SD = 1.07; n = 38); when Self-protective motives were
absent, centrality ratings reached 2.13 (SD = 1.16; n = 253). Contrary to the hypothesis, a
Mann-Whitney U test did not reveal significant differences in centrality ratings between
the two groups, U = 4313.50, Z = 1.03, p (two-tailed) = .306. When the dummy coded
Self-protective vs. Prosocial motives variable was used, centrality ratings in the Selfprotective category reached 2.4 (SD = 1.09; n = 33), whereas centrality ratings in the
Prosocial motives category reached 2.63 (SD = 1.29; n = 53). Contrary to the hypothesis,
the difference in Centrality of Event Scale scores between the two groups, however, was
not statistically significant, Mann-Whitney U = 731.50, Z = 1.28, p (two-tailed) = .204.
Hypothesis 3.1. It was expected that individuals scoring higher on narcissism
would be disproportionally represented among self-discrepant autobiographical
memories. Refer to Appendix B for a diagram of the interpersonal circumplex.
To test this hypothesis, Interpersonal Adjective Scales octant scores were
computed and checked for normality and homogeneity of variance. In light of the
previously reported gender differences, such as the tendency for men to receive higher
scores than women on the Assured-Dominant, Arrogant-Calculating, and Cold-hearted
octants (Wiggins, 1995), as well as the significant gender differences observed between
men and women in the current investigation, tests were run separately for men and
women. Given the small ns, a series of gendered Mann Whitney U tests were set up with
the Self-protective index, originally created to test hypothesis 2.1, as the independent
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variable, and the narcissism-related octants as the dependent variables. Contrary to the
hypothesis, none of the tests reached statistical significance (see Table 4), although,
among women, Self-protective challenges (n = 13) tended to be accompanied by higher
Arrogant Calculating (p = .029, one-tailed) and Cold-Hearted scores (p = .063, onetailed) scores.
As per the Interpersonal Adjective Scales manual guidelines, a Dominance score
and a Nurturance score were also computed. Given significant gender differences on
Dominance, Mann Whitney U tests were conducted separately for men and women, with
the Self-protective index used as the independent variable, and the Dominance and
Nurturance scores used as dependent variables. Again, results did not reach statistical
significance (see Table 4), but there was an indication from consulting the mean ranks
that Dominance scores were higher whenever Self-protective motives were present.
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Table 4
Self-Protective Motives and Interpersonal Adjective Scales Octants
Self-protective index
Present
Variables

M (SD)

U

Z

p (twotailed)

p (onetailed)

Absent
n

M (SD)

n

Men (n = 152)
PA

4.54 (1.28)

25

4.60 (1.36)

127

1541.50

–0.23

.821

.411

BC

3.50 (1.09)

25

3.44 (1.68)

127

1475.50

–0.56

.580

.290

127

1414.50

–0.86

.392

.196

2.30 (1.02)

DE

25

2.64 (1.41)

DOM

–0.19 (1.57)

25

–0.47 (1.58)

127

1424.00

–0.81

.420

.210

LOV

–0.42 (1.25)

25

–0.85 (1.65)

127

1293.00

–1.46

.145

.072

122

672.00

–0.90

.372

.186

122

540.00

–1.89

.058

.029

Women (n = 135)
4.45 (1.46)

PA

3.00 (1.46)

BC

13
13

4.06 (1.35)
2.29 (1.27)

2.59 (1.48)

13

1.96 (1.23)

122

588.00

–1.54

.125

.063

DOM

–0.60 (1.80)

13

–0.99 (1.56)

122

667.00

–0.94

.353

.177

LOV

–1.27 (2.21)

13

–0.48 (1.76)

122

608.00

–1.38

.171

.085

4415.50

–0.66

.510

.255

3611.50

DE

BC

3.33 (1.23)

38

Overall (N = 287)
4.33 (1.38)
249
249
2.88 (1.60)

–2.35

.018

.009

DE

2.40 (1.18)

38

2.31 (1.36)

249

4282.00

–0.94

.347

.173

–0.33 (1.64)

38

–0.72 (1.59)

249

4004.00

–1.53

.128

.064

4.51 (1.33)

PA

DOM

38

–0.71 (1.66)
38
–0.67 (1.71)
–0.06
.951
.475
LOV
Note. PA = Assured-Dominant, BC = Arrogant-Calculating, DE = Cold-Hearted, DOM = Dominance,
LOV = Nurturance.
249

4701.00

Post hoc Analyses. As noted earlier, although subcategories J2 and J7 arguably
contain the most explicit instances of self-discrepant autobiographical memories, the
other subcategories within Self-focused motives may also contain some degree of selfdiscrepancy. For this reason, subcategories J1 through J7 were used to create a Selffocused motives index. If any of the J1 through J7 codes were present in a challenge, that
challenge was coded as containing a Self-Focused Motive and given a value of 1. If none
of the J1 through J7 codes were present, that challenge was coded as not containing a
Self-focused motive and given a value of 0. This index was thereafter used to test post
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hoc hypothesis 2.1 through 2.4.
Post hoc 2.1: A chi-square analysis revealed that challenges containing SelfFocused Motives included proportionally more negative emotional states than challenges
not containing Self-Focused Motives, 2 (291) = 15.73, p < .001 (two-sided), d = .48.
Post hoc 2.2: When Self-focused motives were present, mean ratings on the
question “during the challenge, how important was it for you to convince the other
person that you were right?” reached 8.03 (SD = 2.32; n = 144) whereas when SelfFocused motives were absent, mean ratings on this same question reached 7.61 (SD =
2.46; n = 144). A t test comparing mean ratings, however, did not reach statistical
significance, mean difference = 0.42 [–0.15; 0.95], t (286) = 1.48, bootstrapped p = .141,
d = .18.
Post hoc 2.3: When Self-focused motives were present, mean ratings on the
question “during the challenge, how motivated were you to present a positive image of
yourself?” were 6.38 (SD = 2.87; n = 145), whereas when Self-focused motives were
absent, mean ratings on this same question were 6.22 (SD = 2.85; n = 144). A t test
comparing the two groups did not reach statistical significance, mean difference = 0.16 [–
0.51; 0.82], t (287) = 0.488, bootstrapped p = .626, d = .06.
Post hoc 2.4: When Self-focused motives were present, mean ratings on the
question “At the time, how much did it bother you that you disagreed with what the other
person said or did?” were 5.68 (SD = 3.32; n = 144), whereas when Self-focused
motives were absent, mean ratings were 4.39 (SD = 3.18; n = 144). A t test comparing the
two groups was statistically significant, mean difference = 1.29 [0.55; 2.03], t (286) =
3.37, bootstrapped p = .001, d = .40.

86

SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
When Self-Focused motives were present, mean ratings on the question
“Currently, how much does it still bother you that you disagreed with what the other
person said or did?” were 3.51 (SD = 2.91; n = 144), whereas when Self-focused
motives were absent, mean ratings were 2.72 (SD = 2.54; n = 144). A Mann-Whitney U
test revealed statistically significant differences in ratings, U = 8903.50, Z = 2.40, p =
.016.
Study 1 Discussion
This investigation sought to explore why individuals challenge another’s
recollection of a past event that is occasionally discrepant with their self-concept,
establish that challenges involving self-discrepant autobiographical memories are
different from other challenges, and explore the role of narcissistic features. These
findings are discussed in three separate sections below.
Why Do Individuals Challenge Another’s Recollection of a Past Event?
Based on participants’ own accounts as well as prior research, a coding frame was
developed in order to identify and describe the motives offered for challenging another’s
recollection of a past event. Several memorial beliefs were given as reasons for
challenging, including, among others, believing that the challenged event happened
differently, believing that the challenged event did not occur, and endorsing beliefs
regarding memory integrity that were at odds with the other’s recollection. These
memorial beliefs were primarily used to strengthen the validity of one’s own version of
events and/or undermine the validity of the other’s version.
Of note, the Alternate attributions category was dropped in its entirety because it
was not reliably coded. From a theoretical perspective and consistent with the source
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monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), this category is of
interest because it implies that, at the time of recalling a memory, individuals evaluate
and make attributions about how the memory was acquired (i.e., temporal, spatial, and
social context). For example, in the current investigation, attributions were made about
the other’s memory being influenced by or resulting from drug use (e.g., “I challenged
because they smoke too much marijuana and now their memory is failing them”) or
mental health states (e.g., “I challenged because they have a mental illness that impairs
their perception of reality and memory”). Unlike in Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni
(2015), however, Alternate attributions in this study were not applied to one’s mental
representation. Rather, Alternate attributions were used to challenge the other’s recall.
Furthermore, their use indicated that participants understood how the context in which a
memory was acquired might influence its accuracy and/or interpretation. Because of this,
Alternate attributions - Internal (D1) in the current investigation overlapped with General
beliefs regarding memory integrity (A3), and in fact seven of the nine challenges given
D1 codes also received A3 codes.
Aside from Alternate attributions, Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni (2015) found
evidence of motives similar to the ones outlined in this investigation when exploring
reasons for reducing or relinquishing belief that a past event occurred to the self. Unlike
Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni (2015), however, the present study focused on the
deliverers of the challenge rather than on the recipients, and underscored the use of
memorial beliefs in providing social feedback and even challenging others’ recollection.
Prosocial motives emerged as yet another reason for challenging others’
recollection of a past event. These challenges tended to have a social focus in that they
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centered primarily on the challenged party (rather than the challenger), with the explicit
intention of being helpful to that challenged party. For example, some challenges were
quasi-therapeutic in their emotional support for the challenged other, whereas others
prioritized delivering or clarifying valuable information to the other person. Challenges
included in this category tended to be collaborative in that challengers reported reaching
out to the challenged party for help with piecing together a shared interpretation of the
challenged event or reminiscing on an old memory. A minority of prosocial challenges
involved a degree of deception, specifically lying about a past event in order to improve
or rebuild a strained relationship. These challenges were categorized under the prosocial
motives because of their partial or whole focus on the relationship rather than on the self,
although the lying is arguably indirectly self-serving in making the challenger appear in a
positive light and worthy of the relationship. Taken together, the emergence of prosocial
motives in this investigation echoes Pillemer’s work (2001) on the social function of
autobiographical remembering and the related notion that the sharing of memories helps
develop, maintain, and strengthen interpersonal relationships (also Alea & Bluck, 2003;
Bluck, 2003), as reflected in other areas of autobiographical memory work including
Fivush’s (2012) work on parental reminiscing and Hirst and Echterhoff’s (2012) social
sharing of memories.
Another category that surfaced as a way of describing the dataset was self-inrelation-to-others, which encompassed challenges resulting from participants’ internal
models of themselves, the challenged party, and/or a third party. In the case of the self,
participants reported challenging because doing so was consistent with their dispositional
view of themselves. This notion that dispositional qualities may be related to motives for
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challenging is consistent with the work of Cuc et al. (2006), as well as that of Hirst and
Echterhoff (2012) in that a challenger’s dominance, or at least their self-view as the type
of person who is dominant, may be one reason why they decide to challenge.
Alternatively, participants reported challenging because what was alleged to have
occurred in the challenged event was not consistent with whom they perceived
themselves to be. In the case of the challenged other, participants reported challenging
because aspects of the others’ disposition led them to question the other’s credibility. In
the case of the third party, participants reported challenging to preserve their dispositional
view of this individual. Of interest, this Internal Models of self and others category has
parallels in the dispositional and situational attributions studied within social psychology.
Finally, several self-focused motives also became apparent in coding the dataset.
Challenges coded under this category were reportedly driven by a desire to consolidate,
preserve, protect, and/or enhance a sense of “I” and “who I am.” As expected, challenges
involving the self-concept and arguably dissonance were also apparent among the coding
subcategories (e.g., Defending the self, Correcting views of me). There was substantial
overlap in coding these two subcategories, possibly because protecting one’s positive
self-concept (Defending the self) and making a good impression on others (Correcting
views of self) are closely related and attempts to disentangle the two are somewhat
artificial. For this reason, these two challenges were cumulatively referred to as involving
Self-protective motives and were treated as a singular index. Beyond self-protection, selfenhancement has also been advanced as a motive (see General Introduction). This desire
to enhance oneself was possibly evident in the Seeking recognition subcategory, which is
reminiscent of the self-enhancing nature of intentionally borrowing memories in order to
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make oneself look better (Brown et al., 2015). Overall, most motives under the selffocused category were reminiscent of Pillemer’s self function of autobiographical
remembering insofar as helping maintain and consolidate a sense of self.
Although directive motives did not materialize as a separate category, some
arguably directive motives were evident in the subcategory Managing anticipated
outcomes to the self, which involved challenges with a view to problem solving and
guiding future behaviour (e.g., “I challenged because I wanted to go on that rollercoaster
with my dad”). Another subcategory with a similarly directive undertone was Passing on
knowledge/information (under Prosocial motives category), which may lead to solving
problems and/or motivates change (e.g., “I challenged because I wanted to teach my
brother responsible financial habits”; e.g., Biondolillo & Pillemer, 2015).
How Are Challenges Involving Self-Discrepant autobiographical memories
Different from Other Challenges?
Consistent with the second objective, challenges stemming from self-discrepant
autobiographical memories, as was arguably the case for challenges coded under Self
protective motives, were different from other challenges in ways that appeared indicative
of dissonance.
First, challenges involving Self-protective motives were more likely to include
negative emotional states. Based on Aronson and others’ position that self-referent
negative emotions produce self-threat (Aronson, 1969, 1992; McFarland & Alvaro, 2000;
Pinto-Gouveia & Matos, 2011; Sedikides & Green, 2009), which in turn gives rise to
dissonance, I argue that the proportionally greater presence of negative emotional states
among Self-protective challenges as opposed to other types of challenges is indicative of
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dissonance among Self-protective-coded challenges. In further support of this
relationship between negative emotions and dissonance, Alicke and Sedikides (2009)
posited that experiencing negative affect preferentially activated self-protection rather
than self-enhancement, possibly because it signals threat to the self-concept.
Second, challenges involving Self-protective motives had higher ratings on the
question of importance to convince the other person they were right compared with
challenges involving Prosocial motives. This particular question was asked to ascertain
the extent to which the challenge was a reaction to or an attempt at protecting something
important to the self. That importance ratings in this question were significantly higher
among Self-protective challenges appears to suggest that there was greater dissonance
among Self-protective challenges than among Prosocial challenges. This finding is
aligned with Festinger’s (1957) view that the magnitude of dissonance is contingent upon
the importance, value, and consequence of the elements involved, as well as Aronson’s
revision of cognitive dissonance theory (1969, 1992).
Third, challenges involving Self-protective motives also had significantly higher
ratings on the importance of presenting oneself in a positive light relative to both the rest
of the challenges as well as relative to Prosocial motives. This finding is consistent with
Aronson’s view that dissonance is most powerful and most upsetting when actions
contradict one’s positive self-concept as moral, competent, stable, and predictable
(Aronson, 1969, 1992). When participants respond to this importance question with
higher ratings, it arguably suggests that the response from the other individual may have
threatened participants’ positive presentation and also possibly threatened their positive
self-concept.
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Fourth, challenges involving Self-protective motives were accompanied by higher
distress at disagreeing with the challenged party both at the time the challenge occurred
and at present. Arguably, the presence of distress or at least the acknowledgment that it is
occurring is indicative of dissonance and further supports the argument that the Selfprotective grouping was in fact composed of self-discrepant autobiographical memories.
Regarding the hypothesized appraisals of veridicality, neither Belief in Accuracy
nor Belief in Occurrence showed differential ratings when Self-protective vs. nonSelfprotective challenges were involved. Consistent with the hypothesized direction of this
prediction, however, challenges involving Self-protective motives did have marginally
higher ratings of Belief in Occurrence than nonSelf-protective challenges, but this
disappeared when values were contrasted against Prosocial challenges. It would therefore
appear that appraisals of veridicality and in particular, expected lower Belief in Accuracy
and lower Belief in Occurrence ratings, did not materialize when Self-protective
challenges were present. On the surface, these results appear to contradict D’Argembeau
and Van der Linden’s (2008) findings regarding shame-inducing autobiographical
memories receiving lower ratings of “I believe the event in my memory really occurred in
the way I remember it and that I have not imagined or fabricated anything that did not
occur” than pride-inducing autobiographical memories. The item those researchers used,
however, has been criticized because it tends to cross-load on various constructs,
including belief in occurrence, accuracy, and recollection (Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal,
2015). In contrast to D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008), the current investigation
appears better positioned to assess belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy because it
uses validated and multiple-item measures shown to capture each construct independently
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(Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal, 2015).
Finally, challenges involving Self-protective motives did not have higher ratings
of event centrality and presumably importance than challenges involving nonSelfprotective motives. Furthermore, there were no differences in importance ratings when
Self-protective and prosocial motives were contrasted against each other.
Post hoc analysis with a broader Self-focused motives index revealed that
challenges coded under this category included a higher number of negative emotions than
expected. Such challenges, however, did not demonstrate higher ratings of importance in
convincing the other or in presenting a positive self-image. These challenges were
nonetheless accompanied by higher distress at disagreeing with the challenged other
when the challenge originally occurred and at present. Based on the pattern of these
findings, it appears that the Self-protective index more so than the Self-focused index
isolated a subgroup of challenges that involved threat to the self-concept and dissonance,
namely self-discrepant autobiographical memories.
The Role of Narcissistic Features
In limited support of my original prediction regarding the disproportionate
presence of narcissistic features among self-discrepant autobiographical memories,
challenges involving Self-protective motives tended to have significantly higher ratings
on one aspect of narcissism among women, Arrogant-Calculating, but not other aspects,
like Assured-Dominant or Cold-Hearted. Similar findings did not emerge among the male
participants, meaning that men identifying Self-protective challenges did not endorse
more narcissistic traits than men providing nonSelf-protective challenges. Although not
statistically significant, there was a trend among those identifying Self-protective
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challenges to possess higher dominance scores.
Limitations and Future Directions
These findings are discussed in the context of certain limitations. First, the act of
challenging another’s recollection for a past event arguably stems from a subjective
evaluative process. This evaluative process is likely dynamic in nature insofar as it may
continue to evolve even after the challenging has taken place. It is therefore essential to
point out that the motives identified in this investigation are a snapshot of this evaluative
process and may have evolved or changed in some way since the challenge originally
occurred. In other words, the motives reported by participants could be a reconstruction
of the motives that originally led to the challenge. The motives presently reported by
participants are also limited by their insightfulness into themselves and their motives,
their’ ability to articulate their motives, their willingness to share their motives in writing,
and the nature of the cue they were presented with.
Another related limitation draws from the notion of double hermeneutics
(Giddens, 1987). In the case of this investigation, concepts like denial or defenses have
percolated through popular culture and may have become a lens through which
participants interpret their experiences. The fact that the present study finds similar
themes among challenges does not mean that the themes that emerge are completely
independent from these folk psychology concepts that may have originally informed
participants’ self-interpretations.
Third, it is suspected that the cue used (i.e., “challenge”) pulled for situations with
a more negative connotation, such as doubt and or suspicion regarding the other’s recall.
It is possible that a different, less adversarial cue, such as “describe how you intervened
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when someone was relating a past memory”, may pull for more helpful and supportive
situations, which might in turn lead to a greater variety and frequency of prosocial
motives emerging. Glazewski’s (2016) findings using “aided” rather than “challenged”
provided some preliminary support for the argument that more prosocial themes might
emerge if the cue carries a less adversarial connotation.
The use of this particular cue and the examples offered as part of that cue may
have also contributed to the higher prevalence of certain codes over others. For example,
the most prevalent code belonged to challenges driven by accuracy (63%), a motive that
was indirectly reflected in the instructions to participants (i.e., “told them something
about their memory was wrong”). Although the cue itself may have impacted the
prevalence of certain motives, the emergence of this and other motives, rather their
prevalence, was of greater importance to this study because it indicated that such motives
were part of participants’ experience and response to incompatible autobiographical
memories. It is possible that cues worded differently may have shaped the reporting of
more motives of a certain type, such as self-protective motives, but the aim of this study
was to cast a wider net into incompatible memories and allow self-discrepant
autobiographical memories to emerge in a more natural manner as a subset of
incompatible autobiographical memories.
Fourth, a major limitation was the sample size used in the Interpersonal Adjective
Scales analysis. Because of my decision to cast a wider net into why individuals
challenge others’ recollection, only a subgroup of challenges manifested dissonance and
self-protective motives. When this subgroup was analyzed by gender in relation to
Interpersonal Adjective Scales octants, sample size decreased further, thus limiting
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statistical power. In particular, the gendered findings with respect to the ArrogantCalculating octant of the Interpersonal Adjective Scales need to be interpreted with
caution given the limited number of women who had identified self-protective motives as
driving their challenges. Such results will need to be replicated in other studies before
they are considered reliable.
Furthermore, because this study did not use a clinical sample, even the few highly
narcissistic individuals that might have shown the pattern expected (i.e., narcissistic traits
were expected to be disproportionally represented among Self-protective challenges) may
have been too few to make a substantial difference in findings. Future studies might
selectively recruit more narcissistic individuals through a prescreening stage, and then
ascertain whether those individuals respond differently than non-narcissistic others to
another’s recollection.
Finally, as a way of confirming the coding of negative emotional states, it would
have been helpful to ask participants to fill out a state measure, like the Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), upon describing the
challenge. This could have also been used to index distress and arguably dissonance
processes.
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CHAPTER 3
Introduction to Study 2
Study 2 sought to explore how individuals experience and respond to their own
recollection of an autobiographical memory that may be dissonant with their self–
concept, arguably because it violates their self–concept as moral, competent, and/or
stable and predictable (Aronson, 1969, 1992).
Study 2 takes an intrapersonal approach to answering how individuals experience
and respond to self–discrepant autobiographical memories. Consistent with Campbell and
Sedikides’ (1999) work on activating self–threat (see General Introduction for more
detail), this intrapersonal approach was chosen in order to provoke greater self–threat and
more self–discrepant based responding than was evident in Study 1. According to
dissonance theory, the dissonance is greater when the individuals themselves are
responsible for the inconsistency (Draycott & Dabbs, 1998; Rodriguez & Strange, 2015).
In order to activate this more acute level of dissonance, Study 2 focused exclusively on
autobiographical memories for perpetration of intimate partner violence (IPV). IPV is
here defined as psychological/emotional, physical or sexual violence, or threat of
physical or sexual violence (Saltzman, Fanslow, McMahon, & Shelley (2002).
Perpetrating IPV arguably creates greater dissonance and poses greater threat to an
individual’s current self–concept because it involves socially unacceptable and frequently
illegal acts. The heightened discrepancy between one’s recollection and one’s self–
concept should activate cognitive dissonance, which should in turn be reduced through
dissonance reducing mechanisms like derogating past selves, minimizing the perceived
importance of the past IPV event, and so on.

98

SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
Study 2 is situated within the context of IPV, as opposed to sexual offending or
other types of transgressions, because (a) IPV is comparatively more prevalent than
sexual offending, (b) the IPV literature has extensively documented the presence of
dissonance–reducing appraisals among IPV perpetrators (Henning & Holdford, 2006;
Smith, 2007; Wood, 2004), and (c) the role of shame and its related impact on the self–
concept has received some empirical attention (Dutton, van Ginkel, & Starzomski, 1995;
Lawrence & Taft, 2013). This is not meant to be a comprehensive or representative
review of the IPV literature but rather is intended to show that perpetrating IPV, for
some, does induce shame and pose a threat to the self-concept.
The first part of the literature review outlines how self–threat is tied to IPV among
men. The second part of the review focuses on the kinds of appraisals that have been
studied in the male-perpetrated IPV literature. A third section is dedicated to rates of IPV
and appraisals in nonclinical samples of both men and women. This is followed by the
presentation of the study hypotheses and design, before finally turning to the results and
discussion.
IPV and Self–Threat
Within the IPV literature, four critical arguments help clarify the emergence of
appraisals and their relationship to self–threat: (a) violence is socially undesirable and/or
unacceptable (Dutton & Hemphill, 1992; Edin & Nilsson, 2014; Sugarman & Hotaling,
1997); (b) violating social standards by engaging in an act of violence evokes feeling of
shame (Dutton & Hemphill, 1992); (c) shame is self–threatening (Dutton et al., 1995;
Tangney, 1991); and (d) in order to escape from the experienced shame, the perpetrator
reappraises the violent act (e.g., by diminishing its severity, intensity, or reducing belief
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that it genuinely occurred) with the purpose of defending the self from it and maintaining
a positive self–concept (Smith, 2007; Wood, 2004). These arguments are evaluated in
greater detail in the sections that follow.
Violence is socially unacceptable. Violating moral and legal standards by
committing a violent physical, sexual, or emotional act is often deemed unacceptable by
the perpetrators of such acts (Dutton & Hemphill, 1992). Evidence for this argument
comes from studies reporting high rates of socially desirable responding (Dutton &
Hemphill, 1992; Sugarman & Hotaling, 1997) and significant underreporting of physical,
verbal, and psychological abuse among domestic offenders (Dutton & Hemphill, 1992).
Interestingly, although not statistically significant, the trend in Dutton and
Hemphill’s (1992) results suggests that elevations in socially desirable responding were
related to lower reporting of psychological and verbal aggression. In contrast, socially
desirable responding scores showed a weaker relationship to reports of physical
aggression. This pattern appears to suggest that IPV perpetrators lied the most (to
themselves and others) about psychological abuse, and the least about physical abuse.
One could speculate that, perhaps, given that physical abuse is more likely to leave
physical evidence (e.g., doctor’s visits, bruise marks, injuries), it is more difficult to deny
or minimize its existence to the self and/or to the victim. On the other hand, verbal and
psychological abuse may be less visible and therefore easier to deny or minimize.
Extending this speculation further, it may be easier to reduce the belief that the violent
event actually occurred and/or doubt the accuracy of its recall when physical evidence
confirming its existence is absent. It is therefore plausible that appraisals of veridicality
may be most used in instances of verbal and psychological abuse, and least used in
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instances of physical abuse.
Engaging in violent acts evokes shame. The high rates of socially desirable
responding (Dutton & Hemphill, 1992; Sugarman & Hotaling, 1997), in conjunction with
the elevated rates of denial and minimization among IPV perpetrators (e.g., Henning &
Holdford, 2006), have been used to infer that perpetrators experience shame about their
use of violence (Dutton & Hemphill, 1992; Smith, 2007; Winters, Clift, & Dutton, 2004).
There is some basis for this inference as IPV perpetrators do in fact report feeling
ashamed of their violence (e.g., Wood, 2004). I caution here, however, that not everyone
who perpetrates IPV experiences shame.
Why would the IPV act evoke shame, rather than guilt? Tangney (1991) defined
guilt as a negative evaluation regarding a specific behaviour involving harm to someone
or something. In contrast, she defined shame as a global, negative, and painful evaluation
involving the whole self. Her research has helped connect the two emotions to different
behavioural predispositions; guilt is presumably associated with reparative actions,
whereas shame is associated with a motive to hide or escape. Despite these differences,
the two emotions overlap greatly and may both be activated in a given situation.
Activation of shame or guilt, however, is also contingent upon individual differences and
how the situation is construed by that individual (Tangney, 1992).
It is proposed that IPV acts evoke shame because of distal factors, such as
childhood shaming experiences and considerations, which conceivably shape the
appraisal of adult acts of domestic violence in terms of shame. To elaborate, childhood
shaming experiences (e.g., being physically punished or scolded in the presence of
others; random physical punishment; treated in a way as to feel ashamed) predicted more
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frequent physical and psychological abuse perpetration in adult male IPV perpetrators
(Dutton et al., 1995). There was also a robust positive relationship between early shaming
experiences and borderline personality organization4 in male IPV perpetrators, suggesting
that early shame substantially contributed to the emergence of a personality organization
marked by intense and unstable relationships, splitting, devaluation, chronic feelings of
emptiness, fears of abandonment, and intense anger (Dutton & Starzomski, 1993; Dutton
et al., 1995).
Additional personality considerations emerge out of Tangney’s work with the trait
of shame–proneness. Across several samples (e.g., college students, at–risk youth,
inmates), Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, and McCloskey (2010) found that shame–
prone individuals exhibited an elevated tendency to externalize blame, which in turn
corresponded to elevations in both physical and verbal aggression. Given the fragility of
narcissists’ egos, their unstable self–concept, and their reaction to perceived slights
(APA, 2013), it is not surprising to find that pathological aspects of narcissism (e.g.,
exploitativeness) are related to elevations in shame–proneness (Gramzow & Tangney,
1992).
Taken together, it appears that male IPV perpetrators may be more vulnerable to
experiencing shame as adults due to either early shaming experiences and/or personality
features that sensitize them to shame and potentially promote the formation of a shame–
based sense of self. Because of this sensitivity, they are expected to appraise IPV acts as
shameful (Tangney, 1992). Moreover, personality styles that are more vulnerable to
shame and/or shame–proneness, like narcissism, should theoretically activate greater
4

This personality style differs from borderline personality disorder in that it becomes
salient only in intimate relationships (Dutton & Starzomski, 1993).
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shame. Therefore, one could speculate that narcissists may be more vulnerable to
experiencing more intense shame than the average individual (Gramzow & Tangney,
1992).
Shame is self–threatening. The argument that shame is self–threatening is based
on the evaluation of oneself as globally and painfully bad (Paivio & Pascual–Leone,
2010; Tangney, 1991), which is an affront to the positive self–concept that most
individuals hold (Sedikides & Green, 2004). Shame, therefore, threatens a very basic
assumption about individuals: that individuals are generally good and moral individuals.
Tangney (1991) does not appear to differentiate between adaptive and maladaptive shame
(cf. Paivio & Pascual–Leone, 2010), nor is there a suggestion that shame might exist
along a continuum (cf. Lawrence & Taft, 2013). Her conceptualization of shame as an
inherently toxic emotion, however, may be because she casts guilt as the more adaptive
emotion that is essentially more prosocial in motivating reparative action (Tangney,
1991). Regardless of the exact definition and distinctions, there is an underlying
consensus that experiencing (maladaptive) shame is so painful and threatening to one’s
sense of self that the individual seeks to avoid it or defend oneself against it (Paivio &
Pascual–Leone, 2010; Tangney, 1991), and one such defense is externalization of
responsibility, or blame (Stuewig et al., 2010). Other defenses have also been proposed
and will be reviewed in the next section.
Evidence regarding the threatening nature of shame comes primarily from clinical
and theoretical work, which claims that anger and/or aggression are used to shut down or
avoid shame (“shame–rage spiral”; “humiliated fury”; Paivio & Pascual–Leone, 2010;
Stuewig et al., 2010). In addition, as the relationship between shame and externalized
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blame implies (Stuewig et al., 2010), individuals feel the need to defend against or
somehow protect themselves from shame.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, a handful of studies conducted within the
autobiographical memory literature further bolster the notion that shame is threatening. In
those studies, shame–inducing autobiographical memories tend to be protected against by
being appraised as less important and less coherent to the self than pride–inducing
memories (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008). There has also been some
speculation that reducing the belief that a past autobiographical event occurred to the self
may in fact be an appraisal mechanisms activated to reduce or avoid shame (Scoboria et
al., 2015).
Thus, there are converging findings and theorizing across various literatures that
shame generally constitutes a threat to the self presumably due to the painful implication
that the self is bad. Appraisals are therefore activated to protect the self from this threat.
In light of this research, shame is taken to index self–threat in Study 2.
Appraisals help protect against self–threat. Accumulating research has
examined excuses (admission that the act was bad/wrong but perpetrator does not accept
responsibility for it; e.g., “It was a bad thing to do, but it was not my fault”), justifications
(admission of responsibility for the act, but denial that the act was wrong or
inappropriate; e.g., “I did it, and I had a right to do it”), and denials (no recognition of
responsibility or wrongfulness of the act), as ways of coping with the shamefulness of the
IPV act that some individuals experience while simultaneously protecting the positivity
of the current self–concept (Dutton, 1995; Dutton & Hemphill, 1992; Enosh &
Buchbinder, 2005; Mullaney, 2007; Wood, 2004).
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Most of this work has emerged out of in–depth interviews with men, which have
identified several overarching appraisal–related themes. For example, a major theme
from Smith’s work (2007) was the use of minimization as well as attempts at normalizing
the abusive behaviour by referring to it as “just” an argument. Other themes included
perceiving the IPV episode as self–defense, the latter reminiscent of the “victim position”
some perpetrators adopt to portray their violent act as reactive (Edin & Nilsson, 2014).
The in–depth interviews also underscored themes of entitlement (to obedience and
respect), patriarchal views (with regards to a perceived right to be in control), and
superiority (devaluing and demeaning the partner). Based on these themes, Smith (2007)
concluded, as many others have also done, that the perception of threat and the manner
with which IPV perpetrators defend themselves is partly attributable to personality
characteristics. Specifically, she argued that male perpetrators favoring minimization
might show features consistent with a dysphoric/borderline personality style, whereas
male perpetrators evincing superiority and entitlement might show features more
consistent with a narcissistic/antisocial style (see Tweed & Dutton, 1998; Holtzworth–
Munroe & Stuart, 1994, for more on this typology). It is however noted that research
attempting to link personality disorders or typologies to IPV has yielded inconsistent
results (Ali, Dhingra, & McGarry, 2016).
Goodrum, Umberson, and Anderson (2001) used in–depth interviews to compare
33 male IPV perpetrators against 25 matched nonviolent men (i.e., no history of domestic
violence). The male IPV perpetrators tended to deny their role in the violent acts by
denying that they were batterers because they had “only abused one woman in their life”
or “had never really beaten her.” Another portion of those interviewed blamed their
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partner for inciting the offense and at times accused the partner of controlling or playing
mind games. In addition, they tended to deny or avoid the victim’s physical and
emotional injuries. According to Goodrum and colleagues (2001), avoidance may be
more characteristic of the dysphoric/borderline type, whereas denial may be more
characteristic of the narcissistic/antisocial type, who is traditionally the less relationshiporiented of the two types. Comparatively, nonviolent men had more regard for both their
partner and their relationship. These men further evinced greater empathy towards their
partners and viewed them as a positive influence. This comparison is informative in its
implication that differences in self–threat may be crucial to understanding the nature and
utility of appraisals. Although there might very well be other differences between the two
groups, like childhood adversity, personality, substance abuse, or anger management
problems (Dutton, 1995; Dutton & Starzomski, 1993), it is worth also considering that
the differences in self–threat as experienced by the two groups may be part of the reason
why one group prioritizes appraisals to protect the self whereas the other group prioritizes
affiliation and relationship preservation.
Wood (2004) grouped appraisals into three categories: justifications,
dissociations, and regrets. Justifications involved taking responsibility but explaining that
the violence was appropriate, necessary, or within the perpetrator’s right. Themes
included under this category were “she disrespected me as a man,” “man has a right to
control/discipline his woman,” and “she provoked me.” Dissociations reflected ways in
which male perpetrators attempted to dissociate or disconnect the self from what they
perceived “real abusers” to be. For example, participants explained that they were not the
abusive types because, unlike “real abusers,” they did not enjoy hurting women. In
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contrast to prior research, which has categorized childhood trauma, anger issues, or
drug/alcohol abuse as “excuses,” or classified statements such as “my violence was
limited” as minimizations, Wood (2004) argues that these appraisals may be better
understood from the perpetrator’s perspective as attempts at separating the self from the
violent act. That IPV perpetrators would be motivated to seek this kind of separation or
distance from their violent act appears suggestive of their motivation to self–protect from
the threatening implication that they might be a “real abuser.” The final category includes
regrets, which were replete with statements of shame and guilt (e.g., “I was ashamed. I
felt less than a man when I did those things” (Wood, 2004). The relevance of Wood’s
work goes beyond its grouping of appraisals; the categories she proposes incorporate a
traditional view of masculinity as dominance, which was tellingly endorsed by all
participants. Once again then, personality appears crucial to understanding why
appraisals emerge (e.g., in response to challenges to masculine ideals) and the form they
take (e.g., dissociations or justifications).
A few studies have more explicitly connected appraisals to autobiographical
memory through the use of autobiographical narratives. In a study by Baumeister et al.
(1990), undergraduate participants (gender composition not reported) were asked to each
provide a narrative of a time in which they had been angered (victim narratives) and an
account of a time in which they had angered someone else (perpetrator narratives). Not
surprisingly, perpetrators more so than victims were more likely to deny any lasting
negative consequences stemming from their acts. Perpetrator narratives hinted at greater
closure by referencing “happy endings” or apologies, and also portrayed their acts as
isolated incidents, whereas victim narratives referred to long–lasting negative
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consequences and an ongoing sense of loss. Regarding motives, perpetrators viewed their
actions as motivated by impulsivity, uncontrollability, or caused by external or mitigating
causes; some even portrayed the victim as partly responsible for their actions. The current
study is relevant not only because of its use of autobiographical narratives to essentially
replicate the various appraisals emerging out of the IPV literature, but also because it
crucially emphasizes how different appraisals (e.g., casting the event as an isolated
incident with no ties to the present in order to protect oneself) may be embedded in
autobiographical narratives.
Dating Violence and Marital Violence
As stated earlier, the IPV literature reviewed here is not intended to reflect the full
breadth of the IPV literature. Rather, the literature selected is drawn upon because IPV
events arguably create conditions under which dissonance-reducing appraisals may
emerge. Despite this stated purpose, it nonetheless is important to caution that the
literature presented thus far has drawn primarily from work on marital violence and may
not necessarily extend or apply to dating violence or to female perpetrators.
Some similarities have been noted between dating and marital violence, including
the notion of a continuity of violence that starts during the dating period and extends to
the marriage period (Shorey, Cornelius, & Bell, 2008). Other have argued, however, that
while dating violence may be a precursor to marital violence in some cases, there are also
other cases in which this continuity hypothesis is not supported (Follingstad, Bradley,
Laughlin, & Burke, 1999). Other similarities noted between the types of aggression
include, among others, poor communication skills, alcohol use, and jealousy (Follingstad,
Wright, Lloyd, & Sebastian, 1999). There are also differences between the two types of
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violence, including the greater economic investment and emotional attachment in marital
relationships, and the relative lack of experience and awareness of what may constitute
violence in dating relationships (Shorey et al., 2008).
IPV Rates
Similar to differences between dating and marital samples, rates of IPV often
differ based on the type of sample (e.g., community samples of adults versus university
student samples). Because the current study recruited participants from both the
community and a university setting, rates from both types of studies are reviewed below.
Community samples. Lifetime prevalence rates of perpetrating
psychological/emotional abuse are understood to be higher than lifetime prevalence rates
for perpetrating physical violence. Rates vary between 74% (Straus & Sweet, 1992) and
75% in men (Stets, 1990), and between 75% (Straus & Sweet, 1992) and 80% in women
(Stets, 1990). Other studies that have examined couples have found prevalence rates of
psychological/emotional abuse closer to 97% (Taft et al., 2006).
In terms of physical violence, Desmarais and colleagues (Desmarais, Reeves,
Nicholls, Telford, & Fiebert, 2012) provided pooled prevalence estimates for studies that
used large population samples. They found that in the past year, male-perpetrated
physical violence reached 18.3%, whereas female-perpetrated physical violence reached
25.8%. These numbers were comparable to the college and university samples (i.e.,
20.9% and 27.6% respectively). The prevalence rates in studies using clinical samples,
however, were predictably higher, with past-year prevalence rates of 34.1% for maleperpetrated physical violence and 49.5% for female-perpetrated physical violence.
Desmarais and colleagues also provided lifetime pooled estimates of physical
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violence. They found that male-perpetrated physical violence in college and university
samples reached 18.4%, whereas female-perpetrated physical violence reached 30.0%.
The prevalence rates in studies using clinical samples were again predictably higher, with
lifetime prevalence rate of 41.6% for male-perpetrated physical violence and 42.6% for
female-perpetrated physical violence.
Undergraduate samples. Regarding emotional and psychological abuse, male–
on–female lifetime perpetration, as measured by the Revised Conflict Tactics Scale, was
reported by 82% of male undergraduates (Hines & Saudino, 2003). For minor forms of
psychological dating violence, lifetime prevalence rates for male–on–female are around
85.7% (e.g., insulting or swearing at a partner); whereas for more severe forms,
prevalence rates are around 30.2% (e.g., destroying something belonging to the partner;
Cerone, Beach, & Arias, 2005. Based on the past 12 months, prevalence rates for male–
on–female perpetration show that 59% of male undergraduate students report minor
psychological/emotional violence (as rated on the Revised Conflict Tactics Scale) and
22% report more severe psychological/emotional violence (Scott & Straus, 2007).
Regarding physical violence, lifetime prevalence rate for male–on–female
perpetration was reported by 29% of male undergraduates (Hines & Saudino, 2003). For
minor forms of physical violence (e.g., pushing a partner), the lifetime perpetration rate
ranges between 26% (Hines & Saudino, 2003) to 36% (Cercone et al., 2005;), whereas
for more severe forms (e.g., beating up a partner), lifetime perpetration rate ranges
between 7% (Cercone et al., 2005; Scott & Straus, 2007)) and 10.5% (Hines & Saudino,
2003), and 11% (Scott & Strauss, 2007).
Regarding sexual violence, male–on–female lifetime perpetration was reported by
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15% (Scott & Straus, 2007) to 29% of male undergraduates (Hines & Saudino, 2003).
Minor forms of male-on-female sexual coercion were reported by 15% of male
undergraduates (Scott & Straus, 2007), whereas more severe forms of sexual coercion
were reported by 7% of male undergraduates (Scott & Straus, 2007).
Regarding emotional or psychological abuse, lifetime perpetration of female–on–
male was reported by 86% of female undergraduates (Hines & Saudino, 2003). For minor
forms of emotional and psychological abuse, lifetime prevalence rates are around 89.3%;
for more severe forms of emotional and psychological abuse, rates are around 26.7%
(Cercone et al., 2005). Based on the past 12 months, prevalence rates for female–on–male
perpetration show that 53% of female undergraduate students report minor
psychological/emotional violence and 23% report more severe psychological/emotional
violence (Scott & Straus, 2007).
Regarding physical violence, lifetime female-on-male perpetration was reported
by 13.5% of female undergraduates (Hines & Saudino, 2003). For minor forms of
physical violence, the lifetime perpetration rate ranges from 28% (Scott & Strauss, 2007),
to 34% (Hines & Saudino, 2003) to 38.7% (Cercone et al., 2005), whereas for more
severe forms, lifetime perpetration rate ranges between 7.5% (Hines & Saudino, 2003) to
15.1% (Cercone et al., 2005). Prevalence rates for the past 12 months were 28% of
female undergraduates admitting to a minor physical IPV and 15% admitting to a more
severe physical IPV (Scott & Straus, 2007).
Regarding sexual violence, female–on–male perpetration was reported by 13.5%
of female undergraduates (Hines & Saudino, 2003). Comparable values were obtained by
Scott and Straus (2007), who found a 20% prevalence rate for minor sexual coercive acts
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and 11% prevalence rate for more severe sexual coercive acts.
Cumulatively, these prevalence rates suggest that male and female perpetration
rates for psychological/emotional and physical IPV are relatively comparable, although
the context in which the violence occurred, the motive for it, and the severity of injury are
not accounted for by these data (Miller, 2011). In fact, even though a number of studies
in this area have found women to be significantly more likely to perpetrate physical IPV
than men (Archer, 2000; Desmarais et al., 2012; Miller, 2011), men are significantly
more likely to have injured their partners (Archer, 2000). Regarding sexual coercion, the
perpetration rates demonstrate that men are significantly more likely to engage in this act
than women.
IPV Appraisals
Denial, minimization, and similar appraisals have received extensive empirical
attention among clinical/forensic samples. Much more limited attention has been
dedicated to these appraisals among nonclinical/community/student samples.
Miller (2011) argued that failure to admit to perpetration of IPV or identify
oneself as a victim of IPV may be influenced by appraisals, such as denial or
minimization. In support of this hypothesis, she found that the majority of undergraduate
participants in her sample (a) failed to initially self–identify as perpetrators or victims
despite later endorsing having committed and/or experienced IPV on a rating scale that
labels specific acts as such (i.e., the Revised Conflict Tactics Scale; Straus, Hamby,
Boney-McCoy, & Sugarman, 1996), and (b) minimized abuse by perceiving it as
acceptable, effective, appropriate, or necessary, which was significantly linked to abuse
perpetration in both men and women. In other words, male and female undergraduate
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perpetrators endorsed attitudes that minimized acts of IPV. The extent to which such
attitudes were endorsed, however, differed between men and women. In fact, men were
more likely than women to hold beliefs that abuse was an effective, acceptable,
appropriate, and necessary way of resolving conflict in dating relationships.
Scott and Straus (2007) also examined appraisals in an undergraduate sample.
They created scale items to assess blaming one’s partner for relationship difficulties (e.g.,
“My partner exaggerates negative things I have done in our relationship)”,
minimizing/avoiding relationship difficulties (“After my partner and I fight, I try not to
think about it”), and denial of personal contribution to relationship problems (“I have
never said or done anything that hurt my partner.”). After controlling for social
desirability, the authors found that male and female perpetrators of psychological and
physical violence tended to blame their partners for relationship difficulties. They also
found that male perpetrators of physical assault and sexual coercion tended to minimize
relationship difficulties. In terms of gender differences and consistent with Miller’s
(2011) findings, Scott and Straus showed that male students were more likely to deny the
seriousness of problems in relationships than female students. Although this study is
informative regarding the use of appraisal among undergraduate students, these
appraisals refer to relationship difficulties in general rather than IPV.
Bryant and Spencer (2003) used the vignette-based Domestic Violence Blame
Scale to assess attributions of blame to victims of domestic violence among a sample of
university students. They found that male students were more likely to blame the victim
for causing the domestic incident than female students. They also found that students who
had perpetrated violence in dating relationships were more likely to blame the victim for
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the domestic incident. The Bryant and Spencer study inches closer towards assessing
IPV-related appraisals (i.e., victim-blaming) among undergraduates, but participants’
reactions and ensuing appraisals may be limited by the vignette-based nature of the scale.
Even though there are numerous studies that have explored IPV-related appraisals among
domestic offenders and/or treatment-seekers, few studies to date have delved into IPVrelated appraisals in undergraduate/community samples.
Objectives and Hypotheses
Building on the work of Campbell and Sedikides (1999), the primary objective of
this study is to demonstrate that increasing self–threat heightens cognitive dissonance and
appraisal use. To test this hypothesis, it was necessary to induce different levels of self–
threat, and then observe how this manipulation impacted appraisals. Variations in self–
threat were accomplished by exposing each participant to two counterbalanced
conditions. In the high self–threat condition, participants were instructed to describe a
past event of them engaging in IPV. In the low self–threat condition, they were instructed
to describe a past event of them engaging in a kind, supportive, and/or understanding act
in a relationship context. This manipulation was modeled after the shame– and pride–
inducing conditions of D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008).
Three appraisals of importance were measured: (a) perceived closure from event,
(b) perceived importance of event, and (c) derogation of past selves. It was expected that
the high self–threat condition would activate (a) greater perceived closure, (b) lower
perceived importance scores and (c) greater derogation of past selves, relative to the low
self–threat condition.
Regarding appraisals of veridicality (i.e., accuracy and occurrence), consistent
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with Scoboria et al. (2014), it was expected that the high self–threat condition would
evoke more reduced or relinquished belief that the event genuinely occurred to the self.
In other words, when participants were instructed to report on the likelihood that they
personally experienced a past IPV event (for example), they were expected to produce
lower ratings in the high self–threat condition relative to the low self–threat condition. If
the results were consistent with this hypothesis, it would suggest that participants might
be attempting to go beyond putting the threatening event at arms’ length to denying its
occurrence. It also is possible that participants demonstrate lower accuracy ratings under
conditions of high self–threat. This latter hypothesis was inspired by D’Argembeau and
Van der Linden (2008), who found higher ratings of “I believe the event in my memory
really occurred in the way I remember it and that I have not imagined or fabricated
anything that did not occur” in pride–inducing relative to shame–inducing memories,
suggesting that the more threatening memories may also be defended against by reducing
belief in occurrence and/or accuracy. Otherwise stated, when participants were instructed
to report on whether they had any doubts about the accuracy of the past event (for
example), they were expected to produce lower ratings in the high self–threat condition
relative to the low self–threat condition. If confirmed, the results would imply that
participants have more doubts about the extent to which their current recollection
corresponds to what actually happened when cued to recall a past threatening event.
The second objective of Study 2 was to investigate how personality variables
affected the intensity of appraisals. Of particular interest here were individuals scoring
high on the Assured–Dominant scale of the Interpersonal Adjective Scales and those
scoring high on shame–proneness. Both these personality styles were expected to be
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accompanied by (a) greater perceived closure, (b) lower perceived importance, (c) greater
derogation of past selves, (d) lower belief in occurrence scores, and (e) lower belief in
accuracy scores.
Study 2 hypotheses are summarized as follows:
1. Relative to exposure to the low self–threat condition, exposure to the high self–threat
condition would produce: (a) lower scores on perceived importance, (b) greater
derogation of past selves, (c) higher scores on perceived closure, (d) lower scores of
belief in occurrence, and (e) lower scores of belief in accuracy.
2. In the high self–threat condition, higher shame–proneness would predict (a) lower
scores on perceived importance, (b) greater derogation of past selves, (c) higher
scores on perceived closure, (d) lower scores of belief in occurrence, and (e) lower
scores of belief in accuracy.
3. In the high self–threat condition, higher Assured–Dominance would predict (a) higher
scores on perceived closure, (b) lower scores on perceived importance, (c) greater
derogation of past selves, (d) lower scores of belief in occurrence, and (e) lower
scores of belief in accuracy.
Study 2 Method
Participants
The first wave of recruitment was carried out online through the Psychology
Participant Pool at the University of Windsor and yielded 60 male and 59 female
participants. A second wave of recruitment was carried out online through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk, and yielded 62 men and 58 women. The dataset originally consisted of
239 participants (122 men, 117 women). Of those, 12 were excluded because they had
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not provided a high–threat account, three were excluded because their account suggested
that they had been victims rather than perpetrators, and three were excluded because they
had responded appropriately to the situation (e.g., asked to leave the situation, there was a
discussion but no shouting or yelling was involved). Of note, 16 of the 18 excluded cases
involved participants from the student sample.
The remaining 221 participants passed both validity checks; a simple math
question and a spelling question. Their median time–to–completion was 48 minutes and 2
seconds, with the fastest taking close to 15 minutes to complete the survey. No cases
were excluded based on time–to–completion because of a slow and steady increase in
times that was suggestive of normal within–subject variance.
The overall sample was composed of 111 men and 110 women, and had a mean
age of 27.22 (Mdn = 25, SD = 8.59, range 18– 62). The majority of participants self–
identified as White (n = 161, 72.9%), followed by Multiracial (n = 23, 10.0%), Black (n =
14, 6.3%), East Asian (n = 9, 4.1%), South Asian (n = 5, 2.3%), Hispanic/Latino (n = 4,
1.8%), Middle Eastern (n = 4, 1.8%), and Pacific Islander (n = 1, 0.5%). The highest
level of education completed was Professional degree (n = 1, 5%) or Doctorate degree (n
= 1, 5%), followed by Master’s degree (n = 16, 7.2%), Bachelor’s degree (n = 60,
27.1%), Community college (n = 33, 14.9%) and high school or equivalent (n = 110,
49.8%).
In order to protect participant anonymity, geographic location tracking was
deactivated on Fluid surveys. Prior studies using Mechanical Turk in Dr. Scoboria’s lab,
however, have indicated that the majority of participants come from North America.
Participants whose Mechanical Turk account was affiliated with India were excluded
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from this study because of the large proportion of these individuals not comprehending
similar tasks in prior projects conducted in Dr. Scoboria’s lab.
When comparing students to MTurk participants, statistically significant
differences emerged in age, Mann–Whitney U z = –11.65, p < .001, with students being
on average about 10 years younger than MTurk participants.
Measures (see Appendix G for a complete list of measures for Study 2)
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS: Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988). The PANAS is a 20–item self–report instrument widely used to assess two
dominant dimensions of emotional experience: Positive Affect and Negative Affect. The
20 items reflect 10 positive and 10 negative mood states. Participants were instructed to
rate the extent to which they experience each mood state on a 5–point Likert–type scale
(1 = very slightly or not at all; 5 = very much). Researchers can choose the temporal
reference they want participants to use. For the present study, the instructions directed
participants to report the extent to which they felt a certain way "right now (that is, at the
present moment)" (Watson et al., 1988). A Positive Affect score was computed by
averaging across the 10 items that make up this dimension, with higher scores indicative
of higher levels of positive affect. Similarly, a Negative Affect score was computed by
averaging across the 10 items that make up this dimension, with higher scores indicative
of higher levels of negative affect. Both the Positive Affect and Negative Affect scales
have demonstrated high internal consistency, alpha = .89 and alpha = .85 respectively
(Watson et al., 1988). In this study, the alpha for the Positive Affect scale ranged from
.89 (high self-threat) to .91 (low self-threat). The alpha for the Negative Affect scale
ranged from .91 (high self-threat) to .93 (low self-threat).

118

SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
In the present investigation, the PANAS was used as a manipulation check
administered after a target event had been described. Specifically, the high self–threat
condition was expected to produce a higher Negative Affect score and a higher
“ashamed” score than the low self–threat condition. Conversely, the low self–threat
condition was expected to produce a higher Positive Affect score and a higher “proud”
score than the high self–threat condition.
Centrality of Event Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). The Centrality of Event
Scale is a 20–item self–report instrument that measures the extent to which a past event is
appraised as central to a person’s life story and identity. Participants are asked to rate on
a 5–point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree) statements about the
subjective impact of a past event (e.g., “This event has colored the way I think and feel
about other experiences”). The Total Centrality score is obtained by averaging across all
20 items, with higher scores indicative of greater importance attributions. The scale has
demonstrated good internal consistency, alpha = .94. In the current study, the Centrality
of Event Scale was used to gauge the degree to which participants appraise the target
event as important to their identity and life story. Under both high self-threat and low
self-threat condition, the alpha for the 20 Centrality of Event Scale items was .95.
Measures of belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy. The three items used
in Scoboria, Jackson, et al., (2014) were also used here to assess belief in the occurrence
of an event (i.e., autobiographical belief that the event truly occurred to the self). Two of
the times are scored on a 7–point scale, whereas the third item is scored on an 8–point
scale. The three items are averaged (Scoboria, Jackson, et al., 2014), with higher scores
indicative of stronger autobiographical belief. In the current study, the Cronbach’s alpha
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for belief in occurrence was between .77 (high self-threat) and .78 (low self-threat).
Belief in accuracy, which broadly refers to attributions made about the degree to
which the contents of a current mental representation correspond to the details that in fact
occurred in the past, were captured by using three items from Scoboria et al. (2014).
These items assess confidence in the accuracy of the memory, proportion of memory that
is accurate, and doubts as to the accuracy of the memory, on 7–point scales. The items
are averaged, and higher scores are indicative of greater confidence in the accuracy of
one’s own memory. In the current study, the Cronbach’s alpha for belief in accuracy
ranged between .81 (high self-threat) and .85 (low self-threat). Measures of belief in
accuracy and belief in occurrence were used to capture participant’s appraisals of the
veridicality of target events.
Personal Attributes Rating Scale (McFarland & Alvaro, 2000). This scale
consists of 27 personal characteristics compiled by McFarland and Alvaro (2000; see the
General Introduction for a brief review of this study). Participants are asked to rate their
current and pre–event selves on each personal characteristic on a 9–point Likert type
scale (1 = not at all; 9 = extremely). Items are averaged separately for the current and
pre–event selves to obtain two overall scores, with higher scores indicative of more
positive ratings of personal characteristics. McFarland and Alvaro reported good internal
consistency for the two overall indices (alpha = .91 for current self; alpha = .89 for pre–
event self). This measure was used to index the extent to which participants devalue their
past selves. Derogation of past selves emerges when the average pre–event self score is
lower than the average current self score. In the current study, alpha was .96 (current self
and pre-event self) under the high self-threat condition and .95 (current self) and .94 (pre-
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event self) respectively under the low self-threat condition.
Sense of Closure Scale (Beike, Markman, & Karadogan, 2009). This is a 6–
item self–report scale that measures perceived psychological distance or closure.
Participants are asked to respond to each scale item on a 7–point Likert type scale (1 =
not at all; 7 = very much). The six items, including two that are reverse-scored, are
averaged to produce a single score of perceived closure. Higher scores are indicative of
greater perceived psychological closure. The total score has shown adequate internal
consistency (alpha = .88; Beike, Adams, & Naufel, 2010.). The scale was used to index
participants’ perceived psychological closure regarding the target event. In the current
study, alpha was .87 in the high self-threat condition and .74 in the low self-threat
condition. After exploring inter-item correlations, it became apparent that item 6 (“I just
wish I could figure out why this event happened”) did not relate in predictable ways to
the other scale items. If excluded, alpha values climbed to .90 in the high self-threat
condition and .77 in the low self-threat condition. Because the nature of meaning making
can be conceptually distinct from perceived psychological distance and closure (although
there is likely overlap), item 6 was dropped, and the mean of Sense of Closure was
calculated based on the five items that held better together. This 5-item Sense of Closure
was referenced throughout this manuscript as Sense of Closure Scale-5 to differentiate it
from the original scale that the participants completed.
Test of Self–Conscious Affect–3 (Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow,
2000). The Test of Self-Conscious Affect–3 is a well–known and widely used self–report
instrument that uses brief scenarios to capture dispositional tendencies towards
experiencing shame and/or guilt. It consists of 15 scenarios (10 negative, 5 positive), with
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each scenario being followed by a set of statements rated on a 5–point Likert type scale
(1 = not likely; 5 = very likely). A shorter 11–scenario version of the Test of SelfConscious Affect–3 has also been validated and was used for this study.
Participants are instructed to read each scenario and imagine themselves in it.
They are thereafter asked to indicate how likely they are to act in each of the ways
described. For example, one of the scenarios is: “You are driving down the road, and you
hit a small animal.” Participants are then asked to rate the following statements: “You
would think the animal shouldn’t have been on the road” (scored as externalization);
“You would think: I’m terrible” (scored as shame); “You’d feel: “Well, it was an
accident” (scored as detached); “You’d feel bad you hadn’t been more alert driving down
on the road (scored as guilt).” Answers are summed across scenarios to yield indices of
Shame–Proneness, Guilt–Proneness, Externalization of blame, and
Detachment/Unconcern. The Test of Self-Conscious Affect–3 subscales have
demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (.71 for the shame subscale in Kivisto,
Kivisto, Moore, & Rhatigan, 2011; .73 for the shame subscale in the current study). Only
trait shame–proneness was used in the current investigation, with higher scores indicative
of higher levels of shame.
Physical Aggression and Psychological Aggression Scales (Kwong,
Bartholomew, Henderson, & Trinke, 2003). The Physical Aggression Scale is a 14–
item self–report instrument modeled after the widely used Revised Conflict Tactics
Scales. Participants are asked to report whether each of the 14 items have happened to
them, and if so, to indicate its frequency in the past 12 months (1 = 1 incident, 2 = 2
incidents, 3 = 3–5 incidents, 4 = 6–10 incidents, 5 = 11–20 incidents, 6 = more than 20
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incidents). According to Kwong et al. (2003), the scale can be scored dichotomously in
terms of ever perpetrated violence and currently perpetrating violence. It is also possible
to compute two continuous scores; one is a variety score computed by summing the total
number of different categories endorsed. For example, if a participant reported slapping
their partner three times and pushing them five times, they would receive a variety score
of two because they endorsed two different acts. The other is a weighted frequency score
based on summing the 1–through–6 ratings across all items. The alpha for the Physical
Aggression Scale was .94. Authors suggest that variety scores tend to perform better
statistically than weighted frequency scores.
The Psychological Aggression Scale is a 13–item self–report instrument based on
the Revised Conflict Tactics Scale (Straus et al., 1996) as well as the Psychological
Maltreatment of Women Inventory (Tolman, 1999). The instructions and scoring
methodology for this scale are analogous to the ones used for the Physical Aggression
Scale. The alpha for this Psychological Aggression Scale was .89. Both scales were used
in this study to assess self–reported rates of physical and psychological aggression.
Interpersonal Adjective Scales (Wiggins, 1995). The Interpersonal Adjective
Scales is a self–report measure that assesses interpersonal traits based on the circumplex
model of personality, which posits that interpersonal traits can be located along two
principal orthogonal dimensions: Dominance (which ranges from submissive to dominant
and controlling) and Nurturance (which ranges from cold and hostile to warm and
friendly). Participants are instructed to rate a list of 64 adjectives (e.g., “timid”) on an 8–
point Likert scale (1 = extremely unlikely; 8 = extremely likely) based on how accurately
each adjective describes them. There are eight adjectives that contribute to each of the
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eight octants: Assured–Dominant, Arrogant–Calculating, Cold–Hearted, Aloof–
Introverted, Unassured–Submissive, Unassuming–Ingenuous, Warm–Agreeable, and
Gregarious–Extraverted. Octant scores for each participant are computed by averaging
across the eight adjective scores contributing to that particular octant. A Dominance score
and a Nurturance score can also be computed for each participant based on their octant z
scores and weights specified in the scoring manual (Wiggins, 1995). The Interpersonal
Adjective Scales has demonstrated adequate psychometric properties (Wiggins, 1995). In
the present study, the Interpersonal Adjective Scales and in particular the Assured–
Dominant, Arrogant–Calculating, and Cold–Hearted octants were used to gauge
narcissistic traits (Miller et al., 2012; Wiggins, 1995). A diagram of the interpersonal
circumplex is included in Appendix B to aid in interpretation.
Procedure
Participant pool recruitment. Participants were screened for eligibility through
the Psychology Participant Pool website by answering the following question: “With
respect to your current or past partner, have you ever threatened, attempted, or completed
any of the following: shouted, insulted, name–called, threw something at them, pushed or
shoved them, slapped or grabbed them, kicked, punched, or insisted on sex or forced sex”
(see Appendix F). This wording was chosen to reflect the definition of IPV as
psychological/emotional abuse, physical or sexual violence, or threat of physical or
sexual violence used by Saltzman, Fanslow, McMahon, and Shelley (2002). Those
responding affirmatively to this screener were deemed eligible for participation. Only
eligible participants saw the study advertisement on the Participant Pool website. Those
interested in the study description clicked on an URL link, which directed them to the

124

SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
Letter of Information on the Fluid Surveys site. Participants provided consent by
continuing on in the online survey.
Amazon Mechanical Turk recruitment. The study was advertised on Amazon
Mechanical Turk, which invited individuals who could think of a specific time in which
they acted in a kind, supportive, and/or understanding way towards a past or present
romantic partner or date AND a specific time in which they engaged in any of the
following with a past or present romantic partner or date: shouted, insulted, name–called,
threw something at them, pushed or shoved them, slapped or grabbed them, kicked,
punched, or insisted on sex or forced sex. Those interested accessed a link that directed
them to Turkitron, a tool that screens Turk workers for eligibility for studies and directs
eligible workers to survey links. For the current study, eligible workers were directed to
the landing page of the survey and presented with the Letter of Information. They
provided consent by continuing on in the online survey. Workers deemed ineligible were
informed that they do not meet the criteria for the study and instructed to return to Turk
to remove themselves from the task.
Procedure following initial recruitment. Eligible participants were randomly
and automatically assigned to start with either the low self–threat condition or the high
self–threat condition. The order of presentation of the two conditions was
counterbalanced. In the high self–threat condition, participants were instructed to “Select
a time that you expressed, enacted, perpetrated, inflicted or threatened to do any of the
following to your partner/girlfriend/boyfriend/wife/husband/date: shouted, insulted,
name–called, threw something at them, pushed or shoved them, slapped or grabbed them,
kicked, punched, or insisted on sex or forced sex. Please describe in as much detail as
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you can this event, including (a) what you said/did, (b) why you did what you did, (c)
how you felt at the time, and (d) how you saw yourself at the time.” In the low self–threat
condition, participants were instructed to “Select a time that you acted in a kind,
supportive, and/or understanding way in the context of an intimate relationship (e.g.,
surprised the other with a gift or a dinner, purchased flowers). Please describe in as much
detail as you can this event, including: (a) what you said/did, (b) why you did what you
did, (c) how you felt at the time, and (d) how you saw yourself at the time.”
Although modeled after the pride– and shame–inducing conditions of
D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008), the prompts did not specifically reference
“shame” because doing so might prime shame and potentially trigger defensive
responses. Participants were instead instructed to select a past event involving IPV–
related behaviours. To make the prompts as parallel as possible, “pride” was also not
explicitly referenced; it was instead replaced with instructions that asked about
supportive and kind behaviours within a relationship context. The wording of the low
self–threat prompt was inspired by Ross and Wilson (2002), who refer to a “kind act”
when directing participants to write about an event that made them feel “quite proud
(e.g., a special achievement or kind act)” (p. 798). Asking for specific details to be
included in the narratives, as well as the wording itself, were taken from Wood (2004).
After describing the first target event (either the low self–threat or the high self–
threat event), participants were instructed to complete the PANAS as a manipulation
check, followed by the Centrality of Event Scale, measures of belief in accuracy, and
belief in occurrence, the Personal Attributes Rating Scale, and the Sense of Closure
Scale-5 (see Appendix H for the exact order of measures). At this point in the survey,
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participants were presented with the prompt for the second target event, after which they
again completed the PANAS, Centrality of Event Scale, measures of Belief in Accuracy,
and Belief in Occurrence, the Personal Attributes Rating Scale, the Sense of Closure
Scale-5, and demographic information. Participants completed a positive mood induction
task right after the high self–threat event. The mood induction consisted of asking
participants to describe a positive memory that they believe truly occurred. After being
exposed to both conditions, participants completed the Test of Self-Conscious Affect–3,
the Psychological and Physical Aggression Scales, and the Interpersonal Adjective
Scales.
At the end of the survey, participants from the Participant Pool provided their
name and UWindsor email, which was used to award them course credit. At the end of
the survey, participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk provided their Mechanical Turk
ID in order to receive compensation ($4.00). After completing this page, participants
were thanked for their participation and provided with a list of resources in case the
disclosure surrounding the high self–threat event was upsetting or distressful for them.
This investigation was set up as a repeated measures design because neither
D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008), nor the few other studies that have examined
positively and negatively–valenced memories (e.g., Berntsen, Rubin, & Siegler, 2011) or
self–consistent and self–discrepant memories (e.g., Mutluturk & Tekcan, 2015) within–
subjects have reported any carryover effects. In addition, the survey was administered
online because this method allows for larger sample sizes to be collected more efficiently.
Furthermore, prior research has indicated that rates of disclosure regarding sensitive
topics are higher when online methods are used (Joinson, 2001).
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Although anonymity could not be guaranteed in this investigation, the online
method did offer visual anonymity, meaning that the source of the information could not
be physically detected. This component of online data collection has been proposed as an
important consideration in facilitating self–disclosure (Joinson, 2001). Given that this
investigation asked for instances of IPV to be described in some detail, it was especially
important for participants to feel comfortable enough to disclose acts that may not only
be shame–inducing for them but also potentially illegal. This level of disclosure could
arguably be better achieved through online rather than in–person methods. There are
certainly costs to implementing an online survey, including a limited ability to monitor
participants’ environment and/or level of engagement. In light of the relatively sensitive
nature of this investigation, however, the advantages appeared to outweigh the
disadvantages of conducting the survey online. In addition, manipulation checks were
embedded throughout the survey (e.g., simple math questions) and survey completion
times were checked to ensure completion quality.
In order to ensure as sincere a disclosure of IPV acts as possible, participants were
assured of the confidentiality of their results at the informed consent stage, and notified
that there was no legal or ethical duty to report on any admission to violent act(s)
perpetrated within an intimate partner or dating relationship. Further, they were cautioned
against including any identifying information in their narratives. Participants’ responses
were safeguarded at every stage of research, from data collection to its use,
dissemination, and retention. The security of the data itself was ensured through several
security protocols, including storing the data on secure servers and back–up drives
located in Canada. Although student participant name and email was initially requested to
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ensure compensation for participation, this information was discarded as soon as the
quality of completion was evaluated and the compensation was awarded. Turk
participants were largely (but not completely) anonymous to the researchers. The only
partly identifying information collected were participants’ Turk IDs (i.e., a string of
letters and numbers), which cannot be tracked to real names/identities by researchers
using the Turk service.
At the consent stage and throughout the online survey, participants had the right
to refuse to answer questions or withdraw from the study. Moreover, the principal
investigator’s email was made available in case participants wish to contact her with
questions regarding disclosure (or otherwise). At the post–study stage, participants were
provided with a list of resources in case the disclosure surrounding the high self–threat
event was upsetting or distressful for them. Importantly, past research suggests that
participating in dating violence research, despite some mild negative reaction reported by
the more frequent male perpetrators of psychological and physical IPV, is beneficial to
both male and female perpetrators, who report gaining greater insight into themselves and
their relationships (Shorey, Cornelius, & Bell, 2011). This study received clearance from
the University of Windsor Research Ethics Board.
Study 2 Results
Data Analysis Plan
All analyses were conducting using SPSS 21. Prior to any statistical analyses, data
were checked against corresponding statistical assumptions; only violations and
corrections are reported in the appropriate sections below. Whenever possible,
bootstrapping with 5000 samples was used to calculate statistics of interest. In light of the
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relatively novel and exploratory nature of this study, the alpha level was set at .05.
Missing Data
A missing values analysis revealed a relatively low amount of missing data (i.e.,
2.7% or lower per variable) and the items missing appeared to be distributed randomly
(Little’s MCAR test χ2(49569) = 113.32, p = 1.00). Mean Belief in Occurrence, Mean Belief
in Accuracy, and Mean Centrality of Event Scale were computed with the data available;
no replacement values were used because these are average–based rather than summative
indices. In the case of summative indices (i.e., PANAS, Test of Self-Conscious Affect–
3), missing values were replaced using the series mean (i.e., the mean of that variable
across the dataset). This was deemed appropriate given the low amount of data missing
(Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001). As a check, analyses were run using either series means or
pairwise deletion; the resulting statistics were very similar but the distribution of scores
in the lower end was superior when using the series mean method. This method of
replacing missing data was therefore retained and used in the analyses presented below.
Missing values on the Interpersonal Adjective Scales were handled based on the
recommendations from the manual (Wiggins, 1995), which are based on normed data.
Specifically, a participant profile was deemed valid if at least six of the eight octant
adjectives were present and fewer than five items were missing in the entire Interpersonal
Adjective Scales. Based on these criteria, two additional cases were excluded from the
total of 221 whenever Interpersonal Adjective Scales variables were used in the analyses.
A series of Mann-Whitney U tests comparing the cases retained (n = 221) versus
the cases excluded from the analyses (n = 20) revealed some predictable significant
differences only in the high self-threat condition, including Positive and Negative Affect

130

SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
Scale – Negative Affect, Personal Attributes Rating Scale, Belief in Accuracy, Belief in
Occurrence, Psychological Aggression, and Physical Aggression. Analyses were
conducted both with and without the excluded cases and the finding remained
comparable. Only the analyses with the excluded cases are presented below.
Manipulation Check
To check whether the high self–threat and low self–threat manipulation was
successful, the PANAS administered immediately after the high self–threat condition was
compared to the PANAS administered immediately after the low self–threat condition.
As expected, the high self–threat condition produced significantly higher PANAS–
Negative Affect scores than the low self–threat condition, mean difference = 5.45 [95%
CI 4.46, 6.43], t (220) = 11.17, bootstrapped p < .001. The high self–threat condition also
produced lower PANAS–Positive Affect scores than the low self–threat condition, mean
difference = –4.35 [–5.32, –3.40], t (220) = –8.80, bootstrapped p < .001.
As an additional manipulation check, the PANAS–shame and PANAS–pride
items were also consulted across the two conditions. PANAS–shame was significantly
higher in the high self–threat condition relative to the low self–threat condition, mean
difference = 0.95 [0.78; 1.11], t (220) = 11.48, bootstrapped p < .001. In contrast,
PANAS–pride was significantly lower in the high self–threat condition relative to the low
self–threat condition, mean difference = –1.07 [–1.26; –0.89], t (220) = –11.42,
bootstrapped p < .001.
To check whether gender and/or participant recruitment source was related to
PANAS ratings, a mixed–design ANOVA [condition (within–factor, high self–threat or
low self–threat) x gender (between–factor, male or female) x recruitment source
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(between–factor, student or MTurk)] was conducted separately for PANAS–Negative
Affect and PANAS–Positive Affect. For PANAS–Negative Affect, there was a
significant main effect for recruitment source (higher ratings in undergraduates, F = 4.50,
p = .035), and a significant main effect for condition (higher ratings in the high self–
threat condition, F = 121.64, p < .001). For PANAS–Positive Affect, there was a
significant condition x recruitment source interaction (F = 6.87, p = .009) and a
significant main effect for condition (higher ratings in low self–threat condition, F =
75.11, p < .001). Overall, scores differed in predictable ways across the high self–threat
and low self–threat conditions. PANAS–Negative Affect scores were significantly higher
among undergraduates across conditions. PANAS–Positive Affect scores were
significantly higher among MTurk participants in the low self–threat condition; PANAS–
Positive Affect ratings were comparable across participants in the high self–threat
condition.
Order Effects
A series of t-tests were run to ascertain whether the order in which the conditions
were presented had any effect on the variables of interest. The only significant mean
differences appeared on the PANAS – Negative Affect (high self-threat condition) and on
the Centrality of Event Scale (high self-threat condition). Regarding the PANAS –
Negative Affect, there were significantly higher negative affect ratings in the aftermath of
the high self-threat condition (t = –2.69, df = 219, p = 0.12) when the high self-threat
condition was presented second (M = 21.53, SD = 9.51) than when it was presented first
(M = 18.44, SD = 7.48). Regarding the Centrality of Event Scale, there were significantly
higher scores in the aftermath of the high self-threat condition (t = –2.29, df = 219, p =
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.024) when the high self-threat condition was presented second (M = 2.70, SD = 0.94)
than when it was presented first (M = 2.41, SD = 0.93).
Age
Age was investigated as to whether it should be used as a control variable in the
analyses presented below. Mean age was 23.51 (SD = 6.35, Mdn = 22) at the time of the
high self–threat event and 24.31 (SD = 7.35, Mdn = 22) at the time of the low self–threat.
A paired t test revealed that high self–threat events were dated as originating from an
objectively earlier time period than low self–threat events, t (217) = –2.60, p bootstrapped
= .013. Neither age at the time of the high self–threat event nor age at the time of the low
self–threat event were significantly related to any appraisals (i.e., Sense of Closure-5,
Personal Attributes Rating Scale), suggesting limited need for age to be controlled.
A series of Pearson r correlations were used to explore whether current participant
age was related to any key variables. Older age was significantly related to higher
centrality ratings (Centrality of Event Scale) in the high self–threat condition (r = .21, p =
.002), lower externalization scores (r = –.15, p = .026), and lower psychological
aggression frequency (r = –.15, p = .027) and variety (r = –.14, p = .037) scores.
Rates of Physical and Psychological Aggression
Table 1 presents rates of self–reported engagement in physical and psychological
aggression for men and women. Approximately 30.6% of men and 46.4% of women
reported engaging in at least one kind of physical aggression. Approximately 91.9% of
men and 97.3% of women reported engaging in at least one kind of psychological
aggression. Relative to men, women reported engaging in a greater variety of physical
and psychological aggression. Women also reported significantly greater weighted
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frequency of engaging in either form of aggression.

Table 1
Rates of Self–Reported Physical and Psychological Aggression by Sex
Men (n = 111)
M (SD)

Mdn

1.07 (2.52)

0.00

Women (n = 110)
M (SD)
Mdn
1.55 (2.71)

0.00

Physical aggression variety score
Physical aggression weighted
16.65 (8.41)
14.00
17.37 (8.67)
14.00
frequency score
Psychological aggression variety
4.85 (2.85)
5.00
5.79 (2.78)
6.00
score
Psychological aggression
24.82 (11.05)
22.00
28.73 (12.75)
26.00
weighted frequency score
a
Note. Mann–Whitney U test was used instead of a t test to check for gender differences.
*p < .05

t/z
–2.33*a
–2.26*a
–2.49*
–2.44*

Please refer to Table 2 for rates of endorsement of at least one incident of physical
and psychological aggression. The Excel-based program ESCI was used to estimate
confidence intervals around the proportion difference between men and women
(Cumming, 2012). Women reported threatening to hit, hurt, or throw something at a
partner significantly more so than men. Women also reported pushing or shoving,
slapping, and punching a partner significantly more so than men. Men reported twisting a
partner’s arm or hair and grabbing a partner or holding a partner down in anger
significantly more so than women.
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Table 2
Rates of Endorsement Across Scale Items
Men
(n = 111)

Psychological Aggression Items

Women
(n = 110)

Prop. difference
[95% CI]

n
88

%
79.28

n
95

%
86.36

.07 [–.03; .17]

85

76.58

91

82.73

.06 [–.05; .17]

69

62.16

80

73.39

.11 [–.01; .23]

37

33.64

47

42.73

.09 [–.04; .22]

18

16.22

27

24.55

.08 [–.02; .19]

37

33.33

37

33.64

.00 [–.12; .13]

57

51.35

69

62.73

.11 [–.02; .24]

79

71.82

89

80.91

.09 [–.02; .20]

16

14.41

21

19.27

.05 [–.05; .15]

11

9.91

30

27.27

.17 [.07; .27]

26

23.64

31

28.18

.05 [–.07; .16]

5

4.63

5

4.55

.00 [–.06; .06]

10

9.09

15

13.64

.05 [–.04; .13]

1. Pushed or shoved a partner

n
20

%
18.02

n
37

%
33.64

.16 [.04; .27]

2. Slapped a partner
3. Thrown something at a partner that could hurt
4. Twisted a partner’s arm or hair

11
8
12

10.00
7.27
10.81

27
16
4

24.55
14.55
3.64

.15 [.05; .24]
.07 [–.01; .16]
–.07 [–.15; –.002]

5. Used a knife or gun on a partner

2

1.82

3

2.73

.01 [–.04; .06]

6. Punched a partner
7. Hit a partner with something that could hurt
8. Choked a partner

9
10
4

8.11
9.01
3.64

20
12
8

18.18
11.01
7.34

.10 [.01; .19]
.02 [–.06; .10]
.04 [–.03; .11]

9. Slammed a partner against a wall

8

7.34

7

6.36

–.01 [–.08; .06]

1. Shouted or yelled at a partner
2. Ignored, shut out, or given a partner the silent
treatment
3. Called a partner hurtful names
4. Criticized or put down a partner in front of
others
5. Limited a partner’s contact with others such as
family or friends
6. Controlled a partner’s behavior or activities in
any way
7. Acted jealous or suspicious of a partner’s other
relationships
8. Insulted or sworn at a partner
9. Intentionally destroyed something belonging to
a partner
10. Threatened to hit, hurt, or throw something at
a partner
11. Thrown, smashed, hit, or kicked something in
a partner’s presence
12. Threatened to hurt a partner if they left the
relationship
13. Threatened to hurt yourself if a partner left
the relationship
Physical Aggression Items

10. Beaten up a partner
2
1.83
6
5.50
.04 [–.02; .10]
11. Grabbed a partner or held a partner down in
17
15.45
5
4.55
–.11 [–.19; –.03]
anger
12. Burned or scalded a partner on purpose
5
4.50
5
4.59
.001 [–.06; .06]
13. Kicked a partner
7
6.36
10
9.09
.03 [–.05; .10]
14. Scratched or bitten a partner during a conflict
4
3.60
9
8.18
.05 [–.02; .12]
Note. Percentages are based on available data. N ranged from 108 to 111 for men, and 109 to 110 for women.

A series of Gender x Recruitment source ANOVAs were conducted to ascertain
whether recruitment source, gender, or a combination of the two was relevant to the
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physical and psychological aggression rates reported. For psychological aggression
variety scores, there was a significant main effect for gender (F = 6.48, p = .012) and a
significant main effect for recruitment source (F = 7.10, p = .008), but no interaction (F =
2.34, p = .127). For psychological aggression weighted frequency scores, there was a
significant main effect for gender (F = 6.22, p = .013) and a significant main effect for
recruitment source (F = 12.69, p < .001), but no interaction (F = 2.41, p = .122). As was
the case for physical aggression scores, the results suggest that women reported engaging
in significantly greater variety and significantly higher weighted frequency of
psychological aggression than men. The findings also suggest students reported more
psychological aggression than MTurk participants.
Given the positively skewed distribution of the two aggression scores, gender and
recruitment source differences were examined through Mann–Whitney U tests. Women
reported higher rates of engaging in physical aggression (z variety score = –2.33, p = .020; z
weighted frequency score

= –2.26, p = .023). Rates of engaging in physical aggression did not

differ significantly between recruitment sources (z variety score = –0.81, p = .420; z weighted
frequency score

= –0.76, p = 0.447).

Descriptives
Descriptive statistics for the variables of interest are presented in Table 3 for the
overall sample, as well as men and women separately. A series of t tests or Mann–
Whitney U tests (in case the Levene’s test was significant) were run to check whether
ratings differed significantly between men and women. Significant gender differences
were observed on the Centrality of Event Scale (low self–threat condition), Sense of
Closure Scale-5 (high self-threat and low self-threat conditions), Test of Self-Conscious
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Affect–3 shame–proneness, Assured–Dominant, Arrogant–Calculating, and Cold–
Hearted.
Given the recruitment source differences reported earlier, descriptive statistics are
also presented by recruitment source (see Table 3). Relative to students, MTurk
participants gave significantly higher ratings on Centrality (both high self–threat and low
self–threat conditions), higher ratings on Personal Attributes Rating Scale (low self–
threat condition), and lower ratings on the Assured–Dominant octant.
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Table 3
Descriptives of Variables of Interest

Overall (N = 221)
M (SD)
Mdn

Skew

Women
(n = 110)
M (SD)

Gender
diff.
t/z

2.60 (0.94)

–0.63

1.62 (1.68)

1.55 (1.73)

-0.59
5.30 (1.48)
8.36
7.02 (0.71)
1.55
6.16 (1.05)
Low self threat
–0.21
2.70 (0.98)

Kurt.

Men
(n = 111)
M (SD)

High self threat
–0.37
2.52 (0.95)

MTurk
(n = 118)
M (SD)

Student
(n = 103)
M (SD)

Source
diff.
t/z

2.76 (1.00)

2.32 (0.81)

–3.41**a

0.31

1.73 (1.81)

1.42 (1.55)

–0.80a

4.75 (1.77)
7.02 (0.75)
6.27 (1.05)

–2.27*a
0.04
–0.75

5.11 (1.62)
6.97 (0.81)
6.18 (1.12)

4.93 (1.69)
7.08 (0.62)
6.25 (0.97)

0.78
–0.28a
–0.47

2.38 (0.82)

–2.38*a

2.68 (0.98)

2.39 (0.82)

–2.23*a

Centrality of Event Scale
Personal Attributes Rating
Scale (current – pre-IPV)
Current-self
Pre-IPV self
Sense of Closure Scale-5
Belief in Occurrence
Belief in Accuracy

2.56 (0.94)

2.50

0.41

1.58 (1.70)

1.22

0.91

7.01 (1.14)
5.42 (1.71)
5.03 (1.65)
7.02 (0.73)
6.21 (1.05)

7.11
5.52
5.40
7.33
6.67

-0.59
–2.91
–1.43

Centrality of Event Scale
Personal Attributes Rating
Scale (current – pre-IPV)
Current-self
Pre-IPV self
Sense of Closure Scale-5
Belief in Occurrence
Belief in Accuracy
Test of Self-Conscious
Affect - shame
Assured Dominant
Arrogant Calculating
Cold Hearted

2.54 (0.91)

2.47

0.53

0.19 (0.93)

0.04

1.13

5.54

0.31 (1.03)

0.07 (0.79)

1.95

0.33 (0.99)

0.02 (0.82)

2.57*

6.98 (1.13)
6.79 (1.16)
4.90 (1.43)
7.03 (0.81)
6.45 (0.92)

7.00
6.74
5.00
7.33
7.00

-0.50
–3.19
–2.12

-0.20
9.93
4.46

5.12 (1.27)
7.01 (0.82)
6.41 (0.93)

4.68 (1.56)
7.05 (0.81)
6.49 (0.91)

–2.09*a
–0.35
–0.67

4.98 (1.37)
6.97 (0.88)
6.43 (0.97)

4.80 (1.50)
7.10 (0.72)
6.48 (0.85)

0.94
–0.97a
–0.45

34.90 (7.21)

36.00

–0.47

0.11

33.33 (6.84)

36.49 (7.26)

–3.33*

34.63 (7.17)

35.21 (7.29)

–0.60

4.48 (1.32)
3.24 (1.46)
2.59 (2.13)

4.50
3.00
2.13

0.07
0.51
1.13

–0.22
–0.27
0.97

4.72 (1.25)
3.60 (1.43)
2.88 (1.51)

4.25 (1.34)
2.87 (1.39)
2.30 (1.23)

4.28 (1.39)
3.13 (1.48)
2.72 (1.46)

4.71 (1.19)
3.36 (1.42)
2.45 (1.34)

–2.46*
–1.18
1.38

0.67

2.68*
3.89**
3.09*a

Note. a Because Levene’s test was statistically significant, the non–parametric Mann–Whitney U was run instead.
*p < .05. **p < .001.
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Main Analyses
Hypothesis 1: Relative to exposure to the low self–threat condition, exposure to
the high self–threat condition was expected to produce: (a) lower Centrality of Event
Scale scores, (b) higher Personal Attributes Rating Scale scores, (c) higher Sense of
Closure Scale scores, (d) lower Belief in Occurrence scores, and (e) lower Belief in
Accuracy scores.
Prior to running the paired t tests, difference scores were checked for gender
differences and recruitment source differences. The only significant finding involved
male and female difference scores on Centrality. Because of the gender differences in
Sense of Closure Scale-5 scores, results for men and women are also presented
separately. Finally, given the leptokurtic distribution of Belief in Accuracy and Belief in
Occurrence, difference scores for only these two variables were subjected to a
nonparametric paired test, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks.
As expected, when exposed to the high self–threat condition (i.e., recalling
perpetration of an IPV event), participants reported greater derogation of past selves,
t(220) = 11.58, p < .001, d = 1.01, large effect, and lower Belief in Accuracy, z (220) = –
3.96, p < .001, d = –0.24, small effect, than when exposed to the low self–threat condition
(see Table 4). Contrary to the hypothesis, women but not men reported higher Centrality
scores when exposed to the high self–threat condition than when exposed to the low self–
threat condition, t (109) = 2.34, p = .022, d = –0.19, small effect. Also contrary to the
hypothesis, the high self-threat condition was not accompanied by lower Belief in
Occurrence or higher Sense of Closure Scale-5 scores.

139

SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES

Table 4
Appraisal Comparisons Across Conditions
High self–threat

Low self–threat

M (SD)

M (SD)

M diff.

95% CI

t/z

p

2.56 (0.94)

2.54 (0.91)

0.01

[–0.12, 0.15]

0.17

.865

0.02

Men

2.52 (0.95)

2.70 (0.98)

–0.19

[–0.40, 0.02]

–1.72

.090

–0.19

Women

2.60 (0.94)

2.38 (0.82)

0.21

[0.04, 0.39]

2.34*

.022

0.25

Personal Attributes Rating Scale

1.58 (1.70)

0.19 (0.93)

1.40

[1.16, 1.64]

11.58**

< .001

1.01

Sense of Closure Scale-5

5.03 (1.65)

4.90 (1.43)

0.13

[–0.13, 0.38]

0.98

.327

0.08

Men

5.30 (1.48)

5.12 (1.27)

0.19

[–0.16; 0.54]

1.06

.285

0.13

Women

4.75 (1.77)

4.68 (1.56)

0.07

[–0.29; 0.45]

0.36

.716

0.04

7.02 (0.73)

7.03 (0.81)

–0.01

[–0.11, 0.09]

–1.00a

.319

0.00

< .001

–0.24

Centrality of Event Scale

Belief in Occurrence

Bootstrapped

Belief in Accuracy
6.21 (1.05)
6.45 (0.92)
–0.24
[–0.37, –0.11]
a
Note. Mann–Whitney U z scores. Bootstrapping was only used when conducting parametric statistics.
*p < .05. **p < .001.
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Hypothesis 2: In the high self–threat condition, higher shame–proneness was
expected to predict (a) lower Centrality of Event Scale scores, (b) higher Personal
Attributes Rating Scale scores, (c) higher Sense of Closure scores, (d) lower Belief in
Occurrence scores, and (e) lower Belief in Accuracy scores.
Results of this analysis are presented in Table 5. Because of significant gender
difference on Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3, Shame-Proneness (see Table 3),
correlations were conducted separately for men and women. Given the leptokurtic
distribution of Belief in Occurrence and Belief in Accuracy, Spearman rho correlations
were calculated whenever these two variables were involved.
Within the high self–threat condition, only Personal Attributes Rating Scale
scores were significantly related to Shame-Proneness among women (r = .19, p = .042).
In other words, as expected, under conditions of high self–threat, higher Shame–
Proneness predicted a significant small–to–medium increase in derogation of pre-IPVself among women, but not men. This derogation was primarily attributable to
significantly lower pre–IPV Personal Attributes Rating Scale scores (r = –.25, p = .008,
small–to–medium effect). Contrary to the hypothesis, Shame-Proneness was not related
to Centrality, Sense of Closure, Belief in Accuracy or Belief in Occurrence in either
gender.
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Table 5
Correlations between Test of Self-Conscious Affect–3 and Appraisals
High self–threat condition scores

Shame–proneness

Externalization

Men (n = 111)
Centrality of Event Scale
Personal Attributes Rating Scale
(current – pre-IPV)

.08
–.01

Current-self

–.13

Pre-IPV self

–.08

Sense of Closure Scale-5
Belief in Occurrence
Belief in Accuracy

–.14
.09a
–.06a

Women (n = 110)
Centrality of Event Scale
Personal Attributes Rating Scale
(current – pre-IPV)

–.04
.19*

Current-self

–.10

Pre-IPV self

–.25**

Sense of Closure Scale-5

–.07

Belief in Occurrence

.05a

Belief in Accuracy

.04a

Overall (N = 221)
.03

.13*

.09

–.18**

Current-self

–.11

–.15*

Pre-IPV self

–.16*

.08

Centrality of Event Scale
Personal Attributes Rating Scale
(current – pre-IPV)

Sense of Closure Scale-5

–.14

.03

Belief in Occurrence

.07a

–.34**a

Belief in Accuracy

.01a

–.19**a

Note. a Spearman rho correlations. All other correlations are Pearson r.
*p < .05. **p < .001.

Given that Tangney and colleagues (Stuewig et al., 2010) found that shame–prone
individuals tended to externalize blame, exploratory analyses were also conducted with
the Test of Self-Conscious Affect–3 Externalization subscale. Because there were no
significant gender differences on Externalization (t = 1.45, p = .149), male and female
scores were analyzed together. Contrary to expectation, higher Externalization scores
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were accompanied by higher Centrality scores (r = .13, p = .05; small effect) and lower
Personal Attributes Rating Scale scores (r = –.18, p = .007; small effect). Consistent with
the shame-proneness prediction, however, Externalization scores were accompanied by
lower Belief in Occurrence scores (rs = –.34, medium effect, p < .001) and lower Belief
in Accuracy scores (rs = –.19, p = .004, small effect).
Hypothesis 3: In the high self–threat condition, higher Assured–Dominance was
expected to predict (a) lower Centrality of Event Scale scores, (b) higher Personal
Attributes Rating Scale scores, (c) higher Sense of Closure scores, (d) lower Belief in
Occurrence scores, and (e) lower Belief in Accuracy scores. Refer to Appendix B for a
diagram of the interpersonal circumplex to aid with the interpretation.
Three octant scores corresponding to aspects of narcissism were consulted for
these analyses: Assured–Dominant, Arrogant–Calculating, and Cold–Hearted (Miller et
al., 2012). Because of significant gender differences on Interpersonal Adjective Scales
octant scores, and previous research suggesting that men score significantly higher than
women on Assured-Dominant, Arrogant-Calculating, and Cold-hearted (Wiggins, 1995),
correlations were run separately for men and women (see Table 6). Given the positive
skew in the distribution of Cold–Hearted scores, all correlations involving the Cold–
Hearted octant were calculated using Spearman rho. All the other correlations were
calculated using Pearson r.
Contrary to the hypothesis, among men with higher Assured–Dominant scores,
there were higher Centrality scores (r = .29, p = .002, medium effect) and higher Belief in
Accuracy scores (rs = .23, p = .018, small–to–medium effect). Consistent with the
hypothesis, among women with higher Assured–Dominant scores there were lower
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Personal Attributes Rating Scale scores (r = –.21, p = .026, small–to–medium effect).
Follow–up exploratory analyses revealed that among men and women with higher
Assured–Dominant scores there were higher Personal Attributes Rating Scale–now as
well as higher Personal Attributes Rating Scale–pre-IPV scores (see Table 6), which was
consistent with the original prediction.
Among men with higher Arrogant–Calculating scores there were no significant
relationships with measured appraisals. Among women with higher Arrogant–Calculating
scores there were higher Centrality scores (r = .21, p = .03, small-to-medium effect),
which was contrary to the hypothesis. Consistent with the original prediction, however,
those women with higher Arrogant-Calculating scores had lower Personal Attributes
Rating Scale scores (r = –.21, p = .03, small–to–medium effect), lower Belief in
Occurrence scores (rs = –.24, p = .012, small–to–medium effect), and lower Belief in
Accuracy scores (rs = –.23, p = .016 , small–to–medium effect).
Among men with higher Cold–Hearted scores there were no significant
relationships with measured appraisals. Among women with higher Cold–Hearted scores
there were lower Personal Attributes Rating Scale scores (rs = –.34, p < .001, medium
effect), lower Belief in Occurrence (rs = –.32, p = .001, medium effect), and lower Belief
in Accuracy scores (rs = –.23, p = .014, small–to–medium effect), all of which were
consistent with the original prediction.
The results from the Arrogant–Calculating and Cold–Hearted octant scores were
only partially supportive of the original prediction. Given the unexpected findings,
exploratory analyses examined whether higher scoring Arrogant–Calculating and Cold–
Hearted participants were prone to shame and whether they experienced shame after
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recalling the IPV event. As suspected, Test of Self-Conscious Affect–3 Shame–Proneness
was not significantly related to Arrogant–Calculating scores (r = –.10 in both men and
women) or Cold–Hearted scores (rs = .05 in men, rs = –.18 in women). The PANAS–
shame item administered after exposure to the IPV event was similarly not significantly
related to Arrogant–Calculating (r = .01 in men, r = .11 in women) or Cold–Hearted
scores (rs = .14 in men, rs = .07 in women).
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Table 6
Correlations between Interpersonal Adjective Scales Octant Scores and Appraisals
High Self–Threat Condition
Centrality of Event Scale
Personal Attributes Rating Scale
(current – pre-IPV)
Current-self
Pre-IPV self
Sense of Closure Scale-5
Belief in Occurrence
Belief in Accuracy
Centrality of Event Scale
Personal Attributes Rating Scale
(current – pre-IPV)
Current-self
Pre-IPV self
Sense of Closure Scale-5
Belief in Occurrence
Belief in Accuracy

PA

BC

.29**
.02

.17
–.17

.38**
.23*
.04
.13a
.23*a

–.04
.16
.03
–.09a
–.06a

.03
–.21*

.21*
–.26**

.20*
.34**
–.03
–.08a
–.17a

–.26**
.08
–.18
–.24*a
–.23*a

DE

NO
LM
Men (n = 109)
.17a
–.07
–.04
–.10a
.04
.00
–.22*a
.44**
.38**
–.08a
.25**
.24*
–.06a
.02
–.06
–.07a
.07a
.13a
a
a
–.06
.15
.13a
Women (n = 110)
.13a
.10
.06
–.34**a
.03
.27**
–.37**a
.54**
.06a
.34**
–.10a
.07
–.32**a
.05a
a
–.23*
.06a
Overall (N = 221)
.14*a
.02

.56**
.11
.10
.23*a
.20*a

JK

HI

FG

DOM

–.03
–.21*

–.11
–.26**

.16
–.19*

.11
.16

–.15
.07

–.02
.20*
–.27*
.06a
.02a

–.37**
.02
–.16
–.11
–.14

–.35**
–.03
–.05
–.04 a
–.10 a

.44**
.13
.14
.07a
.16a

.35**
.16
–.08
.11a
.11a

–.09
.14

.06
.05

.32**
.07
.27**
.22*a
.13a

–.20*
–.19
.06
–.02a
–.03a

.02
–.13

.08
–.12

–.41**
–.15
–.03
–.14a
–.11a

.25**
.29**
–.09
–.06a
–.06a

LOV

–.06
.29**
.58**
.10
.16
.27**a
.18a

Centrality of Event Scale
.15*
.17*
.01
–.05
–.03
.08
.09
–.11
Personal Attributes Rating Scale
(current – pre-IPV)
–.10
–.20**
–.22**a
.03
.12
–.03
–.10
–.16*
.01
.18**
Current-self
.28**
–.14*
–.28**a
.49**
.45**
.15*
–.28**
–.37**
.34**
.46**
Pre-IPV self
.28**
.11
.01a
.30**
.18**
.13
–.09
–.09
.21**
.13
Sense of Closure Scale-5
.03
–.04
.05a
.01
.00
.00
–.04
–.01
.02
.04
Belief in Occurrence
.02a
–.16*a
–.20**a
.07a
.19**a
.14*a
–.06a
–.10a
.01a
.20**a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
Belief in Accuracy
.02
–.16*
–.16*
.11
.18**
.09
–.09
–.12
.05
.15*a
Note. PA = Assured Dominant; BC = Arrogant Calculating; DE = Cold Hearted; NO = Gregarious Extraverted; LM = Warm Agreeable; JK =
Unassuming Ingenuous; HI = Unassured Submissive; FG = Aloof Introverted; Personal Attributes Rating Scale = Personal Attributes Rating
Scale;
a
Spearman rho correlations. All other correlations are Pearson r.
*p < .05. **p < .001.
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Post-hoc Analysis
Dominance, affiliation vs. appraisals. As a follow-up to the octant results
presented above, Dominance and Nurturance dimensions were also explored in relation to
appraisals (see Table 6). Pearson r correlations revealed that, when exposed to the high
self–threat condition, participants scoring higher on Dominance did not show any
significant relationships with appraisals, although men did tend to perceive themselves
more positively at the time the IPV occurred (r = .44, p < .001, moderate-to-large effect)
than at present (r = .13, p = .185, small effect). When exposed to the high self–threat
condition, women with higher Nurturance scores showed greater derogation of past
selves (r = .29, p = .002, medium effect) and higher Belief in Occurrence scores (rs = .27,
p = .004, small–to–medium effect). A similar trend was observed with higher Belief in
Accuracy scores, (rs = .18 , p = .06, small-to-medium-effect).
Remaining Interpersonal Adjective Scales octants vs. appraisals. The
remaining five Interpersonal Adjective Scales octants were also explored in relation to
appraisals (see Table 6). In light of previous findings that men score significantly higher
than women on Aloof-Introverted, whereas women score significantly higher than men
on Unassured-Submissive, Unassuming-Ingenuous, Warm-Agreeable, and GregariousExtraverted (Wiggins, 1995), men and women were examined separately in the current
study. Among men and women with higher Gregarious – Extraverted scores there were
higher Personal Attributes Rating Scale ratings both pre-IPV and at present. Although the
Personal Attributes Rating Scale ratings were in the expected direction, derogation of
past selves did not emerge, arguably because the gap between the two Personal Attributes
Rating Scale ratings was insufficient to reach statistical significance.
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Among women with higher Warm – Agreeable scores there was higher
derogation of past-self after exposure to the high self–threat event (r = .27, p = .004,
small–to–medium effect), higher Belief in Occurrence scores (rs = .23, p = .015, small–
to–medium effect), and higher Belief in Accuracy scores (rs = .20, p = .035, small–to–
medium effect). Among men with higher Warm-Agreeable scores there was a similar
trend regarding their Personal Attributes Rating Scale, Belief in Accuracy, and Belief in
Occurrence scores, but results did not reach statistical significance.
Among men with higher Unassuming – Ingenuous scores there was significantly
less derogation of past selves (r = –.21, p = .03, small–to–medium effect) and less Sense
of Closure (r = –.27, p = .004, small–to–medium effect). Although among women with
higher Unassuming-Ingenuous scores there was a similar pattern of derogating past
selves, the result was not significant. These women also had higher Sense of Closure
Scale-5 scores (r = .26, p = .005, medium effect) and higher Belief in Occurrence scores
(rs = 22, p = .02, small-to-medium effect).
Among men, but not women, with higher Unassuming-Submissive scores there
was greater derogation of current rather than pre-IPV self when exposed to the IPV event
(r = –.26, p = .007, small-to-medium effect). Among men with higher Aloof – Introverted
scores there was less derogation of past selves (r = –.19, p = .046, small–to–medium
effect), and a similar trend was observed among women with higher Aloof-Introverted
scores as well.
Correlations between Interpersonal Adjective Scales octants and aggression scores
When exploring Interpersonal Adjective Scales Octant scores in relation to self–
reported physical and psychological aggression scores, a predictable pattern emerged (see
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Table 7). Men and women with higher Cold–Hearted scores had significantly higher
psychological and physical aggression variety and frequency scores, all effects in the
small–to–medium range. There were also a number of significant and positive
correlations among men and women with higher Arrogant–Calculating scores and
elevated psychological aggression scores, all effects in the small–to–medium range. In
contrast, among men and women with higher Gregarious–Extravert, Warm–Agreeable,
and Unassured–Submissive scores there was a tendency towards a negative albeit not
statistically significant relationship with aggression scores. Predictably, among women
with higher Unassuming–Ingenuous scores there was a negative relationship with
psychological aggression, all effects in the small–to–medium range. Moreover, among
men with higher Aloof–Introverted scores there were significantly higher physical and
psychological aggression scores reported, all effects in the small–to–medium range.
Overall, more Dominant women tended to engage in greater variety and frequency of
psychological aggression, although the values were all in the small range and did not
reach statistical significance. More Affiliative men and women, on the other hand, tended
to engage in significantly less variety and frequency of psychological and physical
aggression.

149

SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES

Table 7
Correlations between Interpersonal Adjective Scales Octants and Aggression Scores
Variables

PA

Psychological Aggression
Variety
.11
Frequency
.18
Physical Aggression
Variety
.12a
Frequency
.13a

BC

DE

.19*
.24*

.18a
.19*a

.19a
.15a

.29**a
.28**a

NO
LM
Men (n = 109)
–.13
–.16

–.14
–.12

–.15a
–.17a
a
–.15
–.16a
Women (n = 110)

JK

HI

FG

DOM

LOV

–.03
–.06

.07
.07

.22*
.25**

–.03
–.01

–.22*
–.24*

–.11a
–.08a

.04a
.02a

.26**a
.26**a

–.01a
–.01a

–.32**a
–.31**a

Psychological Aggression
Variety
.20*
.24*
.27**a –.06
–.12
–.29** –.05 .17
.12
–.26**
Frequency
.25**
.26** .21*a
–.06
–.12
–.26** –.07 .16
.15
–.27**
Physical Aggression
Variety
.14a
.17a
.25**a
.01a
–.15a
–.14a
–.13a .10a
.10a
–.20*a
Frequency
.13a
.19*a
.26**a –.01a
–.16a
–.15a
–.10a .12a
.07a
–.21*a
Note. PA = Assured Dominant; BC = Arrogant Calculating; DE = Cold Hearted; NO = Gregarious Extraverted;
LM = Warm Agreeable; JK = Unassuming Ingenuous; HI = Unassured Submissive; FG = Aloof Introverted;
DOM = Dominance; LOV = Nurturance. a Spearman rho correlations. All other correlations are Pearson r.
*p < .05. **p < .001.

Correlations between Interpersonal Adjective Scales octants and PANAS
scores. Correlations between Interpersonal Adjective Scales octants and PANAS scores
are presented in Table 8. Men with higher Assured–Dominant scores produced higher
Positive Affect ratings after both the high self–threat and the low self–threat condition
(effects in the medium-to-large range), but despite a somewhat similar trend, the results
for women were not significant. Men with higher Arrogant–Calculating scores similarly
produced higher Positive Affect ratings after both the high self–threat and the low self–
threat condition, both effects in the small-to-medium range. They also produced higher
Negative Affect ratings (small-to-medium effect) after the high self–threat condition.
Among women with higher Arrogant–Calculating scores there were higher Negative
Affect ratings (medium-to-high effects) after both the high self–threat and the low self–
threat condition. Among men and women with higher Cold–Hearted scores there were
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higher Negative Affect ratings after both conditions, all effects in the medium or smallto-medium range. Among men and women with higher Gregarious–Extraverted scores
there were higher Positive Affect ratings after both conditions (medium or small-tomedium range). A similar pattern was observed among men and women with higher
Warm Agreeable scores, who produced higher Positive Affect scores after both
conditions, small-to-medium range effects. Among women (but not men) with higher
Unassuming–Ingenuous scores, there were significantly lower Negative Affect ratings
after both conditions, small-to-medium effects. Among men with higher Unassured–
Submissive scores there were significantly higher Negative Affect scores after both
conditions (medium effects). Among men with higher Aloof–Introverted scores there
were significantly higher Negative Affect scores after both conditions (small-to-medium
effects). Among women with higher Aloof-Introverted scores, however, there were
significantly lower Positive Affect ratings after both conditions (small-to-medium
effects).
Men scoring higher in Dominance produced higher Positive Affect ratings and
lower Negative Affect ratings than their lower scoring peers, all effects in the small-tomedium range. Women scoring higher on Dominance tended to give higher Positive
Affect and higher Negative Affect ratings, but this reached statistical significance only in
the case of Positive Affect, low self-threat condition. Men scoring higher on Nurturance
tended to produce lower Negative Affect ratings, although this small-to-medium effect
only reached significance in the high self-threat condition. Women scoring higher on
Nurturance produced significantly lower Negative Affect ratings and significantly higher
Positive Affect ratings after both conditions, all effects closer to the medium range.
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Table 8
Correlations between Interpersonal Adjective Scales Octants and PANAS Scores
PA

BC

DE

NO

LM

JK

HI

FG

DOM

LOV

PANAS (Men)
Negative Affect – high threat
Positive Affect – high threat
Negative Affect – low threat
Positive Affect – low threat

.01
.34**
–.12

.27**
.17

.30**a
.10

a

.21*
a

.21*

.00

–.04

.01

.14a

Shame – low threat

–.02

.18

.30**a

.39**

.28**a

.14

Positive Affect – high threat

.06

Negative Affect – low threat

.14

Positive Affect – low threat

.18

Shame – high threat

–.06

–.09
.44**

–.07

a

.30**a

–.10

–.09a

.11

a

.07

–.16

–.10

.35**
a

Shame – high threat

Negative Affect – high threat

.43**

.22*

–.05

.25*
–.03

.09
–.05
.16

.34**
–.05
.37**

.34**
–.09
.23*

.31**
–.23*

–.24*
.09
–.13

–.08

–.16

–.09

.08

.18

.19*

–.19

–.12

–.06
–.07
PANAS (Women)

.16

.30**

.23*

–.17

–.17

.32**
–.17

–.01
.24*
–.07

.26**

–.11

–.21*

.37**

–.03

–.22*

.10

.17

.10

.17

–.02

–.22*

.37**

.32**

.00

.10

.12

–.27**

–.15

–.23*

.17

.21*

–.27**

.03

.13

.13

–.34**

.07

–.19*

–.26**

.24*

.28**

–.07

.16

.09

–.05

–.05

Shame – low threat
.06
.31**
.18
–.14
–.19*
–.26**
–.02
.09
.08
–.25**
Note. PA = Assured Dominant; BC = Arrogant Calculating; DE = Cold Hearted; NO = Gregarious Extraverted; LM = Warm Agreeable; JK =
Unassuming Ingenuous; HI = Unassured Submissive; FG = Aloof Introverted; DOM = Dominance; LOV = Nurturance; a Spearman rho correlations. All
other correlations are Pearson r.
*p < .05. **p < .001.
a
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Study 2 Discussion
This study sought to elucidate how individuals experience and respond to their
own recollection of an autobiographical memory that may be dissonant with their selfconcept. Two variables that arguably modulate the experience and expression of
dissonance-reducing appraisals, self-threat and narcissism, were the primary focus of this
study.
To test the varying effects of self-threat on appraisals, a manipulation was
introduced whereby participants were instructed in a counterbalanced order to describe a
past event of them engaging in IPV and a past event of them engaging in a kind and
supportive act within a relationship context. The manipulation, modeled after the shameand pride-inducing conditions of D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008), appeared
effective at evoking high self-threat and low self-threat, respectively. The high self-threat
condition elicited significantly higher negative affect and more shame, as well as
significantly lower positive affect and less pride, than the low self-threat condition. The
current finding that recalling IPV events provokes shame is consistent with prior findings
(i.e., Dutton & Hemphill, 1992; Smith, 2007; Winters, Clift, & Dutton, 2004) and lends
support to the notion that shame in the aftermath of IPV may be experienced by
nonclinical and nonforensic samples, men and women alike.
No significant concerns were noted with respected to the order the conditions
were presented in. It is believed that the positive mood induction that followed the high
self-threat condition helped alleviate any discomfort and/or assisted with returning
participants to baseline while also helping limit any carryover effects.
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The results of this investigation are discussed below in three separate sections,
each section corresponding to one of the study hypotheses.
Self-Threat and Appraisals Findings
Consistent with Campbell and Sedikides’ (1999) meta-analysis, it was expected
that increasing self-threat would heighten cognitive dissonance and ensuing appraisal use.
In line with this prediction, after recalling an IPV event (high self-threat), participants
derogated their pre-IPV selves to a greater extent and expressed greater doubts about the
accuracy of the event significantly more so than after recalling a kind relationship event
(low self-threat).
Derogation of pre-IPV-self, which was consistent with McFarland and Alvaro’s
(2000) findings, showed a large effect size. Use of this strategy was reflected in the
significantly greater current-self vs. pre-event-self gap under the high self-threat
condition than under the low self-threat condition. In other words, when recalling an IPV
event that they themselves perpetrated, participants viewed their pre-IPV self as less kind,
less tolerant, less open-minded, less wise, etc., than their current-selves. Participants did
not, however, engage in derogation of their past-self when recalling a kind relationship
event, meaning that they viewed their pre-event self and current-self in comparable terms
(i.e., just as kind, just as tolerant, just as wise now as before).
Belief in accuracy, but not belief in occurrence, was also significantly lower in the
aftermath of recalling an IPV event, as compared to when participants recalled a kind
relationship event. This is to some extent in line with D’Argembeau and Van der
Linden’s (2008) findings of lower participant ratings of “I believe the event in my
memory really occurred in the way I remember it and that I have not imagined or
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fabricated anything that did not occur” in shame–inducing relative to pride–inducing
memories. Of note, however, this particular rating item has been criticized because it taps
on several constructs, including belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence (Scoboria,
Talarico, & Pascal, 2015). In contrast, the current investigation uses multiple validated
items that uniquely tap on belief in accuracy independent from belief in occurrence.
As was the case with derogation of past-self, it appears that subjectively lower
accuracy ratings may also serve a protective function in defending the self from
threatening and dissonance-inducing memories. I emphasize here that ratings of Belief in
Accuracy are not the same as actual, objective accuracy of the recall, which cannot be
appraised here. The lower ratings of Belief in Accuracy in the aftermath of recalling an
IPV event represent a subjective sense that the details associated with the event are being
recalled less accurately.
Contrary to prior findings (e.g., Beike & Crone, 2008), perceived psychological
distance or closure was not significantly different between the two conditions, suggesting
that recalling an arguably high self-threatening event, such as an instance of IPV, did not
evoke greater desire for psychological distance than recalling a low self-threatening
event, such as an act of kindness in the context of a relationship. Although counter to the
original prediction, the trend was in the expected direction given that higher
psychological distance scores were observed in the high self-threat as opposed to the low
self-threat condition. Examination of individual item scores (see Appendix I) also
suggested that participants rated the high self-threat event as appearing significantly more
distant to them than the low self-threat event on three of the five scale items. They,
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however, admitted to having significantly less closure and more “unfinished business”
from the high self-threat event than the low self-threat event.
One possible explanation for these results may be that the low self-threat event
was not comparable in complexity to the high self-threat event, and participants may have
rated the low self-threat as more closed than expected because it was more
straightforward in nature. Another possible explanation could be that the high self-threat
event carried greater importance or was in some way more central to understanding the
self than the low self-threat event, and despite wanting to feel like it was more
subjectively distant, participants may have still recognized that it was “unfinished
business” for them. There is some support for this explanation of apparent approach and
avoidance motivation in the form of a moderate negative relationship between closure
scores and event centrality scores, which is discussed in greater detail below.
Contrary to the original hypothesis, women but not men rated the importance of
the IPV event as higher than the importance of the nonIPV event. It would therefore
appear that women but not men perceived the IPV event as having greater importance to
their identity and life story despite reports of lower confidence in the accuracy of their
own memory for the IPV event, and attempts at viewing their past selves as worse than
their present selves. This stance may reflect competing interests in acknowledging the
importance of an event to one’s identity and the change it has brought while also
acknowledging a desire to reappraise it in ways that do not undermine the self.
Examination of individual Centrality of Event Scale items did in fact lend some support
to this idea; for example, both men and women rated the item “this event tells a lot about
who I am” significantly lower in the IPV condition than in the nonIPV condition. Both
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men and women, however, rated the item “if this event had not happened to me, I would
be a different person today” significantly higher in the IPV condition than in the nonIPV
condition.
Another possible explanation is that gender schemas have traditionally included
aggression as part of the male schema but not female schema. According to social role
theory, men are socialized to view toughness and aggression as part of their repertoire of
responses, whereas women are socialized to inhibit aggression as part of their repertoire
of responses (Eagly, 1997). It is therefore possible that women view the IPV they
themselves perpetrate as more salient because it runs counter to the stereotypical gender
role. Some support for this contention comes from Miller (2011), who found that male
undergraduates were more likely than female undergraduates to view abuse as a
necessary, acceptable, effective, and acceptable way of resolving conflict in dating
relationships.
Research into posttraumatic stress disorder from an autobiographical memory
perspective has highlighted somewhat of a similar dialectical position in individuals who
construe a stressful/traumatic event as central to their identity. For example, Boals and
Schuettler (2011) found that event centrality correlated moderately and positively with
posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms, suggesting that construing a traumatic event as
central to one’s identity helped maintain debilitating posttraumatic stress disorder
symptoms. Event centrality was also the strongest predictor of posttraumatic growth,
suggesting that construing a traumatic event as central to one’s identity also helped
individuals grow from their trauma. It would therefore appear that construing a
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stressful/traumatic event as central to one’s identity could be both debilitating in
maintaining posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms and conducive to growth.
Shame-Proneness Findings
As expected, when asked to recall an IPV event they themselves perpetrated,
highly shame-prone women demonstrated greater derogation of past selves. In fact, the
higher their shame-proneness, the lower their preIPV-self ratings were. This finding lends
support to the contention that, under conditions of high self-threat (as was the case for
IPV), those prone to experiencing shame also experienced greater dissonance, to which
they responded to by derogating their past selves.
Whereas gender differences in experiencing and responding to self-discrepant
autobiographical memories were either not found or not reported in prior research, the
current investigation did find that women experienced dissonance differently from men.
Specifically, women had higher ratings of shame-proneness than men. It is possible that
women more so than men experienced shame because perpetration of IPV is traditionally
more aligned with masculine gender roles (Eagly, 1992; Miller, 2011). It is also possible
that women more so than men reported higher shame-proneness because they are
socialized to be more open and expressive with their emotional reactions and more likely
to express internalizing emotions like shame relative to men (Chaplin & Aldao, 2013).
Finally, as some have argued, it is also possible that women experience more shame than
men (Chaplin & Aldao, 2013).
Because shame-prone individuals tend to externalize blame (Stuewig et al., 2010),
dispositional externalization was also explored in relation to appraisals. Unlike shameproneness, an increased disposition towards externalization was accompanied by a
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significant derogation of current-self. In fact, the higher the tendency to externalize, the
lower current-self ratings were (i.e., viewed current-self as less wise, less tolerant). It is
possible that externalizers project blame onto others precisely because their current selfconcept and possibly self-esteem is substantially negatively affected by events such as
IPV that cast them in a negative light. Along those lines, externalizers may be more
sensitive to perceptions of self-threat and could respond to this through criticism of the
current self. In fact, derogating past-self rather than current-self would appear to be the
more adaptive of the two strategies because it preserves the present self-concept more so
than an admission of current self as less tolerant, less wise, etc. would.
Dispositional externalization was also accompanied by higher importance
attributed to the IPV event, yet also greater desire to gain psychological distance from it,
lower belief that the IPV event truly occurred, and lower belief in the accuracy of the IPV
event. As noted earlier and consistent with these findings, it is conceivable for individuals
to construe a stressful/traumatic event as central to their identity yet also want to
reappraise it in a manner that does not undermine their current self-concept.
Circumplex Findings
Contrary to the original prediction, men with higher Assured-Dominant scores
construed the IPV event as more central to their identity. Among male with Higher
Assured-Dominant scores, somewhat surprisingly, there was also greater belief in the
accuracy of the IPV event. Among women with higher Assured-Dominant scores there
was a different pattern in increasingly derogating current-selves more so than preIPVselves. This derogation of current rather than preIPV-self differs from the shameproneness results reported above, possibly because the nature of narcissism captured by
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Interpersonal Adjective Scales is the more adaptive and less pathological kind (Pincus et
al. 2009). In fact, the adjectives that load on the Assured-Dominant octant include items
like self-confidence, self-assuredness, firmness, and assertiveness that arguably capture
the more adaptive aspects of narcissism.
Among women with higher Arrogant-Calculating and Cold-Hearted scores there
was similarly a derogation of current-selves but not preIPV-selves. These women also
showed a reverse relationship with belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy; the more
Arrogant-Calculating and the more Cold-Hearted they were, the lower their belief in
accuracy and occurrence. The trend was in a similar direction for men but did not reach
statistical significance. Exploratory analysis found that higher scoring ArrogantCalculating and higher-scoring Cold-Hearted participants did not appear to experience
shame, nor did they appear to possess shame-proneness. Because of this, they may not
feel a need to criticize past selves to protect current view of self.
Participants with higher Cold-Hearted and Arrogant-Calculating scores also
reported perpetrating more frequent and a greater variety of psychological and physical
aggression. Perhaps not surprisingly, antisocial personality disorder maps primarily on
the Arrogant-Calculating octant (Pincus & Wiggins, 1990) and the adjectives that
comprise the Cold-Hearted octant reflect the callous and cruel traits (e.g., ruthless, cruel,
cold-hearted) commonly encountered in psychopathy. Consequently, the notion that these
individuals with higher Arrogant-Calculating and Cold-Hearted scores may not
experience shame appears to fit. Their decision to criticize their current-self might reflect
a calculated move and/or knowledge that they are supposed to articulate remorse for what
they have done, but this remorse, as is the case for psychopathy, may be superficial.
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The reported lower belief in accuracy and lower belief in occurrence among
women with higher Cold-Hearted scores and higher Arrogant-Calculating scores is
perhaps best understood when contrasted against the higher belief in accuracy and higher
belief in occurrence among women with higher Warm-Agreeable and UnassumingIngenuous scores. Whereas a higher self-reported belief in accuracy and occurrence
appears to have an affiliative purpose, perhaps of demonstrating greater openness to
understanding the impact of the IPV and how it affected the other, a lower self-reported
belief in accuracy and occurrence appears to highlight a general lack of concern for the
other. It is also possible that lower belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence may reflect
a motivated effort to devalue the event. Another related possible explanation is that lower
belief in occurrence could reflect denial, and in fact, as Goodrum and colleagues (2001)
posited, denial is more characteristic of narcissistic/antisocial individuals because of their
lack of empathy. Monitoring belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence may be a useful
indirect way of tracking attempts at devaluing or denial.
Exploratory analyses to elucidate other relationships between Interpersonal
Adjective Scales octants and appraisals revealed some expected trends. The relationship
between Warm-Agreeable, Gregarious-Extraverted, and derogation of preIPV-self was
more in line with the original prediction, although it only reached statistical significance
among women with higher Warm-Agreeable scores. As noted earlier, among women
with higher Warm-Agreeable scores there was higher belief in occurrence and higher
belief in accuracy when confronted with an IPV event. The comparable pattern between
Warm-Agreeable and Gregarious-Extraverted becomes more evident when consulting the
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overlapping adjectives composing each octant, including friendly, neighborly (Gregarious
Extraverted octant), and kind, tenderhearted (Warm-Agreeable).
Among men with higher Unassuming-Ingenuous scores, there was greater
derogation of current-self rather than preIPV-self, whereas among women with higher
Unassuming-Ingenuous scores, there was an increased belief in occurrence.
Cumulatively, these findings appear consistent with the deferential and obliging nature of
individuals with higher Unassuming-Ingenuous scores. Consistent with the overarching
patterns emerging so far, it would appear that heightened belief in occurrence may be
serving a more affiliative purpose in pleasing others, and the derogation of current rather
than preIPV-event self may be indicative of self-doubt, low self-esteem, and martyrdom
to please the other. A similar tendency to derogate current-self rather than preIPV-self
was also observed among men with higher Unassured-Submissive scores and men with
high Aloof-Introverted scores. This appears consistent with the evolving interpretation
that criticizing the current-self rather that the preIPV-self may be a sign of low selfesteem and self-doubt.
The exploratory analyses carried out with the Dominance and Nurturance
dimensions can help summarize some of the findings presented. It would appear that the
more affiliative individuals are, the more likely they are to respond to a self-threatening
event with higher belief in accuracy and higher belief in occurrence, perhaps reflecting
their affiliative nature and relationship needs. Such individuals also appear to derogate
their past-selves more so than their current-selves when confronted with an IPV event,
maybe in an attempt to show that they are worthy of the relationship now because they
have changed (i.e., they are no longer as unwise, as intolerant, as they used to be). Even
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so, the criticism of preIPV-self appears to be relatively mild and in keeping with current
positive self-view. Criticism of preIPV-self rather than current-self also appears more
pronounced among the more dominant individuals, although this too was relatively mild
and in keeping with current positive self-view. Based on how Interpersonal Adjective
Scales octants related to derogation of self, it would seem that criticism of preIPV-self
rather than current-self is the more adaptive strategy in preserving self-esteem.
Sample Considerations
As part of the current investigation, about 91.9% of men and 97.3% of women
reported engaging in at least one kind of psychological aggression in the past 12 months.
In the past 12 months, roughly 30.6% of men and 46.4% of women reported engaging in
at least one kind of physical aggression. These rates are somewhat higher than those
reported by Scott and Straus (2007) because this was a sample originally prescreened to
have committed at least one act of IPV.
Consistent with prior findings (Archer, 2000; Desmarais et al., 2012; Miller,
2011) women reported a greater frequency and a greater variety of physical and
psychological aggression than men. In terms of psychological aggression, significantly
more women than men reported threatening to hit, hurt, or throw something at a partner.
In terms of physical aggression, significantly more women than men reported pushing or
shoving, slapping, and punching a partner. Significantly more men than women,
however, reported twisting a partner’s arm or hair, grabbing a partner, or holding a
partner down in anger. I caution that the psychological and physical aggression scales
used did not ask participants about the extent of the injuries their partner endured as a
result of their aggression. Whereas apparently more women than men endorsed pushing,
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shoving, slapping or punching their partner, the force behind this act and/or the
motivation for it (e.g., using IPV to control vs. using IPV to express anger/hurt and/or in
self-defense) may be quite different between men and women (i.e., Cousins & Gangestad
2007; Follingstad et al., 1991). Along those same lines, the scale does not ask about
reciprocal abuse and whether women employed IPV as a reaction to their partner’s
behaviour and/or in self-defense (Miller, 2011). Yet another consideration given the
endorsement rates observed is that women may be more forthcoming than men in their
perpetration of IPV, although it is likely that both genders underreported true perpetration
rates (Miller, 2011).
Limitations and Future Directions
The findings from the current investigation should be interpreted in the context of
several limitations. First, the undergraduate sample in particular was younger than the
MTurk sample and therefore had less opportunity to experience interpersonal
relationships and conflicts. It is possible that being older and having more exposure to
relationships, as the MTurk sample arguably did, might lead to more severe instances of
IPV, and/or more entrenched patterns of appraising IPV in such a way as to deny or
minimize it. In line with this argument, some studies have found that prior experience of
abuse in dating relationships predicts future perpetration (Miller, 1999). Studies have also
found that the likelihood of experiencing and perpetrating abuse tends to increase as
relationship duration increases (Miller, 1999). In short, the results of the current
investigation are limited by the youth and relative inexperience of the student sample.
Future studies could collect a larger number of community participants and student
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participants to compare and contrast the various ways in which the two groups might
differ on appraisals of IPV.
Another limitation involves the nature of an undergraduate sample as consisting
of a certain level of socioeconomic status, intellectual functioning, etc., which could have
influenced what these students had learned and witnessed about domestic violence while
growing up, how they enacted their aggression, and how they appraised it. As an example
of the potential differences between the IPV experiences of the student and MTurk
samples, a qualitative read of the accounts appeared to suggest that the MTurk accounts
consisted of more severe IPV events. In order to explore any potential differences, future
studies might want to collect additional information about socioeconomic status and
witnessing of violence while growing up in order to compare community and university
samples.
Yet another piece of information that limited the current study was not collecting
information on the type of relationship that the IPV was perpetrated in. As noted earlier,
research has shown some differences between marital violence and dating violence
(Shorey et al., 2008). It appears that one of those differences was reflected in the current
study as well, given that relatively more severe instances of IPV were reported by the
MTurk sample than the undergraduate sample.
Another related limitation is participants’ self-selection to participate in this
study. Even though the eligibility screen was crafted without using words like “abuse” or
“violence” and reflected a range of mild to more severe violent behaviours, it could still
have warded off the more severe perpetrators of IPV or at least the ones that were more
ashamed and/or unwilling to discuss their actions. This self-selection arguably biases the
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results obtained in that the accounts provided and appraisals used may be less severe
and/or less extreme than expected. This kind of self-selection may have also complicated
the kind of personality styles originally expected to experience higher self-threat. For
example, individuals with more narcissistic features may be more unwilling to endure
IPV-based shame and/or discomfort to participate in a study of this nature. As observed
during the recruitment process of this study, men were also less likely than women to
acknowledge having perpetrated or threatened to perpetrate any kind of IPV. This might
reflect a gendered unwillingness to endure discomfort or perhaps a fear of reexperiencing past events because they are simply more severe than those perpetrated by
women. On the other hand, participants who elected to participate in this study may have
committed instances of IPV or nominate instances of IPV that are more resolved and/or
less severe than others. Conducting this kind of study with clinical or correctional
samples where collateral information is available (file review, police reports, etc.) might
help minimize some of these concerns.
Second, there are a number of limitations with the measures and instructions used.
The self-report nature of the data means that the results reported here may be contingent
on, among other things, participant insight, willingness to disclose details of the event
and feelings of shame, personality features, and social desirability. For example,
participants may have rated the IPV event as more important than they truly think it is
because they might believe that denying or minimizing its importance would be a socially
undesirable thing to do. As another example, participants with more narcissistic features,
despite being expected to experience more shame, may be more likely to deny or not
report this very emotion.
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The effect of threat on appraisal use could have been diluted by the manner in
which the IPV event was recounted. Stated differently, the very manner in which
participants describe the IPV event could help them appraise it differently, perhaps
without needing to rely on the appraisal mechanisms administered as part of this
investigation. Although all participants received the same instructions, some may have
used the “why” question to justify what happened, thus arguably decreasing the need to
perceive the event as less important when rating it on the Centrality of Event Scale. It
may be interesting in the future to provide differing instructions, one perhaps focused on
details and another focused on meaning making, to ascertain any differences in emotion
activation and/or use of measured appraisals.
Another aspect of appraisal use is that once participants have engaged in one
dissonance-reducing mechanism, such as criticizing their past selves, they may not need
to engage in another mechanism to the same extent. Otherwise stated, it could be that
dissonance is alleviated after the first or second mechanism, after which the other
mechanisms no longer have an effect. Essentially, the order in which the mechanisms
were measured could have resulted in less observable effects for those mechanisms
measured second, third, or fourth. Counterbalancing the order in which dissonancereducing mechanisms are measured might help tease apart the utility of each mechanism
independent of, or over and above, another mechanism.
Another measure-based limitation was the Belief in Occurrence scale, which had
over 75% of its scores at ceiling level and therefore left little room for variability to be
explained by other factors. The ratings of Belief in Occurrence were particularly elevated
because the events that participants chose to discuss were strongly believed events. This
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is consistent with prior work, which has found that cues often result in the retrieval of
events that are strongly believed to have occurred (Scoboria & Talarico, 2013). In
contrast, Scoboria, Talarico and Pascal (2015) attempted to cue for uncertain events,
which resulted in the retrieval of events that were comparatively less strongly believed
(Scoboria, Talarico, et al., 2015). This approach, as well as analog studies conducted in
the lab, may be two potential avenues for managing high levels of belief in occurrence.
Finally, findings from the Centrality of Events and Sense of Closure-5 scales
indicated the need to parse out competing motives to make meaning and acknowledge
how a high self-threatening event may have impacted the self while at the same time
view the self-threatening event as not defining the self. In many ways, this distinction is
reminiscent of the guilt vs. shame constructs proposed by Tangney (1991) in that guilt
presumably does not involve the entire person as “bad” but rather encourages reparative
action.
Third, because of its novel and exploratory nature, the investigation relied on
numerous comparisons to examine data patterns. This approach in turn increased the rate
of Type I error. Future studies will need to target and replicate specific aspects of this
study before any further conclusions are drawn.
Finally, this investigation measured only certain types of appraisals and therefore
can only report on their use to reduce dissonance. Other types of appraisals may be more
widely used or used more effectively, and future investigations could construct checklists
based on a qualitative exploration of the current dataset, or build other scales to measure
appraisal use. In order to assess the effectiveness of appraisals, a measure of state self-
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esteem may also be included after participants have been directed to engage with a
dissonance-reducing appraisal.
Future studies could explore the nature of the IPV event described in this sample
(physical or psychological) and then determine whether the type and extent of the
appraisal used is related to type of IPV. This line of work may help clarify the trend
observed in Dutton and Hemphill (1992) of IPV perpetrators lying more to themselves
and others about psychological abuse, arguably because it is less objectively visible, than
about physical abuse. For example, those committing an act of psychological abuse may
show lowered belief that the IPV event occurred and/or report greater doubt about the
accuracy of their recall than those committing an act of physical abuse.
Future studies may also wish to look at the differential impact of shame versus
guilt on appraisal use. Tangney (1991) defined shame as a global, negative, and painful
evaluation of the self that was associated with a behavioural urge to hide or escape,
whereas she defined guilt as a more adaptive emotion arising in response to a particular
behaviour and associated with reparative action. It is possible that arousal of shame more
so than guilt is associated with greater appraisal use, perhaps because of the more global
and painful nature of shame. Another potential exploration also tied to Tangney’s work
on shame is the presence of early shaming experiences. Future studies might consider
asking about early shaming experiences in addition to memories of committing IPV to
explore whether such experiences affect appraisal use.
Another future project might consider the use of a clinical sample comprised of
higher rates of narcissism. In the current study, it is likely that few participants
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demonstrated the kind of pathological narcissism (i.e. Pincus et al. 2009) that would
correlate with certain appraisal use.
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CHAPTER 4
General Discussion
The overarching goal of this dissertation was to explore how individuals
experience and respond to autobiographical memories that contradict their self-concept as
morally good, competent, and/or consistent, stable, and predictable (Aronson et al.,
1995). A secondary goal was to explore two potential determinants of the experience and
response to self-discrepant autobiographical memories: self-threat and narcissistic
features.
Dissonance itself cannot be directly observed (Aronson, 1969, 1992; Festinger,
1957); rather, it can be deduced from asking participants about it and from the emergence
of dissonance-reducing mechanisms. Consistent with this, participants in Study 1 were
instructed to select a time in which they challenged another’s recollection of a past event
and then asked to describe why they challenged. Participants identified self-protective
motives, among other motives, as underpinning their challenge, which were presumably
indicative of dissonance. In Study 2, participants were instructed to recall two events of
varying self-threat and after each event, were instructed to use rating scales meant to
capture select dissonance reduction processes. Participants demonstrated more attempts at
dissonance reduction after the high self-threat event than after the low self-threat event.
This selective use of appraisals also suggested the presence of cognitive dissonance.
Building on the theoretical and empirical basis laid out by Festinger (1957), Aronson
(1969, 1992), and Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), this dissertation lends further
support to the notion that cognitive dissonance processes underlie the experience of selfdiscrepant autobiographical memories and the ensuing responses.
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The Experience of Self-Discrepant Autobiographical Memories & Self-Threat
Building on Festinger and Aronson’s cognitive dissonance theories and consistent
with the self-memory-system framework (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), dissonance
in the current investigation resulted from a conflict between autobiographical memory
retrieval of a past behaviour and the current, presumably positive self-concept (Study 1
and Study 2). The dissonant element, meaning the autobiographical memory as recounted
by someone else (Study 1) or as recalled by the self (Study 2), contained information that
an individual acted or was implied to have acted in a way that made that individual feel
and/or be perceived by the other(s) as incompetent, immoral, ashamed, or guilty. As
shown in Study 1 and Study 2, and consistent with the meta-analytic findings of
Campbell and Sedikides (1999), the more self-threatening the retrieved autobiographical
memory was, the sharper the dissonance experienced. Several proxies of dissonance lend
support to this assertion including the intensity of negative emotions and in particular,
shame, experienced after recalling an instance of perpetrating IPV (Study 2), the
disproportionate presence of negative emotions among the self-protective challenges
(Study 1), and the self-reported higher levels of distress at disagreeing with the other
among the self-protective challenges (Study 1). These findings are consistent with prior
conceptualizations of negative self-referent emotion as threatening (Aronson, 1992;
McFarland & Alvaro, 2000) and/or signaling threat to the self because of their negative
implications (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Pinter et al., 2011; Sedikides & Green, 2000,
2004, 2009). There is also some support for the notion that this kind of threat, where
negative emotions are involved, may preferentially activate self-protective motives,
rather than self-enhancement motives (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009).
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In addition to negative emotions, other proxies of dissonance also emerged.
Namely, among the self-protective challenges, there was higher self-reported motivation
to present a positive self-image (Study 1) and higher self-reported need to convince the
other that one is right (Study 1). The self-reported desire to present a positive self-image
to others and convince the other that one is right may not on the surface appear
synonymous with preserving a positive self-concept. As a result, one may wonder why
either item is being cast as a dissonance proxy. According to Swann’s self-verification
theory (2012), however, individuals value symmetry between how they view themselves
and how they present themselves to others, and will seek out opportunities to re-affirm
their perception of themselves in social contexts. Following this line of reasoning,
presenting a positive self-image does become more synonymous with maintaining a
positive self-concept, and consequently, threatening either might arguably result in
dissonance. This very symmetry between individuals’ self-view and how others view
them was to some extent evident in the overlap between Defending the self and
Correcting views of me subcategories developed in Study 1. Taken together, the findings
from these dissonance proxies strengthen the argument that dissonance can arise when a
retrieved autobiographical memory comes into conflict with one’s current self-concept.
The Response to Self-Discrepant Autobiographical Memories
Across both studies, and consistent with prior theorizing, dissonance appeared to
have been reduced and/or resolved through dissonance-reducing mechanisms, or
appraisals. This dissonance-reduction involved confronting the source of incompatible
feedback (Study 1), reappraising aspects of the dissonant autobiographical memory
(Study 1 and Study 2), or reappraising aspects of the self (Study 2).
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In Study 1, and consistent with Swann’s work (Swann, 2012; Swann & Ely, 1984;
Swann & Read, 1981), dissonance appeared to have been reduced by challenging the
person providing the dissonant feedback with a view to correcting their mistaken
impression (Correcting views of me subcategory) and/or protecting the self (Defending
the self subcategory). In fact, when participants were themselves asked why they
challenged, a number of them identified challenging precisely because they wanted to
correct the other’s mistaken impression of them and/or because they wanted to defend
themselves. The use of social transactions to reduce dissonance has parallels in
Scoboria’s (2016) model. The model describes the social and cognitive processes
implicated when an individual’s believed memory is challenged by disconfirmatory
social feedback. According to this model, two types of dissonance arise when this occurs:
intrapersonal dissonance and interpersonal dissonance. Of relevance to this discussion,
Scoboria posits that the decision to defend one’s memory and arguably challenge the
source of disconfirmatory social feedback is one way in which interpersonal dissonance
can be reduced.
In addition to interpersonal challenges, dissonance reduction was also carried out
through intrapersonal appraisals, which resemble the solutions proposed by Festinger
(1957), Aronson (1969, 1992) and Conway (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000). Changing the dissonant element (Aronson, 1992; Festinger, 1957) or otherwise
modifying/distorting the threatening autobiographical memories (Conway & PleydellPearce, 2000) was apparent in the use of appraisals of veridicality. For example,
participants changed the dissonant autobiographical memory by rating their confidence in
its accuracy as lower when they experienced the autobiographical memory as conflicting
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with their current self-concept (Study 2). A note here that ratings of Belief in Accuracy
are not the same as objective accuracy, which cannot be appraised in this investigation.
Rather than focus on objective accuracy, this investigation was more concerned with
perceptions of accuracy, including correct interpretation of events from various
perspectives, correct details of events as seen by the self and/or others, etc.
Unlike belief in accuracy, belief in occurrence did not appear to have been as
extensively used to reduce dissonance. This may be because reducing belief in
occurrence involves a more extreme form of appraisal that is comparatively more
removed from reality than belief in accuracy. One could also argue that changes of belief
in occurrence involve an absolute rejection of self-threatening information and therefore,
resemble denial. The continuum of ego defenses advanced by Vaillant (1994, 2011) is
relevant here in that self-reported lower belief in occurrence may be a more psychotic or
immature defense, whereas self-report lower belief in accuracy may be a more neurotic
defense comparable to rationalization.
Changing the dissonant element to reduce dissonance was also apparent in the
criticism of past-self rather than current-self (Study 2). Specifically, when faced with
self-discrepant information, participants revised their view of their past-selves in such a
way as to enhance their current selves (McFarland & Alvaro, 2000; Ross & Wilson,
2003). McFarland and Alvaro (2000) argue that this particular mechanism may reduce
dissonance by creating an illusion of improvement and growth from the self-threatening
event, which is reminiscent of the literature on post-traumatic growth. Recast in this
manner, devaluing one’s past-self rather than one’s current-self, is better aligned with the
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notion of increasing the number of consonant elements rather than changing the dissonant
element.
In the current investigation, this derogation of “old me” in favour of “current me”
was examined in relation to the level of threat experienced; the high self-threat condition
produced more derogation and therefore greater illusory improvement than the low selfthreat condition. These findings add to prior research into other factors that contribute to
derogation of past self, including subjective temporal distance (the further away an
individual feels from past self, the more unfavorably this past self is regarded; Ross &
Wilson, 2003) and more recently implicit theories of change (individuals who believed
that attributes were malleable were more critical of subjectively distant past selves than
individuals who believed that attributes were stable; Ward & Wilson, 2015).
As a dissonance-reducing appraisal, changing the importance of the dissonant
element was a little less clear in the current investigation. Whereas in Study 1, ratings of
event centrality and arguably importance did not appear to have been used as a way of
reducing dissonance, in Study 2, female participants produced higher event
centrality/importance ratings in response to self-discrepant autobiographical memories.
These results, however, cloud the more complex patterns observed when the
centrality/importance items were fleshed out. Namely, the rating of several individual
scale items suggested that participants did in fact perceive the self-discrepant
autobiographical memory as less central to themselves in certain areas, which is
consistent with the lowering of event importance as a dissonance-reducing mechanism.
For example, when exposed to self-discrepant autobiographical memory, there were
significantly lower ratings of “this event tells a lot about who I am” and lower ratings of
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“I often see connections and similarities between this event and my current relationships
with other people”. On the other hand, and contrary to expectations, there were items
with significantly higher importance ratings following exposure to a highly selfthreatening autobiographical memory, such as “this event has become a reference point
for the way I understand myself” and “If this event had not happened to me, I would be a
different person today.” Taken together, it would appear that reducing the importance of
the dissonant autobiographical memory as a way of reducing dissonance is not
straightforward; rather, it seems that individuals try to strike a balance between
approaching the event to make meaning and acknowledge its impact on one’s
development, yet also regarding the event as not defining or central to who they are.
There are similarities between this and the way traumatic events are avoided yet regarded
to some extent as central to one’s identity (Boals & Schuettler, 2011). Beyond that, what
these situations appear to highlight is that dissonance processes may not comprehensively
explain our responses to self-discrepant autobiographical memories.
Personality
As most authors reviewed in this investigation have acknowledged, personality
plays a role in how dissonance is experienced and how it is responded to. In Study 1, the
female participants who identified self-protective motives as driving their challenge
tended to have higher Arrogant-Calculating scores than their peers who did not identify
any self-protective motives as driving their challenge. A similar trend, involving higher
Cold-Hearted scores among women, was also observed. Both results appear to suggest
that the more narcissistic women experienced greater self-threat than the less narcissistic
women, which echoes prior research on the acute experience of self-threat among
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narcissists (Pincus & Lukowitsky, 2010; Rhodewalt & Eddings, 2002). Furthermore,
consistent with Miller et al. (2012)’s mapping of grandiose narcissism between the
Assured-Dominant and the Arrogant-Calculating octant and his mapping of vulnerable
narcissism on the Cold-Hearted octant, one can arguably conclude that both narcissistic
phenotypes were more sensitive to self-threat than others and challenged to protect
themselves. The notion that narcissistic individuals may experience self-threat more
acutely than their peers was also supported by the finding that more shame-prone women
became more critical of their past-selves than their current-selves when faced with a selfdiscrepant autobiographical memory (Study 2). More narcissistic women, as indicated by
Arrogant-Calculating and Cold-Hearted octant scores, also responded to self-discrepant
autobiographical memories by reporting lower belief in accuracy and lower belief in
occurrence (Study 2).
Beyond narcissism, the two orthogonal dimensions of dominance and nurturance
were also explored. Surprisingly, more nurturing individuals tended to show higher belief
in accuracy and higher belief in occurrence in response to presumed dissonance (Study
2). In other words, instead of defending themselves by reporting lower belief in accuracy
and/or occurrence as originally theorized, they actually reported higher belief. This
response may be specific to the interpersonal nature of the high self-threat event (i.e., an
instance of intimate partner violence) and the value that affiliative individuals place on
their relationship given that they have perpetrated an act of IPV in the past. Over and
above the IPV event, however, more nurturing individuals are probably more attuned to
the other and to the relationship needs. Because of this attunement and likely trust within
the relationship, such individuals may be less defensive and more open to acknowledging

178

SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
their role in the IPV. It is possible that more nurturing individuals use belief in accuracy
and belief in occurrence as a way of acknowledging their responsibility and empathizing
with the other, while also ensuring that the relationship is maintained and that they are
presenting themselves as currently worthy of the relationship (because they have
matured, become more tolerant since the IPV). In fact, belief in accuracy and belief in
occurrence have been proposed to be sensitive to social input in Scoboria’s (2016) model.
Along those lines, they have also been previously discussed as changing in order to avoid
conflict or enhance the quality of the relationship (Scoboria, Jackson, et al., 2014).
More nurturing and more dominant individuals also appeared to criticize their
past-self more so than their current-self to reduce dissonance (Study 2). If high levels of
self-esteem result from achieving love (nurturance) and status (dominance) and selfesteem measures do in fact cluster around the Assured-Dominant and GregariousExtraverted octants (Zeigler-Hill, 2010), then those scoring higher on nurturance and
higher on dominance would have higher self-esteem. Extrapolating from the present
findings, it would appear that devaluing a past rather than current self when faced with a
self-discrepant autobiographical memory may help not just reduce dissonance but also
maintain self-esteem. If true, this would mean that deriding past rather than present self
when reminded of a past self-threatening event may be encouraged in clinical or
therapeutic context in order to build self-esteem.
Limitations and Future Directions
A number of limitations apply to both studies summarized here. First, the
inclusion of a state-measure such as the PANAS after each appraisal measure would have
been helpful in understanding whether the purportedly dissonance-reducing mechanism
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helped mitigate uncomfortable or negative feelings. Another alternative or addition
would be to use a state measure of self-esteem, like the one employed by Beike and
Landoll (2000), to gauge variations in self-esteem as a result of exposure to various levels
of threat.
Second, this study looked only at certain appraisals. Examining alternate
appraisals, such as a feeling of subjective distance between past and present self (Ross &
Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Ross, 2003), or coding the appraisals emerging naturally from
participant accounts, may be another useful strategy to help flesh out appraisal selection
and their use in response to dissonance. Other ways of reducing dissonance in a social
context have also been proposed, such as ignoring, forgetting, or avoiding the source of
dissonance information. These alternate ways of socially managing dissonant feedback
might be the focus of future studies.
Third, a limitation across both studies was the use of a nonclinical sample of
narcissism. Carrying out a comparable study with a clinical sample of narcissists, which
are regarded as aggressive, hostile, manipulative, deceptive, dominant, and antagonistic
but also more sensitive to inconsistent feedback with the self-concept (Morf &
Rhodewalt, 2001; Pincus et al., 2009) may show a more pronounced pattern of using
appraisals when exposed to varying levels of self-threat. By the same token, the current
sample’s use of appraisals was likely not as severe or as may be expected in a clinical
population.
Another issue related to narcissism was the use of the Interpersonal Adjective
Scales, which, although being an empirically validated measure for capturing various
aspects of personality and more adaptive narcissism, can be an inadequate measure for
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capturing more pathological aspects of narcissism (Pincus et al., 2009). Other scales for
assessing the more pathological aspects of narcissism, including grandiose and vulnerable
narcissism, have been validated, such as the Pathological Narcissism Inventory (Pincus et
al., 2009). Inclusion of such scales in future investigations should help clarify the
contribution of pathological narcissism to the experience and response to self-discrepant
autobiographical memories.
Finally, this investigation assumed based on prior theory that individuals
possessed a positive self-concept and were motivated to preserve or protect that positive
self-concept. Clinical samples, however, may have a more negative or fragile selfconcept, as is the case for narcissism. Exploring the motives and use of appraisals with
these possibly more severe instances of self-threat (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996)
may be a fruitful future endeavor.
Based on the literature reviewed, this investigation focused primarily on selfprotection. As part of the coding frame, both self-enhancement (as part of Seeking
recognition subcategory) and self-consistency (as part of Internal models of self and
others category) also emerged as motives for challenging, suggesting that they might be
relevant to the manner in which self-discrepant autobiographical memories are
experienced and responded to. As outlined in the introduction, there is ample research
into coherence between one’s current self-concept and one’s autobiographical memories
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and the value of coherence is also highlighted in
Aronson’s argument that we strive to maintain a consistent, stable, and predictable sense
of self.
Implications
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The findings from this investigation have implications for the utility of cognitive
dissonance processes in understanding the experience of self-discrepant autobiographical
memories and the ensuing dissonance-reducing responses. As theorized by the selfmemory-system (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), the series of findings presented in
this dissertation support the argument that autobiographical memories and the current
self-concept work together to maintain a coherent sense of self and this coherence
appears to be at least partially maintained through dissonance-reducing processes.
The findings from this investigation also have clinical implications in informing
interventions wherein self-discrepant autobiographical memories are central to or
exacerbate a client’s clinical presentation. For example, self-discrepant autobiographical
memories are presumably relevant to the treatment of certain moral injuries—
perpetrating acts that contradict deeply held moral beliefs. The present findings may
inform treatment approaches in this area, perhaps by encouraging perceptions of growth
(McFarland & Alvaro, 2000; Ross & Wilson, 2003) from a pre-event self that was less
tolerant or less wise to a current-self that is more tolerant and wiser. One way to
encourage this perception of growth may be to borrow from Ross and Wilson’s (2015)
manipulation of subjective distance by asking participants to discuss their past selves as
they were “all the way back…” (versus “in the recent past…”). Yet another approach to
promoting this perception of growth may be to foster a transition of some kind that serves
to more clearly separate the past self from the present self, whether that is a life event
(new job, new relationship, etc.) or a simpler physical change (new haircut, etc.; Ross &
Wilson, 2003).
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The current study appears to suggest that derogating one’s past-self but not
current-self may be the healthier route because it encourages growth in self-esteem and
discourages the development of a global shame-based sense of self. Inherent in this
argument, however, is the assumption that once an individual has criticized their pastself, they will maintain coherence with this new, more tolerant and wiser current-self. If
this same individual commits a self-discrepant act again in the future, highlighting the
discrepancy between this discrepant act and the more tolerant and wiser self may help
motivate change and re-establish consistency (Aronson, 1999; Biondolillo & Pillemer,
2015). This approach is reminiscent of motivational interviewing techniques that draw
attention to the discrepancy between the maladaptive behaviour and an individual’s
values and goals in order to motivate change (Miller & Rollnick, 2002).
The notion of a “new” and improved self in the aftermath of a self-discrepant act
may be easier to achieve and maintain for individuals with a positive self-concept in a
nonclinical sample, but may pose problems for individuals with a more negative selfconcept. Further research into negative self-concept and/or tendency towards selfdevaluation would help elucidate this issue.
Another way in which this investigation can inform treatment is by recognizing
the quasi-dialectical stance in wanting to approach and understand the meaning of a selfdiscrepant autobiographical memory but also wanting to avoid viewing such
autobiographical memories as defining the self. In this way, this investigation adds to the
growing literature on how posttraumatic stress disorder may become intertwined with
one’s autobiographical memories and one’s current self-concept.
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This line of work also has implications for treatment in the forensic/correctional
domain. Because appraisals (or dissonance-reducing mechanisms) alleviate or even
eliminate the impact of an act and/or its implications on the self (Lord & Willimot, 2004;
Snyder & Higgins, 1988), they are generally considered valuable to coping with stress,
maintaining self-esteem, and preserving a positive self-concept (Beike & Landoll, 2000;
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; McFarland & Ross, 1982; Schlenker, Pontari, &
Christopher, 2001; Wood & Conway, 2006). Yet, this seemingly protective role of
appraisals is not extended to all contexts. For example, forensic treatment providers
indiscriminately target appraisals (“rationalizations”) as part of rehabilitative
programming (Beech & Mann, 2002; Yates, 2009) despite findings of an inconsistent
relationship between responsibility-taking and re-offending (Hanson & Bussiere, 1998;
Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2005) and despite calls to better understand the meaning of
appraisals to the self before urging offenders to abandon them (Schneider & Wright,
2004; Yates, 2009). The current study highlights the role of appraisals in maintaining a
positive self-concept and may help inform changes in treatment targets in
forensic/correctional settings. Some have proposed that denial or minimization of
responsibility be regarded as a responsivity factor to help engage participants in treatment
rather than a risk factor that needs targeting (Marshall, Marshall, O’Brian, & Serran,
2011). Marshall and colleagues have proposed and researched some techniques for use
with individuals who have sexually offended, including offering face-saving excuses to
deniers so that self-esteem is preserved while also encouraging greater understanding of
the risk factors for offending (e.g., “what might the circumstances of your offense look
like to another person?”), challenging in a firm but respectful manner that employs
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motivational interviewing principles (Miller & Rollnick, 2002), and emphasizing the
difference between a “bad act” and “a good person” in order to foster reparative action
rather than shame (Marshall et al., 2011).
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Appendix A
Mechanical Turk
Turk has become a widely used source for conducting Internet based research in
the field of Psychology. Turk is not specifically a research recruitment tool; it is a crowdsourcing tool that users, including researchers, can access to complete any task that can
be completed via Internet connection. It is a good tool for reaching diverse individuals,
typically not available in traditional academic participant pools (in samples collected by
Dr. Scoboria to date, gender ratios are about 49%, 49%, 1%; and self-identified
race/ethnicity tend to parallel United States census data with some overrepresentation of
Asians populations). Users post tasks to Turk, and Turk “workers” (e.g., potential
participants) view available tasks and select the ones they wish to complete. Once a task
is complete, the user verifies the work and pays the worker. Turk workers are identified
in the system only by their Turk ID (a non-identifying string of letters and numbers),
meaning that a worker’s identifying information is not available to users.
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Appendix B

Figure 1. Diagram Illustrating the Interpersonal Circumplex (Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990)

209

SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
Appendix C
Recruitment Advertisement Posted to Mechanical Turk site
Title: Challenging others’ memories
This is a research study. The study is about times that you challenged somebody else’s
memory.
You are eligible for this research study if you have challenged another person’s memory.
For example, you may have told another person that something that they remember did
not happen to them or happened to them in a different way than they remember it. The
study examines times that people chose to initiate or start a challenge on another person’s
memory. In this study, you will be asked questions about a specific time that you
challenged another person’s memory.
Your participation will take no more than 30 minutes. You will earn $2.50 USD for your
participation.
If you are uncomfortable with answering a question, you have the right to skip it.
However, if you decide at any time that you will not complete the survey (i.e., complete
less than 80% of the questions), please return to Mechanical Turk to withdraw from this
survey. Please complete the survey without consulting with other people.
In order to be compensated, you must provide your Mechanical Turk ID at the end of the
survey.
This HIT is set to be open for 2 hours after you sign up. This is to permit plenty of time
for you to complete the survey and return to Turk to submit the HIT.
If you are interested in completing the study, please follow the link below. You will be
directed to a page that will determine your eligibility. If you are not eligible for this
study, you will receive a message indicating this and you should return to Turk and
withdraw from the HIT.
To access the survey, please follow this link: https://fluidsurveys.uwindsor.ca/s/cm1/
This study has received clearance from the University of Windsor Research Ethics Board.
If you are interested in participating, the next page provides information about the study.
Once you have read it, if you agree to participate you can continue to the study by
clicking through.
Thank you,
Fiona Dyshniku
Dr. Alan Scoboria
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Appendix D
Eligibility Screen on Fluid Surveys
Have you ever challenged another person’s memory for a past event (e.g., disagreed with
their memory, told them something about their memory was wrong)?
 Yes
 No
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Appendix E
Testing Package – Study 1
Items marked with an asterisk (*) indicate the measures that will be used in Study 1.
PART I
*Select a time that you challenged another person’s memory for a past event (e.g.,
disagreed with their memory, told them something about their memory was wrong).
Select a time in which you initiated/started the challenge to the other person’s memory.
Basic questions regarding the challenge
1. *Describe how you challenged this person’s memory. What did you say or do to
challenge the memory?
2. What was your (approximate) age when you challenged this memory? ____
3. *Describe why you challenged the other person’s memory?
4. Describe what happened after you challenged the other person’s memory?
5. Please describe the nature of your relationship with this person at that time (e.g.,
friend, parent, significant other, acquaintance).
a. Who was the person?
b. What was your relationship to the person?
c. What was their age at the time?
d. What was their gender?
Additional questions regarding the challenge
1. How much did you trust your knowledge about the event at the time you challenged
the other person’s memory? (1 = I mistrusted my knowledge completely; 10 = I
trusted my knowledge completely)
2. How successful do you think you were at challenging the other’s memory? (1 =
completely unsuccessful at challenging their memory; 10 = completely successful at
challenging their memory)
3. How forceful were you in delivering your challenge? (1 = not at all forceful; 10 =
very forceful)
4. How often do you challenge this person’s memory? (1 = very rarely; 10 =
very frequently)
5. How often in general do you tend to challenge other people’s memories? (1
= very rarely; 10 = very frequently)
*Here is a list of potential outcomes that may have occurred following the challenge
that you described above. Please check which one applies, or check “other” if none
of the outcomes seems to apply:
a) The other person defended their memory and it looked like they genuinely
continued to believe that the event occurred as they remembered it.
b) The other person defended their memory but it looked like their belief that the
event occurred as they remembered it had been shaken.
c) The other person eventually agreed with you, but it looked like they genuinely
continued to believe that the event had occurred as they remembered it.
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d) The other person eventually agreed with you, and it looked like their belief that the
event occurred as they remembered it had been shaken.
e) Other: None of these really capture what took place.
Please elaborate on the outcome that you just endorsed in the question above. We
would like any more information that you can provide about what took place to lead
to this outcome.

Additional questions regarding the nature of the relationship
1. At the time that you challenged the other’s memory, in general how much did you
trust him/her? (1 = I did not trust them at all; 10 = I trusted them completely)
2. How much did your past experiences with the person(s) whose memory you
challenged influence your behaviour, such as what you said or did when you
challenged them? (1 = past experiences did not influence me at all; 10 = past
experiences greatly influenced me)
3. At the time, how much did it bother you that you disagreed with what the other
person said or did? (1 = It did not bother me at all; 10 = it bothered me very much)
4. Currently, how much does it still bother you that you disagreed with what the other
person said or did? (1 = not at all; 10 = very much)
5. At the time, how easy was it for you, in general, to disagree with the other person? (1
= it was very hard to disagree with this person; 10 = it was very easy to disagree with
this person)
6. How important was it for you to avoid disagreeing with the other person? (1 = not at
all important; 10 = very important)
7. How important was your relationship with the person whose memory you challenged
at that time? (1 = not at all important; 10 = very important)
8. How close was your relationship with the person whose memory you challenged at
that time? (1 = not at all close; 10 = very close)
9. How much did the other person participate in the exchange and/or respond to your
challenge? (1 = the other person did not at all participate in the disagreement; was
very passive; 10 = the other person was very vocal and active in the disagreement)
10. During the challenge, how motivated were you to maintain the relationship with the
other person? (1 = not at all motivated to maintain the relationship; 10 = very
motivated to maintain the relationship)
11. *During the challenge, how motivated were you to present a positive image of
yourself? (1 = not at all motivated to present a positive image of myself; 10 = very
motivated to present a positive image of myself)
12. During the challenge, how important was it for you to convince the other person that
you were right? (1 = not at all important; 10 = extremely very? important)
13. After the challenge, what was the quality of the relationship with the person whose
memory you challenged? (1 = the relationship deteriorated substantially; 10 = the
relationship improved substantially)
14. Did you discuss the event with anybody other than the person whom you challenged
at that time? If yes, who else did you discuss it with (what was your relationship with
them?)
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Communication Patterns Questionnaire (modified)
Please rate each item on a scale of 1 (= very unlikely) to 9 (= very likely)
During the challenge…
1. Both you and the other person blamed, accused,
and criticized each other
2. Both you and the other person expressed your
feelings to each other
3. Both you and the other person threatened each
other with negative consequences
4. Both you and the other person suggested possible
solutions and compromises
5. You nagged and demanded while the other
person withdrew, became silent, or refused to
discuss the matter further
6. The other person nagged and demanded while
you withdrew, became silent, or refused to discuss
the matter further
7. You criticized while the other person defended
himself/herself
8. The other person criticized while your defended
yourself
9. You pressured the other person to take some
action or stop some action, while the other resisted
10. The other person pressured you to take some
actions or stop some action, while you resisted
11. You expressed feelings while the other person
offered reasons and solutions
12. The other person expressed feelings while you
offered reasons and solutions
13. You threatened negative consequences and the
other person gave in or backed down
14. The other person threatened negative
consequences and you gave in or backed down
15. You called the other person names, swore at
him/her, or attacked his/her character
16. The other person called you names, swore at
you, or attacked your character
17. You pushed, shoved, slapped, hit, or kicked the
other person
18. The other person pushed, shoved, slapped, hit,
or kicked you
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*Interpersonal Adjective Scales
Please rate how accurately each word describes you as a person. Judge how
accurately each word describes you on the following scale.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
extremely
very
quite
slightly slightly
quite
very extremely
inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate accurate accurate accurate accurate
For example, consider the word “Introverted”. How accurately does that word
describe you as a person? If you think this is a quite accurate description of you,
you would select the number “6” in the space next to the word “Introverted”. If
you think this word is slightly inaccurate as a description of you, you would
select the number “4”. If it is very inaccurate you would select “2”, and so on…
It is very important that you do not skip any. If you are uncertain about the
meaning of a word, please consult the definitions provided in the brackets.
1. Introverted (feels more comfortable by oneself; is
less interested in other people)
2. Assertive (tends to be aggressive and outspoken
with others)
3. Timid (tends to be fearful or uncomfortable around
others)
4. Unargumentative (tends to avoid arguments or
fights)
5. Boastful (tends to brag)
6. Soft-hearted (tends to be easy-going or gentle with
others)
7. Ruthless (pursues one's own interests regardless of
the effect on others)
8. Kind (thoughtful and caring for others)
9. Cheerful (happy, usually in good spirits)
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10. Unsparkling (not lively or entertaining with others)
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11. Tricky (can be deceiving toward others in order to
get something; able to fool others)
12. Unaggressive (tends to be mild-mannered, not
forceful around others)
13. Calculating (tends to use or manipulate others to
your own advantage)
14. Tender (warm and loving with others)
15. Hard-hearted (unconcerned and unfeeling toward
others)
16. Unneighbourly (unfriendly, aloof toward others,
avoid contact with others)
17. Uncharitable (dislike helping others; tends to
judge others harshly)
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18. Uncunning (not crafty or sly, tends to be
straightforward with others)
19. Extraverted (like being with others; outgoing and
lively around others)
20. Cocky (self-centred; conceited; thinks highly of
one's own abilities)
21. Dominant (tends to lead others, like to command,
take charge in a group)
22. Antisocial (dislike the company of others; behavior
not affected by social rules)
23. Perky (lively, energetic around others)
24. Forceful (tends to take charge around others)
25. Wily (crafty, cagey, or tricky)
26. Sly (crafty, secretive, or cunning in dealing with
others)
27. Iron-hearted (tends to be stern or harsh with
others)
28. Unbold (not daring or courageous)
29. Neighbourly (friendly; likes to get involved with
people around you)
30. Shy (lacking in self-confidence; tends to be
uncomfortable around others)
31. Undemanding (doesn't demand or expect much
from others)
32. Meek (timid, has trouble being assertive or
standing up from others)
33. Unwily (not tricky or crafty)
34. Self-assured (confident, certain of oneself)
35. Dissocial (doesn't care for the company of others)
36. Jovial (cheerful; playful around others)
37. Domineering (tends to control or manipulate
others)
38. Tender-hearted (easily feels love, pity or sorrow
for others)
39. Warmthless (has no feeling of pleasure or affection
for others)
40. Unsly (not tricky or cunning; tends to be genuine;
sincere; trusting)
41. Enthusiastic (enjoys active involvement with
others)
42. Firm (steadfast; does not give in easily; gets others
to do things your way)
43. Uncalculating (doesn't try to manipulate others or
maximize one's own gain)
44. Accommodating (obliging, tends to do favors for
others)
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45. Uncheery (not lively or jolly around others)
46. Friendly (open, accepting, warm around others)
47. Cunning (crafty, skillful at manipulating others,
devious)
48. Self-confident (sure of oneself around others,
devious)
49. Unauthoritative (doesn't try to influence others;
goes with others' opinions)
50. Uncrafty (not tricky or sly when dealing with
others)
51. Unsympathetic (not interested or concerned about
others' feelings or problems)
52. Charitable (generous, like to help others)
53. Coldhearted (have little warmth or feelings for
others; unfeeling; harsh)
54. Distant (tends to be cold toward others; tends to
stay away from others)
55. Forceless (not forceful with others; timid or weak,
find it hard to be assertive)
56. Gentle-hearted (warm or kind to others)
57. Outgoing (enjoy meeting other people)
58. Sympathetic (feel interested or sensitive to the
feelings and problems of others)
59. Boastless (don't like to brag)
60. Persistent (doesn't give up even when others think
you are wrong)
61. Crafty (can mislead or manipulate others for one's
own purposes)
62. Unsociable (doesn't enjoy meeting people or being
in the company of others)
63. Cruel (able to cause pain and suffering to others;
unfeeling)
64. Bashful (tends to shy away from public attention)
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PART II
 What was the source or sources of information that you used to challenge the
memory?
 *Were you present when the original event (that you later challenged) occurred?
If yes…
 *Please describe in detail your memory for the event.
Please answer the following questions as you reflect specifically on your current memory
for the original event.
*Recollection, belief in accuracy, and belief in occurrence
1. How likely is it that you personally did in fact experience this event? (1 = definitely
did not happen; 8 = definitely happened)
2. Do you have any doubts about the accuracy of your memory for this event? (1 = a
great deal of doubts; 7 = no doubts whatsoever)
3. How strong is your memory for this event? (1 = no memory; 3 = weak memory; 5 =
moderate memory; 7 = strong memory)
4. How confident are you that your memory for this event is accurate? (1 = not at all
confident; 7 = completely confident)
5. Do you actually remember experiencing this event? (1 = no memory of event at all; 8
= clear and complete memory for the event)
6. How strong is your belief that this event actually occurred (whether or not you
remember the event)? (1 = no belief; 3 = weak belief; 5 = moderate belief; 7 = strong
belief)
7. What proportion of your memory for this event is accurate? (1 = not at all accurate; 7
= 100% accurate)
8. As you think about this event, can you actually remember it rather than just knowing
that it occurred? (1 = not at all; 3 = vaguely; 5 = distinctly; 7 = more than any event)
9. It is true that this event occurred. (1 = not at all true; 7 = completely true)
10. How plausible is it that you personally could have experienced this event? (1 = not at
all plausible; 8 = extremely plausible)
Items 1, 6, 9 assess Belief in Occurrence
Items 2, 4, 7, assess Belief in Accuracy
Items 3, 5, 8 assess Recollection
Item 10 is a stand-alone plausibility item.
Recollective phenomenology
When I think about this event its overall vividness is (1 = vague; 7 = very vivid)
When I think about this event it involves visual details. (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)
When I think about this event it involves sound. (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)
When I think about this event, the location where the event takes place is: (1 = vague,
7 = clear/distinct)
5. When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement of objects is: (1 =
vague, 7 = clear/distinct)
6. When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement of people in my
1.
2.
3.
4.
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memory is: (1 = vague, 7 = clear/distinct)
7. As I think about the event, I feel as though I am re-living it. (1 = not at all, 7 = very
much)
8. While thinking about this event, I feel that I travel back to the time when it happened.
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much)
Coherence & Connectedness
9. As I think about the event, it comes to me in words or in pictures as a coherent story
or episode and not as isolated scenes, facts or thoughts: not at all, coherent story. (1 =
not at all, 7 = very much)
10. As I think about the event, it is connected with other events. (1 = not at all, 7 = very
much)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

*Centrality of Event Scale – 7 items
I feel that this event has become part of my identity. (1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally
agree)
This event has become a reference point for the way I understand myself and the
world. (1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
I feel that this event has become a central part of my life story. (1 = totally disagree; 5
= totally agree)
This event has colored the way I think and feel about other experiences. (1 = totally
disagree; 5 = totally agree)
This event permanently changed my life. (1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
I often think about the effects this event will have on my future. (1 = totally disagree;
5 = totally agree)
This event was a turning point in my life. (1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
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*PART III - Demographics
Age:
Sex:
Ethnicity (please select):
__ Black/African/Caribbean
__ Chinese
__ Filipino
__ First Nations
__ Japanese
__ Latin American
__ Mixed
__ South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan)
__ Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Cambodian, Malaysian)
__ White
__ Other: ______________________________________________
Highest level of education completed. If currently enrolled, please select the highest
degree you have received:
__ No formal education
__ Elementary school
__ High school or equivalent (GED)
__ Community college
__ Bachelor’s degree
__ Master’s degree
__ Professional degree
__ Doctorate degree
Is English your first language?
Yes  No  If No, please indicate how long you’ve been speaking English for:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk ID in order to be compensated.
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Appendix F
Screening Question for the Participant Pool – Study 2
With respect to your current or past partner/girlfriend/boyfriend/wife/husband, have you
ever threatened, attempted, or completed any of the following: shouted, insulted, namecalled, threw something at them, pushed or shoved them, slapped or grabbed them,
kicked, punched, or insisted on sex or forced sex?
 Yes
 No
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Appendix G
Testing Package – Study 2

Qualitative Questions
Version A: High Self-Threat condition
presented first
Select a time that you have done any of the
following to a past or present romantic
partner or date: shouted, insulted, namecalled, threw something at them, pushed or
shoved them, slapped or grabbed them,
kicked, punched, or insisted on sex or
forced sex.

Version B: Low Self-Threat condition
presented first
Select a time that you acted in a kind,
supportive, and/or understanding way
towards a past or present romantic partner
or date (e.g., surprised the other with a gift
or a dinner, purchased flowers).

Please describe in as much detail as you
can this event, including:
1. what you said/did
2. why you did what you did,
3. how you felt at the time
4. how you saw yourself at the time.
What was your (approximate) age when
this occurred?

Please describe in as much detail as you
can this event, including:
1. what you said/did
2. why you did what you did,
3. how you felt at the time
4. how you saw yourself at the time.
What was your (approximate) age when
this occurred?
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The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.
Read each item and then list the number from the scale below next to each word. Indicate
to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use the
following scale to record your answers.

1
Very slightly or
not at all

___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___

Interested
Distressed
Excited
Upset
Strong
Guilty
Scared
Hostile
Enthusiastic
Proud

2
A little

___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___

3
Moderately

Irritable
Alert
Ashamed
Inspired
Nervous
Determined
Attentive
Jittery
Active
Afraid
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4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely
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Centrality of Event Scale
Please think back upon ______ and answer the following questions in an honest and
sincere way, by circling a number from 1 to 5.

1. This event has become a reference point for the way
I understand new experiences.
2. I automatically see connections and similarities
between this event and experiences in my present life.
3. I feel that this event has become part of my identity.
4. This event can be seen as a symbol or mark of
important themes in my life.
5. This event is making my life different from the life
of most other people.
6. This event has become a reference point for the way
I understand myself and the world.
7. I believe that people who haven’t experienced this
type of event think differently than I do.
8. This event tells a lot about who I am.
9. I often see connections and similarities between this
event and my current relationships with other people.
10. I feel that this event has become a central part of
my life story.
11. I believe that people who haven’t experienced this
type of event, have a different way of looking upon
themselves than I have.
12. This event has colored the way I think and feel
about other experiences.
13. This event has become a reference point for the way
I look upon my future.
14. If I were to weave a carpet of my life, this event
would be in the middle with threads going out to many
other experiences.
15. My life story can be divided into two main
chapters: one is before and one is after this event
happened.
16. This event permanently changed my life.
17. I often think about the effects this event will have
on my future.
18. This event was a turning point in my life.
19. If this event had not happened to me, I would be a
different person today.
20. When I reflect upon my future, I often think back to
this event.
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Totally
Disagree
1

2

3

4

Totally
Agree
5

1

2

3

4

5

1
1

2
2

3
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4

5
5

1

2
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4

5
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4
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Please answer the following questions as you reflect specifically on your current
memory for the original event.
Recollection, belief in accuracy, and belief in occurrence
1. How likely is it that you personally did in fact experience this event? (1 = definitely
did not happen; 8 = definitely happened)
2. Do you have any doubts about the accuracy of your memory for this event? (1 = a
great deal of doubts; 7 = no doubts whatsoever)
3. How strong is your memory for this event? (1 = no memory; 3 = weak memory; 5 =
moderate memory; 7 = strong memory)
4. How confident are you that your memory for this event is accurate? (1 = not at all
confident; 7 = completely confident)
5. Do you actually remember experiencing this event? (1 = no memory of event at all; 8
= clear and complete memory for the event)
6. How strong is your belief that this event actually occurred (whether or not you
remember the event)? (1 = no belief; 3 = weak belief; 5 = moderate belief; 7 = strong
belief)
7. What proportion of your memory for this event is accurate? (1 = not at all accurate; 7
= 100% accurate)
8. As you think about this event, can you actually remember it rather than just knowing
that it occurred? (1 = not at all; 3 = vaguely; 5 = distinctly; 7 = more than any event)
9. It is true that this event occurred. (1 = not at all true; 7 = completely true)
10. How plausible is it that you personally could have experienced this event? (1 = not at
all plausible; 8 = extremely plausible)
Recollective phenomenology
1. When I think about this event it the overall vividness is (1 = vague; 7 = very vivid)
2. When I think about this event it involves visual details. (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)
3. When I think about this event it involves sound. (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)
4. When I think about this event, the location where the event takes place is: (1 = vague,
7 = clear/distinct)
5. When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement of objects is: (1 =
vague, 7 = clear/distinct)
6. When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement of people in my
memory is: (1 = vague, 7 = clear/distinct)
7. As I think about the event, I feel as though I am re-living it. (1 = not at all, 7 = very
much)
8. While thinking about this event, I feel that I travel back to the time when it happened.
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much)
9. As I think about the event, it comes to me in words or in pictures as a coherent story
or episode and not as isolated scenes, facts or thoughts: not at all, coherent story. (1 =
not at all, 7 = very much)
10. As I think about the event, it is connected with other events. (1 = not at all, 7 = very
much)
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Personal Attributes Rating Scale
Rate the following adjectives on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely).
YOUR STANDING OVER
THE PAST YEAR

1. Kind
2. Tolerant
3. Good-natured
4. Open-minded
5. Appreciative of
others
6. Unselfish
7. Knowledgeable
8. Courageous
9. Experienced
10. Strong coping
skills
11. Self-confident
12. Wise
13. Strong sense of
inner strength
14. Ability to cope
with change
15. Intelligent
16. Insightful about
oneself
17. Insightful about
other people
18. Strong desire to
take better care of
oneself
19. Appreciative of
what I have
20. Good sense of my
abilities and
limitations
21. Good sense of
priorities in life
22. Mature
23. Honest
24. Reliable

Extre
mely

YOUR STANDING
IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO
THE EVENT
Not
Extre
at
mely
all
1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9
1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9
1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9
1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9
1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9

Not
at
all
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6
6

7
7
7
7
7

8
8
8
8
8

9
9
9
9
9

1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6
6

7
7
7
7
7

8
8
8
8
8

9
9
9
9
9

1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

8
8
8
8
8

9
9
9
9
9

1
1
1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9
9
9

1
1
1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9
9
9

1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

1
1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9
9

1
1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9
9

1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

1
1
1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9
9
9

1
1
1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9
9
9
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3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6
6

7
7
7
7
7
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25. Tidy
26. Happy about life
27. Healthy

1
1
1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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9
9
9

1
1
1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9
9
9
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Sense of Closure Scale

1. I have complete closure on this event
2. The event seems like ancient history to me.
3. The event is a ‘closed book’ to me.
4. The event is “unfinished business” for me.
5. I have put the event behind me completely.
6. I just wish I could figure out why this event happened.*
Note. *Item 6 was dropped from the Sense of Closure Scale.
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Not
at all
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6
6
6

Very
much
7
7
7
7
7
7
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Test of Self-Conscious Affect, Version 3S
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed by
several common reactions to those situations.
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how
likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate all
responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or
they may react different ways at different times.
For example:
A. You wake up early one Saturday morning. It is cold and rainy outside

a. You would telephone a friend to catch up on news
b. You would take the extra time to read the paper.
c. You would feel disappointed that it’s raining
d. You would wonder why you woke up so early

Not
likel
y
1
1
1
1

Very
likely
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5

In the above example, I’ve rated all of the answers by circling a number. I circled “1” for
answer (a) because I wouldn’t want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday
morning— so it’s not at all likely that I would do that. I circled a “5” for answer (b)
because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely). I
circled a “3” for answer (c) because for me it’s about half and half. Sometimes I would be
disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn’t—it would depend on what I had
planned. And I circled a “4” for answer (d) because I would probably wonder why I had
awakened so early.
Please do not skip any items—rate all responses
1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At five o’clock, you realize you have
stood your friend up.
Not
Very
Likely
Likely
a. You would think, “I’m inconsiderate.”
1
2 3 4
5
b. You would think: "Well, my friend will understand."
1
2 3 4
5
c. You’d think you should make it up to your friend as
1
2 3 4
5
soon as possible
d. You would think, “My boss distracted me just before
1
2 3 4
5
lunch.”
2. You break something at work and then hide it.
a. You would think, “This is making me anxious. I need
to either fix it or get someone else to.”
b. You would think about quitting.
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Not
Likely
1

2

3

4

Very
Likely
5

1

2

3

4

5
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c. You would think, “A lot of things aren’t made very
well these days.”
d. You would think: "It was only an accident."

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

3. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out badly.
Not
Very
Likely
Likely
a. You would feel incompetent.
1
2 3 4
5
b. You would think, “There are never enough hours in the
1
2 3 4
5
day.”
c. You would feel, “I deserve to be reprimanded for
1
2 3 4
5
mismanaging the project.”
d. You would think: "What's done is done."
1
2 3 4
5
4. You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for the error.
Not
Very
Likely
Likely
a. You would think the company did not like the co1
2 3 4
5
worker.
b. You would think: "Life is not fair."
1
2 3 4
5
c. You would keep quiet and avoid the co-worker.
1
2 3 4
5
d. You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the
1
2 3 4
5
situation
5. While playing around, you throw a ball, and it hits your friend in the face.
Not
Very
Likely
Likely
a. You would feel inadequate that you can’t even throw a
1
2 3 4
5
ball
b. You would think maybe your friend needs more
1
2 3 4
5
practice at catching.
c. You would think: "It was just an accident."
1
2 3 4
5
c. You would apologize and make sure your friend feels
1
2 3 4
5
better.
6. You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal.
Not
Likely
a. You would think the animal shouldn’t have been on
1
the road.
b. You would think, “I’m terrible.”
1
c. You would feel: "Well, it was an accident."
1
d.. You’d feel bad you hadn’t been more alert [while]
1
driving down the road

2

3

4

Very
Likely
5

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

7. You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well; then you find out you
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did poorly.

a. You would think: "Well, it's just a test."
a. You would think, “The instructor doesn’t like me.”
b. You would think, “I should have studied harder.”
c. You would feel stupid.

Not
Likely
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

Very
Likely
5
5
5
5

8. While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who’s not there.
Not
Very
Likely
Likely
a. You would think: "It was all in fun; it's harmless."
1
2 3 4
5
a. You would feel small . . . like a rat.
1
2 3 4
5
b. You would think that perhaps that friend should have
1
2 3 4
5
been there to defend himself/herself.
c. You would apologize and talk about that person’s good
1
2 3 4
5
points.
9. You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending
on you, and your boss criticizes you.

a. You would think your boss should have been more
clear about what was expected of you.
b. You would feel as though you want to hide.
c. You would think, “I should have recognized the
problem and done a better job.”
d. You would think: "Well, nobody's perfect."

Not
Likely
1

2

3

4

Very
Likely
5

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

1

2

3

4

5

10. You are taking care of your friend’s dog while she is on vacation and the dog
runs away.
Not
Very
Likely
Likely
a. You would think, “I am irresponsible and
1
2 3 4
5
incompetent.”
b. You would think your friend must not take very good
1
2 3 4
5
care of her dog or it wouldn’t have run away.
c. You would vow to be more careful next time.
1
2 3 4
5
d. You would think your friend could just get a new dog.
1
2 3 4
5
11. You attend your co-worker’s housewarming party, and you spill red wine on a
new cream-colored carpet, but you think no one notices.
Not
Very
Likely
Likely
a. You think your co-worker should have expected some
1
2 3 4
5
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accidents at such a big party.
b. You would stay late to help clean up the stain after the
party.
c. You would wish you were anywhere but at the party.
d. You would wonder why your co-worker chose to serve
red wine with the new light carpet.
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1

2

3

4

5

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5
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Psychological Aggression Scale

Have you ever:
1. Shouted or yelled at a partner
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

2. Ignored, shut out, or given a partner the
silent treatment?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

3. Called a partner hurtful names?
(If yes) In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

4. Criticized or put down a partner in front of
others?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

5. Limited a partner’s contact with others such
as family or friends?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

6. Controlled a partner’s behavior or activities
in any way?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?
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Circle your answer
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
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5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
7. Acted jealous or suspicious of a partner’s
other relationships?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
8. Insulted or sworn at a partner?
Yes
No
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 1 = 1 incident
you done this?
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
9. Intentionally destroyed something belonging Yes
No
to a partner?
1 = 1 incident
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 2 = 2 incidents
you done this?
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
10. Threatened to hit, hurt, or throw something Yes
No
at a partner?
1 = 1 incident
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 2 = 2 incidents
you done this?
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
11. Thrown, smashed, hit, or kicked something Yes
No
in a partner’s presence?
1 = 1 incident
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 2 = 2 incidents
you done this?
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
12. Threatened to hurt a partner if they left the Yes
No
relationship?
1 = 1 incident
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 2 = 2 incidents
you done this?
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
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13. Threatened to hurt yourself if a partner left
the relationship?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?
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Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
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Physical Aggression Scale

Have you ever:
1. Pushed or shoved a partner?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

2. Slapped a partner?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

3. Thrown something at a partner that could
hurt?
(If yes) In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

4. Twisted a partner’s arm or hair?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

5. Used a knife or gun on a partner?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

6. Punched a partner?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?
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Circle your answer
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
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7. Hit a partner with something that could
hurt?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

8. Choked a partner?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

9. Slammed a partner against a wall?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

10. Beaten up a partner?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

11. Grabbed a partner or held a partner down
in anger?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

12. Burned or scalded a partner on purpose?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?

13. Kicked a partner?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?
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Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
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4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
14. Scratched or bitten a partner during a
conflict?
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have
you done this?
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Yes
No
1 = 1 incident
2 = 2 incidents
3 = 3-5 incidents
4 = 6-10 incidents
5 = 11-20 incidents
6 = More than 20 times incidents
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Interpersonal Adjective Scales
Please rate how accurately each word describes you as a person. Judge how
accurately each word describes you on the following scale.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
extremely
very
quite
slightly slightly quite
very extremely
inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate accurate accurate accurate accurate
For example, consider the word “Introverted”. How accurately does that word
describe you as a person? If you think this is a quite accurate description of you,
you would select the number “6” in the space next to the word “Introverted”. If
you think this word is slightly inaccurate as a description of you, you would
select the number “4”. If it is very inaccurate you would select “2”, and so on…
It is very important that you do not skip any. If you are uncertain about the
meaning of a word, please consult the definitions provided in the brackets.
1.

Introverted (feels more comfortable by oneself;
is less interested in other people)
Assertive (tends to be aggressive and outspoken
with others)
Timid (tends to be fearful or uncomfortable
around others)
Unargumentative (tends to avoid arguments or
fights)
Boastful (tends to brag)
Soft-hearted (tends to be easy-going or gentle
with others)
Ruthless (pursues one's own interests regardless
of the effect on others)
Kind (thoughtful and caring for others)
Cheerful (happy, usually in good spirits)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

8
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

8
8

10. Unsparkling (not lively or entertaining with
others)
11. Tricky (can be deceiving toward others in order
to get something; able to fool others)
12. Unaggressive (tends to be mild-mannered, not
forceful around others)
13. Calculating (tends to use or manipulate others to
your own advantage)
14. Tender (warm and loving with others)
15. Hard-hearted (unconcerned and unfeeling
toward others)
16. Unneighbourly (unfriendly, aloof toward others,
avoid contact with others)
17. Uncharitable (dislike helping others; tends to

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

8
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

judge others harshly)
Uncunning (not crafty or sly, tends to be
straightforward with others)
Extraverted (like being with others; outgoing
and lively around others)
Cocky (self-centred; conceited; thinks highly of
one's own abilities)
Dominant (tends to lead others, like to
command, take charge in a group)
Antisocial (dislike the company of others;
behavior not affected by social rules)
Perky (lively, energetic around others)
Forceful (tends to take charge around others)
Wily (crafty, cagey, or tricky)
Sly (crafty, secretive, or cunning in dealing with
others)
Iron-hearted (tends to be stern or harsh with
others)
Unbold (not daring or courageous)

29. Neighbourly (friendly; likes to get involved with
people around you)
30. Shy (lacking in self-confidence; tends to be
uncomfortable around others)
31. Undemanding (doesn't demand or expect much
from others)
32. Meek (timid, has trouble being assertive or
standing up from others)
33. Unwily (not tricky or crafty)
34. Self-assured (confident, certain of oneself)
35. Dissocial (doesn't care for the company of
others)
36. Jovial (cheerful; playful around others)
37. Domineering (tends to control or manipulate
others)
38. Tender-hearted (easily feels love, pity or
sorrow for others)
39. Warmthless (has no feeling of pleasure or
affection for others)
40. Unsly (not tricky or cunning; tends to be
genuine; sincere; trusting)
41. Enthusiastic (enjoys active involvement with
others)
42. Firm (steadfast; does not give in easily; gets
others to do things your way)
43. Uncalculating (doesn't try to manipulate others
or maximize one's own gain)
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1
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7

8

1

2

3

4
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7
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1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5

6 7 8
6 7 8
6 7 8
6 7 8

1
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3

4

5

6

7
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1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

8
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

6
6
6

7
7
7

8
8
8

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

8
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
44. Accommodating (obliging, tends to do favors
for others)
45. Uncheery (not lively or jolly around others)
46. Friendly (open, accepting, warm around others)
47. Cunning (crafty, skillful at manipulating others,
devious)
48. Self-confident (sure of oneself around others,
devious)
49. Unauthoritative (doesn't try to influence others;
goes with others' opinions)
50. Uncrafty (not tricky or sly when dealing with
others)
51. Unsympathetic (not interested or concerned
about others' feelings or problems)
52. Charitable (generous, like to help others)
53. Coldhearted (have little warmth or feelings for
others; unfeeling; harsh)
54. Distant (tends to be cold toward others; tends to
stay away from others)
55. Forceless (not forceful with others; timid or
weak, find it hard to be assertive)
56. Gentle-hearted (warm or kind to others)
57. Outgoing (enjoy meeting other people)
58. Sympathetic (feel interested or sensitive to the
feelings and problems of others)
59. Boastless (don't like to brag)
60. Persistent (doesn't give up even when others
think you are wrong)
61. Crafty (can mislead or manipulate others for
one's own purposes)
62. Unsociable (doesn't enjoy meeting people or
being in the company of others)
63. Cruel (able to cause pain and suffering to others;
unfeeling)
64. Bashful (tends to shy away from public
attention)
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Positive Mood Induction
Please select a positive memory that you still believe truly occurred. Please answer the
following questions as you reflect on this believed memory.
Please briefly describe the event:
What was your (approximate) age when this event took place?

Please answer the following questions as you reflect specifically on your current
memory for the original event.
Recollection, belief in accuracy, and belief in occurrence
11. How likely is it that you personally did in fact experience this event? (1 = definitely
did not happen; 8 = definitely happened)
12. Do you have any doubts about the accuracy of your memory for this event? (1 = a
great deal of doubts; 7 = no doubts whatsoever)
13. How strong is your memory for this event? (1 = no memory; 3 = weak memory; 5 =
moderate memory; 7 = strong memory)
14. How confident are you that your memory for this event is accurate? (1 = not at all
confident; 7 = completely confident)
15. Do you actually remember experiencing this event? (1 = no memory of event at all; 8
= clear and complete memory for the event)
16. How strong is your belief that this event actually occurred (whether or not you
remember the event)? (1 = no belief; 3 = weak belief; 5 = moderate belief; 7 = strong
belief)
17. What proportion of your memory for this event is accurate? (1 = not at all accurate; 7
= 100% accurate)
18. As you think about this event, can you actually remember it rather than just knowing
that it occurred? (1 = not at all; 3 = vaguely; 5 = distinctly; 7 = more than any event)
19. It is true that this event occurred. (1 = not at all true; 7 = completely true)
20. How plausible is it that you personally could have experienced this event? (1 = not at
all plausible; 8 = extremely plausible)
Recollective phenomenology
11. When I think about this event it the overall vividness is (1 = vague; 7 = very vivid)
12. When I think about this event it involves visual details. (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)
13. When I think about this event it involves sound. (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)
14. When I think about this event, the location where the event takes place is: (1 = vague,
7 = clear/distinct)
15. When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement of objects is: (1 =
vague, 7 = clear/distinct)
16. When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement of people in my
memory is: (1 = vague, 7 = clear/distinct)
17. As I think about the event, I feel as though I am re-living it. (1 = not at all, 7 = very
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much)
18. While thinking about this event, I feel that I travel back to the time when it happened.
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much)
19. As I think about the event, it comes to me in words or in pictures as a coherent story
or episode and not as isolated scenes, facts or thoughts: not at all, coherent story. (1 =
not at all, 7 = very much)
20. As I think about the event, it is connected with other events. (1 = not at all, 7 = very
much)
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Demographics
Age:
Sex:
Ethnicity (please select):
__ Black/African/Caribbean
__ Chinese
__ Filipino
__ First Nations
__ Japanese
__ Latin American
__ Mixed
__ South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan)
__ Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Cambodian, Malaysian)
__ White
__ Other: ______________________________________________
Highest level of education completed. If currently enrolled, please select the highest
degree you have received:
__ No formal education
__ Elementary school
__ High school or equivalent (GED)
__ Community college
__ Bachelor’s degree
__ Master’s degree
__ Professional degree
__ Doctorate degree
Is English your first language?
Yes  No  If No, please indicate how long you’ve been speaking English for:
Please enter your UWindsor name and email address in order to receive participant pool
credit for your participation: _____________
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Appendix H
Order of Measures – Study 2
Version A
1. Letter of Information
2. High self-threat prompt
a. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
b. Appraisals:
i. Centrality of Event Scale
ii. Measures of belief in accuracy, occurrence, recollection.
iii. Recollective phenomenology
iv. Personal Attributes Rating Scale
v. Sense of Closure Scale
3. Low self-threat prompt
a. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
b. Appraisals:
i. Centrality of Event Scale
ii. Measures of belief in accuracy, occurrence, recollection.
iii. Recollective phenomenology
iv. Personal Attributes Rating Scale
v. Sense of Closure Scale
4. Other variables:
a. Test of Self Conscious Affect – Version 3 (short version)
b. Psychological Aggression scale; Physical Aggression Scale
c. Interpersonal Adjective Scales
5. Positive mood induction
a. Measures of belief in accuracy, occurrence, recollection.
b. Recollective phenomenology
6. Demographics
7. Resource sheet
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Version B
1. Letter of Information
2. Low self-threat prompt
a. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
b. Appraisals:
i. Centrality of Event Scale
ii. Measures of belief in accuracy, occurrence, recollection.
iii. Recollective phenomenology
iv. Personal Attributes Rating Scale
v. Sense of Closure Scale
3. High self-threat prompt
a. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
b. Appraisals:
i. Centrality of Event Scale
ii. Measures of belief in accuracy, occurrence, recollection.
iii. Recollective phenomenology
iv. Personal Attributes Rating Scale
v. Sense of Closure Scale
4. Other variables:
a. Test of Self Conscious Affect – Version 3 (short version)
b. Psychological Aggression scale; Physical Aggression Scale
c. Interpersonal Adjective Scales
5. Positive mood induction
a. Measures of belief in accuracy, occurrence, recollection.
b. Recollective phenomenology
6. Demographics
7. Resource sheet
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Appendix I
Item-by-item Analyses
Table 1
Item-by-item Analysis of Sense of Closure Scale-5 Items
Men

Women

Condition

M

N

SD

High vs. low
self-threat
95%CI

High self-threat

5.55

111

1.81

–0.93

Low self-threat

6.08

111

1.42

High self-threat

4.65

110

1.93

Low self-threat

3.89

110

2.09

High self-threat

5.49

108

1.71

Low self-threat

5.00

108

2.04

4. The event is “unfinished business”
for me. (Reverse coded)

High self-threat

5.64

109

1.77

Low self-threat

6.00

109

1.75

5. I have put the event behind me
completely.

High self-threat

5.22

109

1.86

Low self-threat

4.60

109

2.02

Sense of Closure items
1. I have complete closure on this event
2. The event seems like ancient history
to me.
3. The event is a 'closed book' to me.

Note. The values in bold are statistically significant at p < .05.
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0.30
–0.01
–0.81
0.13

–0.13
1.23
0.99
0.09
1.12

M

N

SD

High vs. low
self-threat
95%CI

5.08

108

1.90

–1.20

–0.30

5.83

108

1.90

4.46

110

2.06

0.40

1.42

3.55

110

2.23

4.83

109

2.05

–0.22

0.76

4.57

109

2.19

4.80

110

2.07

–1.14

–0.19

5.46

110

1.90

4.60

109

2.06

0.11

1.08

4.00

109

2.27

SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES

Table 2
Item-by-item Analysis of Sense of Closure Scale Items
High vs. low
self-threat

Men
Centrality of Event Scale items

Condition

M

SD

N

1. This event has become a reference point
for the way I understand new experiences.

High self-threat
Low self-threat

3.17
3.00

1.22
1.19

111
111

2. I automatically see connections and
similarities between this event and
experiences in my present life.

High self-threat

2.84

1.30

109

3. I feel that this event has become part of
my identity.

Low self-threat
High self-threat
Low self-threat

3.07
2.37
2.81

1.22
1.26
1.29

109
111
111

4. This event can be seen as a symbol or
mark of important themes in my life.

High self-threat
Low self-threat

2.61
3.26

1.34
1.25

5. This event is making my life different
from the life of most other people.
6. This event has become a reference point
for the way I understand myself and the
world.
7. I believe that people who haven’t
experienced this type of event think
differently than I do.

High self-threat
Low self-threat

2.26
2.43

High self-threat
Low self-threat

95% CI
–0.11

0.45

High vs. low
self-threat

Women
Mean

SD

N

3.17
2.55

1.23
1.22

108
108

2.77

1.24

109

1.23
1.31
1.24

109
110
110

95% CI
0.36

0.88

–0.57

0.05

–0.33

0.26

–0.57

0.11

–0.75

–0.13

3.03
2.38
2.42

111
111

-0.95

-0.35

2.65
2.62

1.41
1.18

109
109

–0.27

0.32

1.33
1.28

111
111

–0.47

0.12

2.22
2.23

1.23
1.13

110
110

–0.24

0.22

2.61
2.77

1.29
1.26

111
111

–0.46

0.14

2.81
2.50

1.26
1.23

108
108

0.03

0.58

High self-threat

2.92

1.38

110

2.86

1.31

109

Low self-threat

2.81

1.22

110

0.44

2.45

1.21

109

0.12

0.70

8. This event tells a lot about who I am.

High self-threat
Low self-threat

2.39
3.52

1.27
1.16

111
111

–0.83

2.73
3.57

1.20
1.19

108
108

–1.15

–0.54

9. I often see connections and similarities
between this event and my current
relationships with other people.

High self-threat
Low self-threat

2.47
2.89

1.31
1.21

110
110

–0.77

–0.07

2.63
3.15

1.28
1.22

110
110

–0.82

–0.21

High self-threat
Low self-threat
High self-threat

2.15
2.53
2.76

1.30
1.31
1.41

111
111
110

–0.66

–0.09

2.23
2.06
2.81

1.24
1.20
1.30

110
110
110

–0.10

0.42

Low self-threat

2.75

1.21

110

–0.29

0.32

2.40

1.17

110

0.14

0.68

10. I feel that this event has become a
central part of my life story.
11. I believe that people who haven’t
experienced this type of event, have a
different way of looking upon themselves
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than I have.
12. This event has colored the way I think
and feel about other experiences.
13. This event has become a reference point
for the way I look upon my future.
14. If I were to weave a carpet of my life,
this event would be in the middle with
threads going out to many other
experiences.
15. My life story can be divided into two
main chapters: one is before and one is after
this event happened.
16. This event permanently changed my
life.
17. I often think about the effects this event
will have on my future.
18. This event was a turning point in my
life.
19. If this event had not happened to me, I
would be a different person today.
20. When I reflect upon my future, I often
think back to this event.

High self-threat
Low self-threat
High self-threat
Low self-threat

2.77
2.85
2.59
2.82

1.30
1.22
1.37
1.34

109
109
111
111

High self-threat

1.99

1.23

109

Low self-threat

2.36

1.32

109

High self-threat

2.11

1.30

110

Low self-threat

2.12

1.40

110

High self-threat
Low self-threat
High self-threat
Low self-threat
High self-threat

2.58
2.33
2.23
2.38
2.54

1.43
1.42
1.22
1.36
1.35

110
110
111
111
109

Low self-threat
High self-threat
Low self-threat
High self-threat
Low self-threat

2.33
2.79
2.46
2.18
2.48

1.39
1.44
1.46
1.17
1.31

109
111
111
111
111

Note. The values in bold are statistically significant at p < .05.
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1.97
2.45
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1.36
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–0.02

0.56
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0.09
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SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
PURPOSE OF THIS CODING MANUAL


In this study, participants were asked to write about a time in which they
challenged someone else’s account of a past event. The instructions specifically
asked them to describe:
o How they challenged the other.
o Why they challenged the other.



Use this manual to code the reasons participants themselves identify as motivating
their challenge. In other words, although you may detect numerous reasons for
initiating a challenge, you are being asked to code ONLY those reason(s) the
participant himself/herself explicitly identifies in his/her writing.



In every account, you will find at least 2 players:
o The challenger = the participant in this study.
o The challenged party (the challengee) = the other
Some accounts may involve the following additional players:
o A third party other = a person who was absent when the challenge
occurred but may have been present when the challenged event occurred.





Throughout this coding manual, the labels “participant(s)” and “challenger(s)” are
equivalent; they denote the same individual.



Throughout this coding manual, the words “reason(s)” and “motive(s)” are used
interchangeably.
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GENERAL CODING GUIDELINES


Read this document entirely before you begin coding. Be sure that you understand
the definitions for the major categories and are able to distinguish amongst them.



Always code from the perspective of the challenger.



Do not infer beyond what is explicitly stated by the participant as motive for
challenging, unless directed otherwise. Code ONLY what the participant says and
do not put forth your own opinion while coding.



The coding categories devised here are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive. A
single statement can be coded under multiple categories.



In every participant’s narrative, attempt to assess which is the focal event. For
consistency in coding, pick the broadest grain size (e.g., if participant speaks
about a fight in which she was hit, and she said that her partner denied the hitting
[but not the fight], see the overall fight as the focal event, not the hitting).



In most cases, you will be able to identify the focal event from reading the
participant’s response to “Describe how you challenged this person’s memory.
What did you say or do to challenge the memory?” For further context or clarity,
it is helpful to consult the participant’s response to “Describe your memory for the
event that you chose to challenge.”



In every participant’s response to “why” they challenged, it will be helpful to
segment and paraphrase their reasons without any embellishments or repetitive
words. Paraphrasing involves identifying the logical proposition or statement
being made independent of any filler or embellished words.
o One reason for challenging = one unit of coding.
o One unit of coding can receive multiple category codes, but only one
subcategory code within any one category.



Do NOT use the response to the following question to code motive: “Describe
your memory for the event that you chose to challenge”. This should only serve as
context and help clarify the recalled event.



Do not discuss your coding strategies or tendencies with other coders until the
entire data set is complete and you are instructed to do so.



Note categories or concepts you find confusing or difficult to distinguish from
other categories.



If you have any questions, ideas, comments, please contact Fiona at
dyshnik@uwindsor.ca
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STRATEGY FOR CODING MOTIVES
FIRST STEP, read the participant’s response to the question “Describe why you
challenged the other person’s memory?”
 Segment and paraphrase the reasons for challenging (see General Coding
Guidelines for this). One reason for challenging = one coding unit.
 Code mostly everything here as motive.
 At times, there may be extraneous information included in this answer that does
not relate to motive. Extraneous information will usually be obvious from the
context. If in doubt, code as motive.
o Example: “I was absolutely sure that I was right and he was wrong. I made the
effort to not say a bad word. It doesn't always work, but this time I am
positive it did work.”
 “I was absolutely sure that I was right and he was wrong” = Motive.
The participant is stating that they challenged because they were
confident they were right and the other was wrong.
 “I made the effort to not say a bad word. It doesn't always work, but
this time I am positive it did work” = Extraneous info. Although
revealing about the participant himself/herself, these two sentences do
not speak to motive for challenging.
SECOND STEP, read the participant’s response to the question “Describe how you
challenged this person’s memory. What did you say or do to challenge the memory?”
 Be selective about what you code here as motive. There may be extraneous
information included in this answer that does not relate to motive.
 If a participant hints at a motive (however implicitly) when answering “why”, and
then elaborates explicitly on that same motive when answering “how”, you can
code that particular “how” content as a motive. If, however, a participant
discusses or hints at a motive while answering “how” that is not mentioned in any
way while answering “why”, do not code as motive.
o REMEMBER: Prioritize “why” answers at all times! Statements inside
“how” response are only coded if they are contained, discussed, or hinted
at in “why” response.
 As a very general guide, it is safe to use “how” if you see the following in the
“why” responses:
o Vague stand-alone statements like “X was wrong” (e.g., “I challenged
because) I thought some of the things he was talking about were
completely wrong, or slightly wrong”. The use of vague statements like “x
was wrong” open the door to looking into the “how” answer to better
determine what the participant means by “wrong”.
o Words that imply inaccuracies, like “liar”, “lying”, “embellishing” and
their synonyms (e.g., “I challenged because she had a way of embellishing
things to make them sound worse than they really are”). On their own,
such statements hint at accuracy concerns, and looking at “how” response
might help narrow down the type of accuracy concern.
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o Statements about participant’s own memory ability (e.g., I challenged
because I have an excellent memory”; “I challenged because I thought I
was right”; “I challenged because I have first-hand knowledge of the
situation”). The participant here is strongly suggesting that their version of
events differs from the others. Consult the “how” response for clarification
and further evidence of this accuracy motive.
As a very general guide, it is safe to use “how” if you see the following in the
“how” responses:
o Dispositional statements about others (e.g., about the challenged other,
about a third party person). These will usually take the form of “X is
always…” or “Y has a tendency to…”). These are clearly not “how”
answers and would be more appropriately categorized as motives for
challenging.
o Dispositional statements about oneself. These are also clearly not “how”
answers and would be more appropriately categorized as motives for
challenging.
The logic behind this selective coding of the “how” question is to strike a delicate
balance among 1) comprehensively coding motives, 2) staying as close as
possible to what the participant is explicitly stating as motivating the challenge,
and 3) being mindful of the difference between “how” the challenge was carried
out and “why” it was carried out.

Examples of when to use “why” and when to consult “how” responses:
Example 1:
 FIRST STEP: Response to “why”: “his details were wrong, and that memory
was very important to me. It was a traumatic event for me, and I wanted to make
sure that he knew exactly how it happened.”
o At least 3 motives/reasons here segmented and paraphrased: #1 Because
his details were wrong, #2 Because the memory was important to me, #3
Because I wanted to ensure he knew how it happened.
 SECOND STEP: Response to “how”: “I had to stop him midway through,
because his facts were wrong. I told him that it's not how it happened. I
remembered the incident very clearly since it was a somewhat traumatic event for
me, and I corrected him immediately. He got some minor details wrong, but it
was understandable, since the event happened many years ago. I, however, still
remember it vividly and I can recall every single detail about it, including the
colors and the outfit I was wearing that day.”
o “I had to stop him midway through, because his facts were wrong. I told
him that it's not how it happened. I remembered the incident very clearly
since it was a somewhat traumatic event for me”  Participant elaborates
on the previously identified motive #1 (i.e., “his details were wrong”) by
adding that the other was wrong because he himself remembers “the
incident very clearly”. This elaboration would receive a code for Internal
Features.
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“I remember the incident…as it was somewhat traumatic event for me”
 This phrase can arguably be considered an elaboration of motive #2
above and would receive a code for Memory Integrity.
o “He got some minor details wrong, but it was understandable, since the
event happened many years ago”  This is another elaboration on motive
#1 above. Here, the participant demonstrates a Belief in Accuracy “…he
got some minor details wrong” and a Belief about Age and Memory
(…since the event happened many years ago”).
o “…still remember it vividly and I can recall every single detail about it,
including the colors and the outfit I was wearing that day”  More
elaboration of motive #1, which would receive a code for Internal
Features.
o

Example 2:
 FIRST STEP  Response to “why”: “Because they weren't in fact with me at
the event.”
o One motive/reason segmented and paraphrased here: Because they were
absent from the event [Accuracy]
 SECOND STEP  Response to “how”: “A friend tried to invoke the memories
of a concert that they claimed they went to with me. I challenged them and said
they weren't there. They were surprised but when they thought back, they
realized I was right and that they in fact had simply heard so much about the story
that they assumed they were there, as they regularly hang out with our mutual
friend group.”
o The participant here demonstrates an understanding of general metamemory beliefs, specifically Memory Integrity (i.e., they had… heard so
much…that they assumed they were there). This is not, however,
identified explicitly as a reason for challenging, nor is it a direct
elaboration of the motive identified when answering “why”. No statements
inside this “how” response will receive any motive codes.
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HOW TO USE THE CODING TEMPLATE


If a category/subcategory is present, enter ‘1’ in the appropriate cell.



If a category/subcategory is absent, enter ‘0’ in the appropriate cell.



The Excel spreadsheet is organized such that each MAJOR CATEGORY
corresponds to the same letter of the alphabet as the one used in this document
(“A” denotes “General Meta-Memory Beliefs”, “B” denotes “Internal Features”,
etc.).



Within each MAJOR CATEOGRY there are one or more subcategories. Each
SUBCATEGORY corresponds to a number. The numbers used in the Excel
spreadsheet correspond to the numbers used in this document.



Within each MAJOR CATEGORY, there is a “Notes” column to include any
relevant information pertaining to that category.

257

SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES

(A) GENERAL META-MEMORY BELIEFS
General Notes:
 General beliefs regarding memory and ability are meta-memory attributions about
the operations of memory in general (e.g., how memory works); they are NOT
event-specific.
 They tend to be learned at school, through conversations with others, through
personal experience with remembering, etc.
 General beliefs may be derived through others. For example, one’s reasoning that
they were “told by another person that memories before a certain age cannot
occur,” would still be regarded as a general belief.

A1. GENERAL BELIEFS REGARDING MEMORY & AGE
 The participant explicitly states that his/her challenge to the other’s memory was
motivated by the assumption(s) that:
o Memories before a certain age cannot occur
o One was too young to remember
o Childhood memories are illogical or unreliable
o Memory declines with age
o Other memories should be present at age of particular memory assessed
 Specific Codes:
o Code 1a if comparative = the motive provided includes a statement that
compares the ages of the challenger and the person whom they challenged
(e.g., “I challenged his memory because I was older than him and I know
the event didn't happen.”)
o Code 1b if absolute = the motive provided includes an absolute statement
regarding age, with no comparison evoked (e.g., “Young people don’t
remember well”; “I had to question it because I was sure this was a detail
of the story I would've remembered, even though I was too young to
remember the original memory”)
o It is possible to code both 1a and 1b if the participant makes a
comparative statement in one part of their account, and then makes an
absolute statement in another part of their account. To assess whether two
separate sentences are intended as a comparative statement, use the
proximity of the sentences to each other and any context that indicates
links between the two as guide. Sentences that follow one-another and/or
use connecting links (“and”, “so”) are to be coded as comparative.
 Examples:
o “[I challenged because] I was concerned with her memory as she is getting
quite old.” [coded as 1b]
o “I challenged her memory because… I can understand that she may not
fully remember her past since she was only a child back then [when 9/11
happened]…[coded as 1b]
o “There is no way I could remember something that happened when I was
just 2 years old. My teacher said that people can’t have memories before
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the age of 3 or 4” or “Children have such wild imaginations,” or “I should
have other memories from that age but I don’t”.

A2. GENERAL BELIEFS REGARDING MEMORY ABILITY
 The participant explicitly states that his/her challenge to the other’s memory was
motivated by assumptions regarding their own general ability to accurately recall
events, AND/OR the other’s general ability to accurately recall events. For
example, the challenger may believe that their memory is superior to the other’s,
or that the other’s memory ability is quite poor.
 Specific Codes:
o Code A2a if comparative = the motive provided includes a statement that
compares the general memory ability of the challenger against the other’s
general memory ability (e.g., I challenged because my memory is good
and their memory is horrible).
o Code A2b if absolute = the motive provided includes a statement that
mentions the challenger’s own general memory ability (e.g., “I challenged
because my memory is excellent”.); OR that mentions the other’s general
memory ability (e.g., “I challenged because their memory is awful”).
o It is possible to code both A2a and A2b if the participant makes a
comparative statement in one part of their account, and they make an
absolute statement in another part of their account. To infer whether two
separate sentences are intended as a comparative statement, use the
proximity of the sentences to each other and any context that indicates
links between the two as guide. Sentences that follow one-another and/or
use connecting links (“and”, “so”) are to be coded as comparative.
 Examples:
o “[I challenged because] I have very, very good memory so I clearly know
she said it,” (coded as A2b).
o “[I challenged] because I have a pretty good memory and rarely forget
things. So, I was sure that she had forgotten because she always does.”
(note in this case that an initially absolute statement is closely followed by
a statement about the other’s memory. The proximity, as well as the link
“so” between the two statements, warrants a A2a code)
o “[I challenged] because I pride myself on my good memory and
recollection skill and his side of the story was flawed and untrue from my
perspective.” (coded as A2a)

A3. GENERAL BELIEFS REGARDING MEMORY INTEGRITY
 The participant explicitly states that his/her challenge to the other’s memory was
motivated by the assumption that:
o Memories can be false or reconstructed
o The telling of (or hearing of) someone else’s memory (or another event)
can become one’s own memory
o Memories can result from expectations (or prior beliefs)
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o “Important” (serious, dangerous, life threatening, etc.) events should be
more memorable
o Memories can be intentionally or unintentionally borrowed from others.
Code this subcategory when the participant states that the other’s memory or
features of their memory were wrong OR the participant’s memory or features of
their memory are right; do not give this code if the participant states that the other
“is/was wrong” or they “I am right” because there is insufficient information here
to determine whether memory integrity is being challenged.
Examples:
o “I challenged their memory because the order in which things took place
along with the outcomes from this event were being misconstrued by the
false recollection.”
o “If my sister really did do something that serious, I think I would
remember it better” or “I think I have this memory because of hearing
similar stories from other people but I don’t think it really happened to
me,”
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(B) INTERNAL FEATURES OF EVENT REPRESENTATION
General Notes:
 Internal features of event representation refer to the subjective representation of
the event in the participant’s mind and the characteristics therein. Examples of
internal features or memory characteristics include people, objects, sights, sounds,
smells, clarity or vividness, location, narrative coherence (i.e., whether the pieces
of the story appear to fit together), imagery perspective (i.e., first person/field or
third person/observer), and other thoughts and feelings experienced when
recalling the event.
o For example, the challenger/participant might state they are challenging
because their memory for the event feels especially vivid/strong.
 Internal features refer to the participant’s assessment of how and/or whether the
event, or parts of the event, are remembered along with specific sensory,
contextual, and emotional characteristics of the memory itself. It is a person’s
image of the event in the mind’s eye.

B1. INTERNAL FEATURES/MEMORY CHARACTERISTICS
 The participant explicitly states that his/her challenge to the other’s memory was
motivated by something that:
o Was/is odd or unusual about their own memory representation, and may
align with the following:
 Internal features present but disorganized (unusual, unfamiliar, not
logically consistent)
 Internal features present but not clear (faded, weak, vague)
 Internal features absent (missing, unable to retrieve key episodic
details)
 The event no longer seems/feels real
 The memory seems different compared to other memories
o Was/is odd or unusual about the other’s memory representation, and may
align with the following:
 Internal features present but disorganized (unusual, unfamiliar, not
logically consistent)
 Internal features present but not clear (faded, weak, vague)
 Internal features absent (missing, unable to retrieve key episodic
details)
 The event no longer seems/feels real
 The memory seems different compared to other memories
o Was/is clear, vivid, and interconnected with the participant’s other
memories, and may align with the following:
 Internal features are present and clear (vivid, strong, clear)
 Internal features are organized or linked in some logically
consistent manner.
 The memory seems different compared to other memories
 Examples:
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o “[I challenged because] I remember it clearly”
o “[I challenged] because it was so clear in my memory what he said”
o “There were certain things that transpired during that visit to Goodwill
that link my memory together”
o “I can’t remember the details well and everything seems blurry,” or, “It
just doesn’t feel real anymore,” or “There are certain parts of my memory
that just don’t make sense,” etc.
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(C) EXTERNAL EVIDENCE
General Notes:
 A participant’s challenge is motivated by possessing external evidence or lack of
thereof. Do not infer lack of external evidence; only code lack of external
evidence if the participant explicitly states they could not locate any external
evidence.
 External evidence in this category refers to anything that is concrete and/or
tangible, such as photos, receipts, videos, other documentation, etc. Emails and
letters are also considered external evidence.
 Using logic to discount the plausibility of an event is not coded under this
category. Similarly, talking to others or trying to find information or
corroboration from others does not constitute external evidence as defined in this
category.

C1. EXTERNAL EVIDENCE PRESENT
 The participant explicitly states their challenge to the other’s account was
motivated by their possession of external evidence that undermines or threatens
the validity of the other’s account.
 Example: “[I challenged because] I had evidence to the contrary, an email”

C2. LACK OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE
 The participant explicitly states their challenge to the other’s account was
motivated by the conspicuous absence of external evidence, which undermines or
threatens the validity of the other’s account.
 Example: “[I challenged because…] if he had rode the merry-go-round, there
would have been pictures because I had my camera all ready to take them.”
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(D) ALTERNATE ATTRIBUTIONS
General Notes:
 Alternate attributions refer to sources that affect the event-specific memory or
parts of it.
 These sources can be “internal” (from my fantasy) or “external” (from a movie).
 Regardless of the source, the participant states that they are challenging because
they know or believe that the other’s account has resulted from OR has been
spoiled or modified in some way by internal or external sources.
 Do not code here if the “source” for the alternate attribution is social interaction.

D1. INTERNAL ALTERNATE ATTRIBUTION
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the belief or
knowledge that the other’s account or features of it may have resulted from or
were influenced by an alternate internal source, such as imagination, fantasy,
nightmare, etc., to the point of being confused with reality.
 Specific Codes:
o Code 7a. Imagination/ Confabulation/ Exaggeration/ Simplification/
Fantasy/ Daydream = The participant explicitly states that their challenge
to the other’s account was motivated by their knowledge or belief that the
other’s account resulted from or was influenced by an alternate internal
state, such as imagination, confabulation, exaggeration, simplification,
fantasy and/or daydream, etc. and it is implied this source was confused
with reality.
 Examples: “[I challenged because…] their version is made up,”
OR “[I challenged because…] he/she probably just imagined it”
o Code 7b. Dream/ Nightmare = The participant explicitly states that their
challenge to the other’s account was motivated by their knowledge or
belief that the other’s account resulted from or was influenced by a dream
or nightmare, and is implied this source was confused with reality.
 Example: “[I challenged because] they dreamt it all up,” etc.

D2. EXTERNAL ALTERNATE ATTRIBUTION
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their
knowledge or belief that the other’s account resulted from or was influenced by
an external source such as a movie, television show, book/magazine, etc. and it is
implied this source was confused with reality.
 Example: “[I challenged their account because] they probably saw that in a
movie/on television”.

D3. OTHER ALTERNATE ATTRIBUTION (INTERNAL AND/OR EXTERNAL)
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their
knowledge or belief that the other’s account resulted from or was influenced by
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an alternate internal or external source other than the abovementioned categories
and it is implied this source was confused with reality. These internal or external
sources might include:
o Déjà vu
o Confusion/ misunderstanding
o Hallucination/ delusion
o Mental health issues (includes depression, Alzheimer’s etc.)
o Substance use (alcohol, or other “recreational” substances)
o Medication
o Feeling tired/ sleepy/ sleeping
o Meditation
o Hypnotism
o Otherwise lack of alertness
Examples:
o “I challenged my friend's memory because they have a mental illness that
impairs their perception of reality and memory.”
o “I challenged this person because they smoke too much [marijuana] and
now there memory is failing them”
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(E) PLAUSIBILITY
General Notes:
 Refers to an assessment of whether the event could have actually occurred; it is an
appraisal based on one’s knowledge of the world. For reasons involving
plausibility, the participant assesses the reality status of the event and decides that
it is either impossible (i.e., it could not have occurred), implausible (i.e., it is not
likely to have occurred), or illogical (i.e., it simply does not make sense) for
themselves or for another person.
 Plausibility is an assessment of “could this have happened?”, not “did this
happen?”
 It is possible for a challenged event to be deemed plausible (and be coded under
Plausibility), yet NOT deemed to have occurred (and therefore not coded under
Belief in Occurrence).

E1. SUBJECTIVE PLAUSIBILITY
 The participant explicitly states that his/her challenge was motivated by their own
assessment that the event was impossible, implausible and/or illogical for reasons
that are subjective in nature (i.e., they are based on personal feelings, tastes, or
opinions) and may align with the following:
 Given age in event
o Given it was an isolated event/ given frequency of event
o Relative to anchoring/other life events
o Given changes in imagery perspective
o Given people/characters/objects/animals present in memory
o Given actions in memory
o Given aesthetics of memory
o Given one’s location in memory
o Given time the event occurred
o Given duration of event
o Given condition in memory
o Given outcome in memory
o Given knowledge of other events/ conditions in memory
o Given characteristics of people/characters/objects/animals/surroundings in
memory (size, color, location, condition, etc.)
o Given inability to remember details in memory
 Examples:
o “I told her that it didn't make much sense. A) At age three, I'm fairly
certain if I had fallen and gotten hurt I would have cried and alerted my
parents. B) Considering my cousin was two and a half at the time I doubt
she could actually remember that far back. C) Even if she could have
remembered and even if I fell out of my crib, how in the world would a
little three year old with a dislocated elbow climb back into the crib?”
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o “[I challenged] because I thought the thing she said happened was absurd.
I don't even think we have the same blood type, plus she lives out of the
country!”
o “I don’t think the roads could have been that icy in the spring, so it’s not
likely that that’s what caused our accident,” or, “It just doesn’t make any
sense. Why would I be wearing winter clothes in the summer?” or, “A car
flipped on it’s side like that? It’s impossible!”
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(F) BELIEF IN OCCURRENCE
General Notes:
 Belief in Occurrence refers to an assessment of whether a past event actually
occurred.
 It differs from Plausibility by focusing on “did this event in fact happen to me?”,
not “could this event have happened?”
 As a general rule, all the categories in this section involve a participant who
claims to challenge BECAUSE they doubt the occurrence of the event for one
reason or another.

F1. THE EVENT DID NOT OCCUR
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the
belief/knowledge that the event did not occur. OR the participant states that they
challenged because the other or others deny the occurrence of the event or
provide an alternate explanation or state attribution (e.g., dream) for it.
 This category may overlap with subcategories 13 and 14 below depending on the
context provided by the participant.
 Examples:
o “[I challenged because] I'm quite sure that this never happened”; “I
mentioned that when growing up she spanked me and she stated that she
never did.”
o “My uncle told me it didn’t happen,” or, “I spoke to my grandfather about
it and he denied it ever happening,” etc.

F2. THE EVENT COULD NOT OCCUR (I.E., IS IMPOSSIBLE)
 The participant explicitly states that his/her challenge was motivated by the
belief/knowledge that there is no way the event could have occurred (i.e., it is
impossible).
 Examples:
o Examples from Fiona’s dataset: “I challenged it because I never
remembered having gone fishing ever when growing up. This isn't
something your mind can make up...you either have done something like
that or not. So unless I blocked it out of my memory, I never went fishing
on my 10th birthday with my sister.”
o Chantal’s examples from coding: “My mom told me that there is no way
she would have forgotten my birthday,” or, “My brother said that there
was no such amusement park near our grandparent’s house,”

F3. THE EVENT IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE OCCURRED (I.E., IS
IMPLAUSIBLE)
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the
belief/knowledge that the event could have occurred but it is unlikely (i.e., it is
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implausible). In other words, the participant challenges the other because they
themselves doubt the occurrence of the event, but they do not actually state that
the event did not occur.
Examples: Chantal’s examples from NBM coding: “My mother told me she
didn’t think that I would have been allowed in the water at that age without a life
jacket,” or, “My dad said my grade 4 teacher probably wouldn’t have told me that
I did a horrible job on my science fair project,” etc.

F4. LACK OF CORROBORATION FROM ANOTHER
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the
belief/knowledge that others cannot confirm the memory. Otherwise stated, the
participant challenges the other’s account because others have told the participant
that they do not remember the event (or cannot confirm the event). Note that the
participant is not actually stating that the event did not occur; they are only stating
that the event cannot be confirmed by a third party.
 Example: Chantal’s examples from NBM coding: No body else remembers it but
me,” or, “My friend who I thought was with me does not remember it at all,”

F5. THE EVENT WAS NOT WITNESSED
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the
belief/knowledge that they themselves and/or others did not witness the event.
Note that the participant is not stating that the event did not occur; the participant
is only expressing a reason for the inability to witness the event.
 Specific codes:
o F5a: The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by
the belief/knowledge that they themselves were not present (physically or
mentally) to witness the event (e.g., I didn’t see it).
o F5b: The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated
by the belief/knowledge that the other person (i.e., the challenged person)
was not actually present to witness the event (e.g., You weren’t there).
o Code F5 if either F5a or F5b, or both, are present.
 Example: Chantal’s examples from NBM: “I was told I wasn’t even there,” or, “I
was told I was too drunk to see it,” or “I was told I was sleeping at the time,”

269

SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES

(G) BELIEF IN ACCURACY
General Notes:
 Belief in Accuracy refers to an assessment of whether the details of a recalled
event are accurate.
 As a general rule, all the categories in this section involve a participant who
claims to challenge BECAUSE they doubt the accuracy of the event for one
reason or another.
 Whereas Belief in Occurrence focuses on whether the entire event occurred or
not, Belief in Accuracy focuses on whether the details recalled within the event
are correct or not. For example, “You did not wear a blue jacket, you wore a
green sweater” is a challenge to Belief in Accuracy.
 The challenger may agree that the event occurred, but challenge one or more
details about the memory for the event.
 The challenger may challenge both occurrence and accuracy; for example “You
were not there when that event happened [occurrence], and so are wrong that he
did not wear the blue jacket, he was wearing the green sweater [accuracy] .”
 It is possible to challenge occurrence without challenging accuracy, “That event
did not happen to you, it happened to me; but everything you describe is exactly
right because I told you the story.”

G1. THE EVENT HAPPENED DIFFERENTLY
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the belief
that feature(s) of the event, as recounted by the other, are inaccurate, wrong, or
happened differently.
 This challenge does not necessarily invalidate the occurrence of the event; it
merely offers alternate suggestions regarding content components of the event.
 The stated reason might include the following:
o Occurred to someone else (other than the participant)
o Occurred at a different age
o Occurred at a different place
o Occurred at a different time
o Occurred over a different length of time
o Occurred in a different context
o Involved different objects
o Involved different actions
o Involved a different outcome
o Did not include certain features that were reported
 Examples:
o “[I challenged because] his details were wrong”
o “I challenged his memory because his recollection of the event was not
exactly how it had unfolded in reality,”
o “[I challenged because] her perception of how many cigarettes she had
was wrong. My mother claimed that I stole a large portion of her cigarettes
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from her pack. I immediately let her know I only took one and she insisted
there were MANY missing.”

(H) PROSOCIAL MOTIVES
General Notes:
 Prosocial Motives refers to challenges intended to develop, maintain, and/or
nurture closeness in social relationships. This takes a number of forms, including
being helpful in some way, illustrating a point or giving advice in order to teach
and inform others (e.g., pass on valuable life lessons or information), making the
conversation more enjoyable, collaboratively co-constructing memories with
others present at the original event so as to produce more complete memories, and
providing empathy to others.
 Challenges prompted by prosocial motives will tend to show all of the following
characteristics:
o Consist primarily of an external, social focus;
o Are accompanied by the participant’s explicit expression of helpful and/or
positive intentions;
o Focus more on a specific person other than OR in addition to oneself.
 Subcategories inspired by Alea & Bluck (2003); Bluck et al., 2005; Webster,
2003; Pasupathi et al., 2002.
 At all times, prioritize the coding of the “why” responses over the “how”
responses.

H1. SEEKING CONFIRMATION
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by a desire to
seek out, verify, or confirm details about a past event and/or negotiate a shared
interpretation of a past event. In all these instances, participants enlist the other’s
assistance with the explicit purpose of co-constructing memories in order to
produce more complete memories.
 Coding aid:
o The participant will typically admit OR strongly hint at having doubts
about their own recollection and/or interpretation of the challenged event.
This doubt motivates their asking the other for help.
o The tone of these narratives will typically be benign in nature, reflecting a
genuine collaborative attempt at trying to make sense of a past event.
o Participant’s use of words like “verify” or “confirm” (or their synonyms)
will typically suggest a Seek Confirmation motive.
o If in doubt, prioritize coding the “why” response over the “how” response.
 Examples:
o “I challenged her memory because I thought it was different from mine
and I figured between the two of us we could iron out the parts that were
incorrect on both sides.”
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o “The reason why I challenged the person's memory was to verify a bet to
ensure that the loser of the previous set of games would go on to cover the
winner's games.”
o “We challenge each other because we value accuracy in memories and
love one another. We want to make sure we are both right. It is not a
matter of keeping tabs to see who has the better memory.”
o “I was unsure about my recollection of the event that happened and
wanted to see if I was just being crazy.”

H2. PROVIDING EMOTIONAL SUPPORT
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by a desire to
offer empathy, care, understanding, and/or emotional support to the other. There
will often be a quasi-therapeutic tone to these challenges as participants attempt to
cheer the other up, instil confidence, show that they care for the other, or alleviate
the other’s stress.
 Expressions of concern about a loved one’s memory should be coded under this
category.
 Examples:
o “I challenged this person's memory because I wanted to instil confidence
in them so that they would succeed. Whether true or not, I wanted them to
see the events that happened as positive rather than negative”
o “I wanted my partner to remember this event that way he would feel more
at ease about the delivery”

H3. PASSING ON KNOWLEDGE/INFORMATION
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by a desire to
pass on valuable life lessons or information.
 The value/importance of the information needs to be recognized implicitly or
explicitly by both the challenger and the challenged party in order to be coded
here. If the participant states that the challenged account was important or
valuable to them, but there is no indication of importance to the other, do not code
the account under his category.
 Coding aid:
o The participant is motivated by their own belief and/or knowledge that the
information they are passing on by challenging the other’s account is
valuable or important to the other.
o This belief/knowledge can be explicitly stated (e.g., “I thought it was
important to x”) OR strongly implied by the context (e.g., themes of
safety, security, love/belonging, financial lessons, health, happiness, selfesteem, confidence, achievement, etc. are strongly indicative of
importance/value to the other).
 Examples:
o “I wanted to teach my brother responsible financial habits”
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o “I did so partly because I wanted to inform her of something she actually
had that she believes she never had”
o “I felt that she should know where she was at that time [when 9/11
happened] so that she does not live life thinking she was somewhere else
when that happened.”
o “I challenged the memory because I thought it was important for my
mother to realize that the reason my dad was making more money was
because his boss wasn't managing the company correctly.”

H4. REMINISCING
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by a desire to
indulge in the enjoyable recollection of a past event.
 Coding aid:
o Participants will often (but not always) refer to positive emotions and
actions like “happy”, “funny”, or “laugh”.
o Participants will also typically (but not always) use neutral or positive
labels to refer to the act of the challenge itself, like “conversation” or
“reminiscing”, rather than “disagreement” or “fight”.
 Examples:
o “[I challenged] to reminisce on the good times. To take us back to a happy
time.”
o “This is why I brought it up, pretty much for the laughs from the rest of
our friends.”
o “It was just a conversation about our childhood.”

H5. RELATIONSHIP MAINTENANCE [H5]
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their desire
to rebuild or maintain the relationship with another person, either the challenged
party or another third party. In order to receive this code, the participant must
explicitly state that relationship maintenance is partially or entirely at the root of
their motive for challenging (e.g., “I have hope of recreating our friendship”).
 Consult both “how” and “why” responses because context and background
information provided primarily in “how” responses will be crucial to your coding
of this subcategory. If there is contradictory information, prioritize “why” over
“how” responses.
 Specific Codes:
o Code H5a if relationship maintenance is done through manipulation
and/or deception. For example, the participant might lie, omit, or even
blame the challenged party about the event or features of the event in
order to rebuild, maintain, or strengthen the relationship with the
challenged person.
o Code H5b if relationship maintenance is done through any other means
aside from the ones described in H5a. Please make a note of this in the
Excel file.
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Example:
o “[I challenged because] I have hope of re-creating our friendship”
[Example of H5b]
o “How” response: “When I was younger, I borrowed a game from a friend.
I played and highly enjoyed it. Before I could return it the friend moved
and I kept it. Several years later we reconnected with each other. We got
on the topic of the game ad he stated vaguely remembering lending it to
me. I said that it was great and that I returned it right before he moved out
of the state. He shrugged and said “oh, that’s right” and that was it. I’ve
still got the disc sitting in a case on my shelf. “Why” response: “It was
easier to just say that I returned it and continue with the friendship rather
than potentially starting an argument about if I was being a thief.”
[Example of H5a]

(I) INTERNAL MODELS OF SELF & OTHERS
General Notes:
 Internal Models of Self & Others refers to challenges resulting from the
participant’s internal model(s) of themselves/the challenged party/a third party in
terms of qualities, values, characteristics, personality traits, typical behaviors,
preferences, social category, etc.
 Unless otherwise indicated, any mention of “internal models” when coding this
category is always referring to internal models held by the participant
himself/herself.
 As a reminder, in every account, you will find at least 2 players:
o The challenger = the participant.
o The challenged party (aka, the challengee) = the other
 Some accounts may involve the following additional players:
o A third party other = a person who was absent when the challenge took
place but may have been present when the challenged event occurred.
 Challenges prompted by internal models will tend to have an implicit or explicit
assessment of the compatibility between the participant’s internal models and/or
the challenged event (or features of the event). Challenges may involve:
o Disputing the other’s account because the other is deemed to possess
personality traits/tendencies that the participant believes would undermine
the credibility of the challenged event (or features of the event).
o Disputing the other’s account because they are deemed to undermine the
credibility of the challenged event (or features of the event; e.g., by lying,
being in denial, or omitting the truth) only in the context of this challenge.
o Disputing the other’s account and/or perception of a third party person
because it differs substantially from the challenger’s own perception of
this same third party person.
o Disputing the other’s account because doing so is compatible with the
participant’s perception of their own personality characteristics, values,
qualities, preferences, etc.
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o Disputing the other’s account because what the other alleges about the
challenged event (or features of the event) is deemed incompatible with
the participant’s self-concept and their sense of continuity between past
and present self-concepts.

I1. DISPOSITIONAL VIEW OF OTHER
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the
knowledge or belief that the other’s disposition (e.g., their qualities,
characteristics, personality traits/tendencies) undermines their credibility.
 There is an implicit sense in these accounts that the participant has formed an
internal model of the other (i.e., as a “drama queen”) from prior knowledge and is
relying on this model and its associated expectations to now evaluate the
credibility of the other’s account.
 Coding aid:
o Look for statements that refer to tendencies (e.g., “she always …”; he has
a way of…”; “x is a drama queen”) or blanket/sweeping dispositional
statements (e.g., “he is a liar”.)
o Look for dispositional attributes that speak to notions of credibility,
honesty and dishonesty. (e.g., synonyms of: “liar”, “denial”, “exaggerate”,
“drama queen”).
o Participant’s use of present tense verbs to describe the other might also be
indicative of dispositional attributions. Use the context to determine if this
is the case.
o Consult “how” answers and code under this subcategory if dispositional
attributes are found there.
 Examples:
o “[I challenged because] she also had a way of embellishing trifling things
to make them sound more worse than they really are”
o “[I challenged because he is a liar and is constantly full of shit regarding
his stories and memories.”
o “My husband is overly optimistic, and is innocent to a fault.”  Note that
the appraisals are not always negative in nature.

I2. SITUATIONAL VIEW OF OTHER [12]
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the
knowledge or belief that the challenged other is lying, in denial, or untruthful
specifically with regards to the challenged event. In other words, the participant
makes dispositional claims about the challenged other (e.g., x is dishonest, a liar,
in denial…) only in the context of the challenged account.
 There is a sense in these accounts that the participant may be challenging because
the other’s dishonesty in this situation is incompatible with the participant’s own
internal model of the other. Alternatively, or additionally, the challenge may be
rooted in the incompatibility between the participant’s own values of honesty,
truth, etc., vs. the other’s values of honesty, truth, etc.
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Incompatibility between internal models may at times be evident through
expressions of frustration (e.g., “it bothered me that…” or “it was aggravating
that…”).
Examples:
o “I had to bring this event up because it always bothered me why he lied to
me about what he paid for the car”
o “[I challenged because] it was aggravating that she denied [saying that she
was barely making it on a 30k salary when I was complaining of being in
a large amount of student debt yet still managing through it] in that latest
argument.”

I3. DISCREPANT VIEWS OF OTHER
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the belief or
knowledge that their view of another person (either the challenged party or a third
party) is incompatible with the challenged other’s view. The incompatibility may
be around the challenged other’s OR the third party’s behavior(s), thought(s),
reaction(s), characteristic(s) and/or trait(s).
 Specific Codes:
o Code I3a if discrepant view of 3rd party other = the challenger and
challenged other disagree on view of a 3rd party person. In some but not all
cases, the participant may believe that their own internal model of this
third party person is more accurate than the other’s. In some but not all
cases, the participant may perceive the other’s view of this third party
person as distorted or unfair.
o Code I3Bb if discrepant view of challenged other = the challenger and
challenged other disagree on their views of the challenged other. Look for
challenger statements that are directed at the challenged other and take the
form or the spirit of “you are acting differently from what I know of you”
or “you have changed”.
o Code the column labelled I3 as well as I3a OR I3b. If it is not clear, code
only I3.
 Examples:
o I3a: “[I challenged because] I didn't think it was right for her to continue
to blame her sister for things [her sister] was not at fault for”
o I3a: “[I challenged because] she created a memory in her mind that was
not fair to our mother”
o I3a and I3b: “He remembers not being abusive at all to our mother when I
witnessed his emotional and sometimes physical abuse first hand. He now
wants me and everyone else to believe his stories because the truth of the
facts would make him look bad. I feel it is almost my obligation to remind
him that as long as I am around, his lies and version of the truth will
continually be challenged.]…He made some bad things try to disappear by
not admitting what he really did to our Mom…. I don't like the fact that he
tries to sweep all of this negative action under the carpet now that the
person he did it to [Mom] passed away.”
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I4. DISPOSITIONAL VIEW OF SELF [14]
 Participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their perception
of their own dispositional tendencies (e.g., their values, qualities, characteristics,
personality traits and tendencies, preferences, behavior), likes, and/or dislikes.
There is an implicit sense that through the challenge, the participant is reaffirming
or upholding aspects of who they believe they are.
 Participants may claim to challenge because they perceive themselves as:
o Being the kind of person who challenges, argues, disputes or starts fights;
o Being the kind of person who speaks up (or does not back down);
o Being the kind of person who needs to be is right
o Being the kind of person who likes Y or hates X
 This subcategory differs from subcategory #30 below in that participants are NOT
evaluating the compatibility between their past self-concept (as currently
perceived) and their current self-concept (as currently perceived). Rather, their
dispositional statements are expressed as absolute truths about them, with no
explicit evaluative overtones.
 Examples:
o “[I challenged because] I can't stand when something is incorrect. Besides
that, I always feel the need to be right.”
o “[I challenged] because I don't like to be misunderstood, but most
importantly I don't like being lied on.”
o “[I challenged] because I like to argue…”
o “[I challenged because] I generally don't like to back down when I think
I’m right.”

I5. CHANGING VIEW OF SELF [15]
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their desire
to break away from own dispositional tendencies and habits (e.g., their values,
qualities, characteristics, personality traits and tendencies, preferences, behavior).
 There will typically be a clear sense in these accounts that, by challenging, the
participant is behaving differently in this situation from what they typically do.
 Specific Codes
o Code 27a if participant deviates from own dispositional tendencies this
one time = the participant acknowledges that they have always been the
kind of person who X (e.g., does not challenge, does not argue, fights,
does not speak up, speaks up, gets annoyed, likes Y, hates A), but not this
time; this time, they are doing something different.
o Code 27b if participant deviates from own disposition tendencies from
now on = the participant acknowledges that they have always been the
kind of person who X (e.g., does not challenge, does not argue, fights,
does not speak up, speaks up, gets annoyed, hates A), but not anymore;
now on, they will be acting differently.
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o Code the column labelled 27 as well as 27a OR 27b if the participant
states that the change is specific to the challenged event or whether they
intend to act differently now on. If it is not clear whether the change is
temporary or perpetual, code only 27.
Examples:
o “[I challenged because] on that day I got tired of playing along and not
wanting to rock the boat with her.”
o “[I challenged because] I felt like I was standing up for myself by holding
her accountable because I've witnessed others correct her when she does
this and I notice that I have a tendency to just go along with what she says
just to keep the peace.”

I6. CONSISTENT VIEW OF SELF OVER TIME [16]
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their belief
or knowledge that the event or features of the event are inconsistent with how they
currently view themselves. Participant appears to base this belief or knowledge on
an implicit assessment of compatibility & continuity between their past and
present self-concept.
o In other words, participant’s internal models of “past self” and “present
self” do not match.
 For example, the participant might dispute the other’s account by arguing that “it
is unlike me to do X” or “it is not in my character to do Y”.
 Coding aid:
o All challenges coded under this category will include a strongly implied or
explicit assessment of past self & present self.
o Look for statements that explicitly or implicitly refer to: “I’m not like
that!”, “I would never…” or “It is not like me to do/think x…”
 Examples:
o “[I challenged because] I wouldn't have gotten rid of myself because they
had sentimental value to me. “
o “[I challenged because] my husband claimed I had said something that I
didn't. I tried to tell him I would never say something of the sort and told
him why I wouldn't have.”
o “My girlfriend claimed that I had previously agreed to wait until we
owned our own home to buy another car to work on. I [challenged]
because I would never enter into this agreement.”
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(J) SELF-FOCUSED MOTIVES
General Notes:
 Self-focused motives refer to challenges intended to consolidate, preserve,
protect, and/or enhance a sense of “I” and “who I am”.
 These challenges will tend to show all of the following characteristics:
o Consist primarily of an internal, self focus;
o Focus more on the self rather than OR in addition to others.
 If unsure about a code, err towards coding conservatively.

J1. CORRECTING THE EVENT INTERPRETATION
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by a desire to
correct, clear up, or clarify the other’s interpretation of a past event. Stated
otherwise, the participant deems the others’ interpretation of a past event to be
erroneous; the challenge is intended to rectify this interpretation.
 Regardless of how the other is affected by the challenge, it is the participant’s
stated intention to correct the other’s interpretation that matters.
 These challenges differ from subcategory “Correcting Views of Me” below in
that:
o The participant is not explicitly reflecting upon the impression they are
making on the other
o The participant is not explicitly concerned about whether they are being
perceived in a positive light. Rather, their overarching concern is the
stated desire to correct/rectify/clarify the other’s interpretation, not restore
their positive self-image.
 Coding aid:
o Consider both “how” and “why” responses because context and
background information will be crucial to your coding of this subcategory.
o Participant’s use of words like “correct”, “clarify” and/or “clear up” in the
context of interpretations might suggest a Correcting the Event
Interpretation motive.
 Examples:
o “How” response: “When my sister came home for winter break in 2014,
we found a stuffed pink rabbit in the garage along with the other junk.
When I was little I used to cherish this rabbit and hugged and slept with it
every night. My sister thought I just outgrew the rabbit when I stopped
caring about it, but I told her she was the one who made me stopped caring
about the rabbit. I told her that she told me a scary story about stuffed
animals coming to life and killing their owners, and that I got scared and
locked my rabbit in the closet. I even told her the TV show that inspired
her story. My sister said she did not remember telling that scary story at
all, and the look on her face was one of denial.] “Why” response: When
we found the rabbit, the subject about me outgrowing it came up, but I
wanted to correct my sister that that was not the case.”
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o “How” response: “My mom believes I think she is stupid. I don't, but she
will put words in my mouth whenever she tells her friends about our
disagreements. I found out that she had been drinking heavily and was
involved in an affair with a married man, and we got into an argument
over it. After a few weeks, she started to say I had called her "stupid" and
"a whore". I hadn't, and I disagreed with her. My brother was there during
the argument and told me I was right. I didn't say those things. “Why”
response: I wanted to make it very clear that I didn't say that to my
mother. I didn't mention the drinking and cheating to call her stupid or a
whore. I wanted to make it clear that I was just worried about her
behavior.”

J2. CORRECTING VIEWS OF ME
 The participant strongly suggests OR explicitly states that their challenge was
motivated by a desire to correct an unfavourable self-presentation and/or to
establish a favourable self-presentation. In such instances, the participant deems
the other’s recollection to reflect unfavourably upon them; the challenge is
intended to shape the other’s impression of the challenger in more
positive/favourable terms.
 These challenges differ from the coding subcategory “Correcting the Event
Interpretation” in that the participant strongly suggests OR explicitly states being
concerned with how unfavourably or negatively they are being perceived or risk
being perceived by others.
 Coding Aid:
o Strong suggestions of concern regarding one’s self presentation may take
the form of the challenger trying to distance themselves from socially
undesirable qualities, like stupid/ignorant, violent, liar, etc.
o It is possible to code both this and subcategory “Correcting Event
Interpretation” if the participant explicitly articulates both (a) a desire to
correct the other’s interpretation (regardless of how that correction makes
them look), coded under the subcategory above and b) a desire to project a
more favourable self-presentation, coded under this category.
 Examples:
o “[I challenged because the event as told by the other] made me look a little
more violent than I had been.”
o “[I challenged because] it bothered me that she thought of me as a heavy
drinker when I was younger.”
o “[I challenged because] if the incorrect details about me were assumed to
be true, it would be a poor reflection on my character and my personality.”
o “[I challenged because] I didn't want people thinking me and my brother
fight MMA style over stupid things”

J3. PERSONAL NEED TO CORRECT THIS EVENT
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The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by a personal
need for accuracy for the event itself. These challenges will typically involve all
of the following:
o Participant values accuracy regarding the event itself (or event features).
Look for evidence of the participant acknowledging their need for
accuracy through statements like: “I wanted to set the record straight”.
o Participant believes that their own recollection regarding the challenged
event is accurate. This may be implicit or explicit.
o Ensuring that the event is recollected accurately primarily benefits the
participant (i.e., satisfies their need for accuracy).
Coding Aid:
o Look for tell-tale expressions like: “I wanted to set the record straight”, “I
just had to help her remember”, “I wanted to clarify xyz”, “I wanted to
correct him”, “I wanted to let her know she was wrong”, “I wanted the
memory to be correct” to identify a personal need for accuracy.
o Accounts that receive a code under this subcategory could also be coded
under Belief in Accuracy. Only code as “Personal Need to Correct this
Event” instances when the participant strongly implies or explicitly
articulates their own desire/need for an event (or event features) to be
recalled accurately.
o Participant’s statement that they always need to be right or are the kind of
people that like to be right are captured by subcategory “Dispositional
View of Self” and should NOT be coded here.
Examples:
o “[I challenged because] I wanted to make sure the story that I was
listening to was accurate”
o “[I challenged because] but I couldn't justify letting her continue to believe
that my hair was long just for the sake of some laughs. I never had long
hair.”
o [I challenged because] I just had to help her remember.”

J4. SEEKING VALIDATION
 The participant strongly suggests OR explicitly states that their challenge was
motivated by a desire to elicit empathy and/or validation of a past experience.
Specifically, participants challenge because they want the other to:
o Acknowledge and/or take responsibility/admit guilt/wrongdoing regarding
the challenged event.
o Understand the emotional consequences of what happened in the past.
 Coding Aid:
o Look for statements or synonyms of “I wanted X person to understand” or
“I wanted Y person to admit the truth…”
o Challenges involving past trauma and/or abuse will typically be coded
under this subcategory, unless there is good reason not to. Other
challenges (i.e., not involving some kind of trauma or abuse) may also be
coded under this subcategory.
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o Consider both “how” and “why” responses because context and
background information will be crucial to determining the nature of the
challenged event.
Examples:
o “[I challenged because] her version was so far off that it functioned as a
violent denial of the pain we children had experienced at various points in
our childhoods”  Although not explicit, there is a strong implicit
suggestion that the participant challenged because she felt invalidated and
wanted the other to admit [not deny] what happened. The “pain us
children…” here is also strongly suggestive of the desire this participant
demonstrates to be understood at an emotional level.
o “I challenged his memory of it because I just wanted him to admit the
truth,”

J5. SEEKING RECOGNITION
 The participant strongly suggests OR explicitly states that their challenge was
motivated by a desire to be recognized/acknowledged for their role in something
deemed positive, valuable, and/or helpful by both the challenger and the
challenged party.
 In these instances, the participant will typically claim that the other attributed the
challenger’s helpful advice to someone else (e.g., a third party other, the
challenged other). The challenge is intended to rectify this role misattribution and
reinstate the participant as the source of the positive contribution.
 Examples:
o “I challenged the other person's memory because she wanted to claim all
the glory for herself and wasn't giving me any glory that I deserve [for
helping her win money on a scratch card]”
o [“I challenged because] I was upset that he did not [give me] credit for
playing a part in his eventual marriage.”

J6. MANAGING ANTICIPATED OUTCOMES RELATED TO THE SELF
 The participant explicitly states that the challenge was motivated by a desire to
prevent a negative, unfavourable, or unwanted situation from occurring to them
and/or ensure that a positive, favourable, or wanted situation does occur to them.
o Note that it is the participant who decides what is negative, unfavourable,
or unwanted. For example, here’s an instance when ice cream, a
favourable outcome for most people, is nonetheless not considered
wanted: “I challenged it because I wanted to go on that rollercoaster with
my dad. This was the bargain I had been promised, not the ice cream!”
 Examples:
o “I challenged it because I wanted to go on that rollercoaster with my dad.
This was the bargain I had been promised, not the ice cream!”
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o “[I challenged because] I wanted her to keep her promise to me to do
something for me, so when she told me she didn't want to do the thing I
wanted her to do, I was quite upset. I wanted her to fulfill her promise.”
o “[I challenged because] I didn't want to watch the same movie I had
already seen.”

J7. DEFENDING THE SELF
 The participant explicitly states that the challenge was motivated by a need to
protect oneself in response to a strongly implied or explicit threat to the self. In
other words, participants will claim to challenge in self-defence.
 All challenges coded under this subcategory involve an explicit or strongly
suggested threat that has either already occurred or is anticipated to occur. Threats
may be of an emotional or physical nature, or both.
o Emotional threat may involve: feeling or anticipating fear, dread, pain,
hurt, shame
o Physical threat may involve: actual or threatened serious injury or violence
 Most (but not all) challenges coded under this category will contain an explicit
acknowledgment that the challenge itself is a form of self-defence (e.g., “I
defended myself…”).
 Examples:
o “[I challenged because I wanted] to avoid being emotionally and verbally
abused by her.”
o “I challenged the person's memory because they were trying to intimidate
me in the litigation”
o “[I challenged because] I was defending myself”
o “I challenged this particular memory because it is one of the most painful
experiences that I have ever had to endure”

J8. SOCIAL MISCHIEF
 Participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their own
pursuit of fun, thrill, or amusement within an interpersonal relationship. Whether
the challenge itself was viewed as fun or amusing by the challenged other is
irrelevant to this code; only the participant needs to explicitly view the challenge
as fun or amusing in order to receive this code.
 Coding Aid:
o Synonyms of “fun”, “amusing”, and expressions of thrill (e.g., “I want to
see if I could do it”; “just for the thrill of it”, “just for the heck of it”) can
all be used as coding cues.
o Consult both “how” and “why” responses because context and background
information (e.g., as to whether something was done for amusement only,
for example) provided primarily in “how” responses will be crucial to
your coding of this subcategory. If there is contradictory information,
prioritize “why” over “how” responses.
 Examples:
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o “[I challenged because] I wanted to have some fun challenging my sister's
memory because she prides herself in her memory”
o “How” response: “I told my friend he forgot to give me back the 100
dollars I gave him. “Why” response: “[Even though he actually returned
the money owed to me 2 weeks ago, I challenged him about not returning
the money because] I wanted to see if I could do it.”

J9. SOCIAL COMPARISON
 Participant states that their challenge was motivated by one-upmanship – wanting
to show superiority or dominance in a particular area relative to another person.
To receive this code, participants need to explicitly state OR strongly imply that
they are attempting to overly influence or take control of the conversation about
the event itself or event features in order to demonstrate superiority or
dominance.
 Consult both “how” and “why” responses because context and background
information provided primarily in “how” responses will be crucial to your coding
of this subcategory. If there is contradictory information, prioritize “why” over
“how” responses.
 Examples:
o “[I challenged because] I wanted to be able to say I knew more then him,
about the house that we lived in.”
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(K) EMOTIONAL STATES
General Notes:
 Emotional States refers to challenges stemming from participants experiencing
certain emotional states.
 Only code an emotional state that is explicitly stated in the “why” answer. You
may consult the “how” answer for context purposes only.
 If unsure about a code, err towards coding conservatively.

K1. EMOTIONAL STATES
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their
experience of a particular emotional state. Sometimes (but not always)
participants will elaborate on the intensity and/or distress associated with the
emotion state; this provides further evidence of their view that the challenge was
motivated by emotions (e.g., it was the most painful, I had all this anger pent up).
 Code this subcategory anytime an emotional state is used to partly OR entirely
explain the motivation for challenging.
 Coding Aid:
o Only code the participant’s emotions. Do not code how others may be
feeling.
o Sometimes, participants do not take ownerships of their feelings but will
instead speak in third person (e.g., “this friend…has a way of making
people feel bad.” OR “It irritated me that…”). Using the “how” answer as
context, you can code this as a feeling the participant themselves is
experiencing.
o Note the emotional state in the NOTES column in Excel for quick
reference.
o Figure 1 (below) is a non-exhaustive list of adjectives used to describe
commonly encountered emotional states. You may come across adjectives
that are not represented in Figure 1 below.
 Specific Codes.
 Code 38a for Negative Affect/Emotion: This includes but is not confined to
states of sadness, upset, guilt, disgust, shame, anger, hostility, fear, or anxiety.
 Code 38b for Positive Affect/Emotion: This includes but is not confined to
states of interest, confidence (“I’m sure…”), excitement,
strength/empowerment, enthusiasm, inspiration, happiness, surprise, love,
hope, joy, pride, etc.
 Code 38c for Neutral affect/Emotion: This includes but is not confined to
states of indifference, not caring, etc. (“I was indifferent”; “I didn't care”).
o NB: Code 38 if 38a, 38b or 38c are present. If it is not clear, code only 38.
o NB: Code “I’m sure…” under 38b as a synonym to “I’m confident”
(Positive Affect). DO NOT CODE “I knew/know” as an emotional state.
 Examples:
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o “I challenged because it is one of the most painful experiences that I have
ever had to endure.”  Notice the identification of an emotional state,
“painful”, as motivating this challenge. Code under 38a.
o “[I challenged because] I was trying to be honest about what happened in
the past and come clean about something that I had felt guilt over when I
was younger.”  Notice the identification of two emotional states:
“honesty” and “guilt”. The participant feels guilty. By challenging, he
wants to reveal the truth and be honest, but he is not there yet. Code this
under 38a for guilt.
o “[I challenged because] I had all this pent up frustration and anger even
years later and I just finally felt mature enough to call my mom out on it”
 Note the identification of frustration and anger. Code under 38b.
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